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" Venturing to a foreign country can be daunting. The challenge becomes 
compounded when one is attempting to delve into obscure philosophical texts that 
many have relegated to the heap of inconsequential historical labors. But in my 
experience, the transition and subsequent work progressed rather smoothly. This is 
no doubt due to the massive support-cast that ensured my affective disposition 
would never waver. 
" I would be remiss if I did not first thank the University of Dundee and the 
Scottish Overseas Research Award Scheme that funded the great bulk of my 
duration in Scotland. Without this financial support, I would have never begun to 
venture into PhD research. Thank you, a million times over. 
" Within the University of Dundee, the Department of Philosophy carried the 
weight of institutional support. Thank you for making my decision to travel to bonny 
Scotland worth enduring the cold, dark winters. For a Southern California boy, there 
were definitely periods of Seasonal Affective Disorder, but the sunny dispositions and 
stimulating intellectual environment of the department, from top to bottom, injected a 
surge of vitality into my daily habits. Thank you James Williams. Your initial guidance 
set my research trajectory on a path that was both challenging and enlightening. 
Your endless inquisitiveness and attentiveness to minute details gave me vision to 
see cracks and fissures over which other supervisors would have glossed. You may 
not have been around to the see the project to completion, but trust that your 
influence hovers over each page. Ashley Woodward, since you stepped into the role 
of supervisor, you have given me support and guidance every step of the final stages 
of my writing period. With the clock working against me, you remained calm and 
confident. This infectious assurance no doubt impelled me to the finish line. I will be 
forever grateful.  
" My family and friends have always been One to me. I see no ontological 
difference between blood and water. All of those who have affected me in positive 
(and even negative) ways have shepherded me in my life journey. I canʼt possibly 
thank you all. That said, there are those who bear a special significance of intensity 
that must be addressed. Mom, there are literally no words that can describe what 
you mean to me. Our little family is small but our bonds are strong. Like the fastest of 
4
light waves, we are bound together with a great energy. Your smile, your strength, 
your spaghetti – they have given me life throughout the years. Although Iʼm not the 
little towhead anymore, you will always be my ʻmommaʼ. Pop, you are a man of 
integrity. I know your humility will never let you see it, but you are the highest 
standard of a man that I can look to on Earth. Dedication, perseverance, diligence, 
wisdom, critical thinking, and faith – these are the earmarks of an apostle. Thank you 
for your witness. Als ik kan. To my Aunt, your sofa has been a home to me (I know, I 
know, thereʼs the guest room too, but that sofa...). You have been my cultural guide. 
You introduced me to theatre, art museums, and Terminator 2! Thank you for giving 
endlessly of yourself. Even when you were sick, you gave and gave. I finished this in 
large part because of that selflessness. Fran, if pop is a man of integrity, you are the 
reason why. I feel like in every story there is an unsung hero. In mine, youʼre it. You 
live the motto, ʻlove is a verbʼ. And even though pop might be the front man, you are 
clearly the backbone, the time keeper, the drummer. Thank you for your unwavering 
love. I have a clearer idea of ἀγάπη because of you. And Elly, you will forever be a 
punk, but I love you so much. I am excited to continue witnessing your growth into a 
caring and motivated woman. 
" Finally, thank you to all those who provided feedback on the various drafts of 
this thesis, as well as the innumerable influences that have contributed flourishes by 
way of insightful debate and discussion, particularly Scott Gallacher, Matthew Ally, 
Michael Burns, and Brian Smith. And as for Troy Polidori, the time spent at M-dub, 
the three-hour Skype sessions, and your consistent friendship through all the varying 
stages of my continual epistemological crisis have shaped me in more ways than just 




! Jean-Paul Sartreʼs Critique of Dialectical Reason is generally read as a work 
of social ontology and/or normative social theory. The present project proposes that it 
is better to approach CDR as a heuristic, as a formal, logical investigation into the 
elementary formal structures of history. Once the ontological and normative 
hermeneutic is attuned towards a hypo-logical reading, CDR becomes a proto-text of 
critical theory that can aid future theorists in both analyzing material conditions and 
proposing paths for liberatory praxis.
" This thesis is divided into two parts. Part One is an analysis of the key formal, 
logical constructions in Jean-Paul Sartreʼs Critique of Dialectical Reason. Their 
intelligibility is the result of a fresh reading of a text that has been either relatively 
neglected or that has been read within a particular, predefined way. This reading will 
be challenged through an exegetical approach, while also engaging with key figures 
of the standard interpretive approach. The intent is not to smear previous 
interpreters, for this work is heavily indebted to them, but to suggest a slight 
corrective that will enable a hidden richness of this text to be uncovered. At the end 
of Part One, the various modes of “practical ensembles” will be understood by their 
formal, logical, and heuristic value. This will allow us to construct a theory of a logical 
disposition that is being termed an ʻimaginative logic of actionʼ that will resist the 
hegemonic control of seriality.
" Part Two connects these concepts with Sartreʼs early work on the imagination 
and suggests further ways in which such a marriage can be strengthened by 
analyzing select tendencies from recent trends in Continental Philosophy. The result 
is that a renewed understanding of the ʻliving logic of actionʼ in Critique of Dialectical 
Reason emerges as an ʻimaginative logic of actionʼ, whereby the imagination 
becomes a latent, embedded moment of praxis itself in the latter’s perpetual 
recreative active antagonism to serial conditions. By incorporating the imagination 
into Sartre’s living logic of action, two results follow: 1) by further explicating the logic 
of the dynamic power relations that make up social life, a more robust set of 
analytical tools emerge with which novel social and political theory can develop and 
2) by theorizing ways in which such a logic can be deployed in the perpetual 





Are you sorry that young intellectuals donʼt read you any more, that they know you only through false 
ideas of you and your works?
 
Sartre: 
I would say itʼs too bad for me.
Interviewer: 
For you, or for them?
Sartre: 
To tell the truth, for them too. But I think it is just a passing stage.
Interviewer: 
Basically you would agree with the prediction Roland Barthes made recently when he said that you 






1 Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Contat, “Sartre at Seventy: An Interview,” The New York Review of 
Books, originally published August 7, 1975 Issue, accessed June 12, 2016, http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/1975/08/07/sartre-at-seventy-an-interview/.
Introduction – Rediscovering Sartre in a Completely Natural Way
"
" The oft-neglected work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason 
(hereafter CDR), investigates the formal conditions of structural and historical 
anthropology.2 Divided into two volumes, CDR undertakes a formal3 and logical4 
investigation into the historicized a priori conditions of social life.5 Abstractly analyzed 
as heuristic devices, these “elementary formal structures”6 are 1) the result of 
dialectical totalization, 2) the condition(s) of any and all praxis, and 3) the intelligibility 
of what Sartre refers to as ʻpractical ensemblesʼ. Simply stated, in CDR, Sartre is 
seeking to develop a logic for the analysis and creation of new humanisms, 
analyzing what the human is under particular historical and structural conditions, and 
then seeking to provide the necessary tools to envision alternatives. For him, 
dialectical reason is the way to do this. Logic, for Sartre, is not a reformulation of 
thinking ʻfrom a higher standpointʼ à la Hegel. Rather, it is the development of an 
orientation to the world, one that is defined by dialectical reason. 
" Dialectical reason is a form of thinking and acting. It is a particular disposition 
and comportment of thought and action toward material realities. It is 'praxis' 
understood as totalization, which is the human creating from within conditions that 
are not of his/her choosing. It is the intelligibility of history – as constructed by praxis. 
Thus, CDR is at once a criticism of analytical reason and also a criticism of particular 
rationalities within Marxism that are either positivist, totalized, or idealist. In CDR he 
erects a form of rationality that is both structural and historical, but that is purely lived 
10
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason: Volume One, ed. Jonathan Ree, trans. Alan 
Sheridan-Smith (London, Verso, 2004), 69.
3 ʻFormalʼ refers to the many grouped as one. A formal construct is one in which a multiplicity is united 
into a singular category. Critique of Dialectical Reason is a formal investigation in that it seeks to 
encompass the manifold of lived experienced under particular conditions into simple, abstract logical 
notions. These notions are considered formal in that they contain the many in the one; the many are 
not reduced to the one. In this way, the one opens up to the infinite constellation of meanings 
contained within it. These formal notions are historicized a priori. They are both the result and 
condition of dialectical totalization.
4 ʻLogicʼ in the language of CDR means ʻdialectical intelligibilityʼ. While it is related to dialectical 
reason, the terms are not interchangeable. Chapter One will elaborate further on Sartreʼs deployment 
of dialectical reason in its self-referential founding and movement and will elaborate on in what sense 
ʻlogicʼ is to be understood in this project. 
5 Sartre, CDR, 11. 
6 ibid., 818. 
(le vécu). Thus, dialectical reason is a living logic of action. In his words, “[It) appears 
in the course of praxis as a necessary moment of it; in other words, it is created 
anew in each action (though actions arise only on the basis of a world entirely 
constituted by the dialectical praxis of the past) and becomes a theoretical and 
practical method when action in the course of development begins to give an 
explanation of itself.”7 The meaning of this will become clearer as this project 
unfolds. 
" Through his analysis, Sartre develops a series of abstract terms that serve as 
points of departure in which complex and concrete analyses can subsequently take 
place. The most notable of these terms for present purposes are 1) praxis, 2) 
seriality, and 3) the group. 
" Praxis is how Sartre characterized facticity as the entirety of material human 
existence in a Marxian fashion – identifying the human with labour: “[The] truth of a 
man is the nature of his work... But, this truth defines him just insofar as he 
constantly goes beyond it in his practical activity.”8 This latter experience of one 
working, being defined by her work, and surpassing her situation is what Sartre 
would call one’s ʻpraxis-projectʼ. It is the essential identity marker of human 
existence. That said, we must distinguish Sartreʼs use of ʻworkʼ here from wage-
labor. Sure, this is part of oneʼs praxis-project, but by speaking about man ʻconstantly 
[going] beyond [this truth] in his practical activity' he is expanding on his earlier 
notions about the transcending nature of consciousness. To reduce praxis to wage-
labor is to miss the robustness of Sartreʼs reconceptualization of subjectivity as a 
system of interiority. The latter encompasses the entirety of embodied and 
embedded human activity – "practical activity" – into his redefined understanding of 
ʻmanʼ in CDR. Part of the reason seriality is alienating is because it reduces the 
human to a player mediated by market relations. This is precisely one reason the 
apocalypse has a transformative effect on subjectivity – it reconstitutes the human, in 
his/her praxis, as something other than a node in the swirling mediacy of market 
sociality. Thus, to speak of ʻmanʼ merely in terms of wage-labor would be to reduce 
11
7 Sartre, CDR, 38.
8 Jean-Paul Sartre, Search For a Method, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), 93.
praxis to a serial logic. And while praxis can be understood as anti-praxis, this mode 
of praxis is only expressed under conditions of seriality.9
" Praxis is also how Sartre would redefine his notion of freedom. Eschewing 
voluntarist ideas of freedom being related to one’s capacity to choose within a given 
context, praxis defines the human in her persistent overcoming of the scarce 
material reality in which one finds herself thrown at each moment. Freedom is thus 
understood as interiorizing the milieu of scarcity (i.e. negating it) while at the same 
time re-exteriorizing a new condition, from objectification to objectification, that itself 
can be taken up in a new interiorization. The result is a concrete notion of dialectical 
movement that is firmly rooted in the activity of human beings in material conditions. 
In other words, the dialectic, for Sartre, is just that movement of human beings as 
they overcome their present situation in seeking to satisfy a need.
" However, a problem arises: since material conditions under capitalist 
hegemony are characterized by scarcity, the dialectic is marred by seriality. Seriality 
is the result of scarce material conditions mediating human relations, causing 
conflict, competition, violence, and radical alterity. As persons within collectives are 
united externally by shared objects in the milieu of scarcity, they are deemed 
inessential in the service of the goal of the collective or institution which is given 
essential status. Sociality, under the conditions of seriality, is therefore perpetually 
embattled in a field of subjective and objective conflict. For Sartre, political parties 
themselves exhibit the force of seriality over their members by instituting a serial 
logic by which the individual members of the party would take it up as their ‘own’ and 
then live it. This adoption of the institutional logic and then expression of it as one’s 
own is understood as the self-domestication of the human. It is not truly a free act, as 
the adopted logic was pre-destined by the pre- existent institution. Therefore, the 
persons adopting such a logic are trapped within the serial conditions of the 
institution. 
" All is not lost though. When the pressures of this serial entrapment are felt 
deeply, an irruption of freedom bursts forth. This is the apocalyptic moment for 
Sartre, and out of this Event a group-in-fusion emerges, uniting people in a common 
action in their shared antagonism to the impossibility of living under serial conditions 
any longer. This notion of the group-in-fusion is where Alain Badiou derives his 
12
9 This will be elaborated in Chapters 4, 5, and 7. 
notion of the Event.10 And like Badiou’s later formulation, a space is opened in Being 
that allows for the recreation of political subjectivity itself. Whereas under serial 
conditions, people are ‘inhuman’ and marked by alterity, conflict, and competition, 
once the freedom of the fused group irrupts, new humanisms are created. 
Unfortunately, the affective power of the Event only lasts an instant and the group 
settles once again back into seriality. But this new situation is not just a fall back into 
the previous condition, for the people have been changed. They have experienced 
freedom and their subjectivities have been re-constituted. They are now a new 
people.
" It is generally assumed that Sartre was unconcerned with complexes of 
mediation and relationality, and that ultimately Sartre was a theorist of the Cartesian 
individualist tradition unable to provide viable ideas for social or political life. Thinkers 
like Raymond Aron, Lévi-Strauss, Wilfrid Desan, and even Thomas Flynn all place 
Sartre in this camp.11 They claim, to different extents, that Sartreʼs later work is still 
trapped within the individualist paradigm that he established in his early existentialist 
writings. This has been the dominant mode of reception of CDR. They see it as a 
work of individualism seeking to vindicate itself in the social realm, or, in Flynnʼs 
case, as a social ontology that gives primacy to individual praxis and which lacks “an 
ontology of relations.”1213 According to Edouard Morot-Sir, CDRʼs effort to provide a 
novel social theory fails catastrophically, for as he states, “la mariée est trop belle.”14 
13
10 Alain Badiou, interview with Emmanuel Barot, “Entretien avec Alain Badiou, par Emmanuel Barot,” 
in Sartre et le Marxisme, ed. Emmanuel Barot (Paris, La Dispute, 2011): “I must say that in effect [my] 
notion of event finds its genesis... in the descriptions of the group-in-fusion, and particularly all the 
episodes of the French Revolution interpreted by Sartre in this way.”
11 Although Flynn is one of the most astute early readers of CDR, his emphasis on individual praxis in 
CDR ultimately places his reading into the Cartesian camp with the majority of readers. He does, 
however, contribute valuably to the text as a whole, and he will be mostly referred to favorably 
throughout this project. 
12 Thomas Flynn, Sartre and Marxist Existentialism (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984) 206.
13 Against this view, it could be argued that CDR is only concerned with an ontology of relations, 
insofar as an ontology can be derived from the formal, logical investigation. That is, the shift in CDR 
from his earlier work takes place precisely under a rubric of social mediation. This social mediation 
can only be understood as relational. In other words, what Sartre assumes, not so much develops, is 
an ecology of material relations between (in)humans and the material field in which they live and 
create. For this reading, see Matthew Ally, Ecology and Existence: Bringing Sartre to the Waterʼs 
Edge (Lantham, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2017).
14 Edouard Morot-Sir, “Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 22, 
No. 4 (1961): 575
In other words, Sartreʼs attempt to wed together ʻmethodological individualismʼ with 
any meaningful social theory is nothing but a fanciful endeavor.15 
" Against the dominant mode of CDR reception, this project will show that 
Sartre is a theorist who bridges the gap between many modernist and postmodernist 
concerns. Following the work of Christina Howells, Nik Farrell Fox, and Elizabeth  
Butterfield, this project views CDR as providing a transition from simplistic, modernist 
political readings that tout the centrality of the pre-constituted subject, to postmodern 
concerns with the dispersal of power relations that condition subjective constitution, 
structural institutional potency, and the relations between the two. 
" In a sense, the true potency of CDR has yet to be mined. Rather than 
establishing a social ontology or set of normative models that can aid in the 
construction of social life, CDR is a work of logic. That is, CDR investigates the 
formal, logical conditions of social life in its various forms (collectives, groups, 
organizations, institutions, classes, political parties, etc.) in order to make their 
emergence and functionality intelligible. As he makes explicit, the dialectic is “the 
living logic of action.”16 The result is not to suggest which groupings are superior. 
Instead, Sartre wants to equip future theorists with a foundational logical disposition 
that will aid further investigation into the mechanisms that drive anthropological 
14
15 It must be acknowledged that the history of Sartre reception is far more complex than merely 
drawing a line between individualism and social theory. In Being and Nothingness (BN), Sartre does 
explore inter-subjective relations. In fact, the mode ʻbeing-for-othersʼ is a term that necessarily 
denotes the relationality of lived experience. It also must be noted that the three modes of being (in-
itself, for-itself, and for-others) are abstractions that in lived experience co-inhere within embodied 
existence. This means that there are no pure ʻfor-itselfsʼ walking around. Rather, Sartreʼs investigation 
was to unveil the truth of phenomenological ontology as it is expressed in its various modes. And he 
did this by investigating what he formulates as the three basic modes of existential phenomenological 
being. The problem in BN is that his investigation ends up diminishing the possibility for any lasting or 
valuable inter-subjective relations. He does discuss the ʻus-objectʼ and ʻwe-subjectʼ as modes of 
social being-together. However, both of these terms end up deficient. The we-subject is the term given 
the most positive treatment of the intersubjective modes. However, the we-subject is merely a 
temporary state where individuals suspend their individual freedom for a single purpose. And even 
while this might seem a useful way of being together, there is always suspicion that the Other will 
betray your confidence and depart from the task, and of course inevitably it is only a short-lived 
positive relation because once the task is complete, there is no longer any union of interests. CDR 
signals a shift in that Sartre develops a genuine understanding of the conditions of free social 
ensembles. It might be argued that CDR takes the concept of the ʻwe-subjectʼ and expands it, seeking 
to make the conditions under which this mode of being together might be made intelligible (as it does 
have a lot of resonance with his group logic in CDR). However, this is a claim that is outside the scope 
of the present project. The point here is merely to note that although Sartreʼs ontology in his earlier 
writings is far more complex than a crude Cartesian accusation would suppose, it is also the case that 
he is often lumped into this category; and I would even argue that there is often a residue of this 
interpretation in even the most sympathetic of CDR readers. 
16 Sartre, CDR, 38. 
history. In his words, “If our critical investigation actually yields positive results, we 
shall have established a priori – and not, as the Marxists think they have done, a 
posteriori – the heuristic value of the dialectical method when applied to the human 
sciences, and the necessity... of reinserting it within the developing totalisation and 
understanding it on this basis.”17 This is why he refers to CDR as a “prolegomena to 
any future anthropology.”18
" Once this hypo-logical reading of CDR has been articulated, the investigation 
turns to creation and reconstruction. After establishing the above reading, we will 
pick up precisely where Sartre stopped in his investigation in Volume One. This will 
be pursued in two ways: 1) by further explicating the logic of the dynamic power 
relations that make up social life and 2) by theorizing ways in which such a logic can 
be deployed in the perpetual transformation of life. In light of this, the two most 
pressing political concerns of this project will be 1) micro-political and 2) macro-
political. The micro-political concerns will regard the logic of subjective constitution 
and horizontal political action. The macro-political concerns will focus on the logic of 
transforming structural and systemic power relations.
" There have been many theorists in recent years who have sought to think ʻthe 
peopleʼ (such as Enrique Dussel and Alain Badiou) or against a notion of the people 
(ex. Hardt and Negri) in order to empower global political liberatory praxis. Micro-
political theorists (ex. William Connolly and Todd May) are less concerned with large-
scale political endeavors, favoring instead horizontal and local political disruptions/
transformations. What I endeavor to demonstrate are the ways in which both micro- 
and macro-political concerns are crucial in the development of an imaginative 
disposition that seeks the transformation of the human in the creation of new social 
and political ensembles.
" Therefore, the first half of the thesis is a creative but thoroughly exegetical 
reading of the formal constructions that Sartre develops in CDR, paying particular 
attention to praxis, seriality, and the group. The second half of the thesis explores the 
deployment of these notions in conjunction with Sartreʼs early work on the 
imagination. Guiding this section is the claim that Sartre unwittingly develops a 
theory of praxis in CDR that presupposes his earlier work on the imagination, and 
15
17 Sartre, CDR, 66.
18 ibid., 66. 
that this earlier work in fact supplements how praxis ought to be understood in CDR. 
The result is that a renewed understanding of the ʻliving logic of actionʼ in CDR 
emerges as an imaginative logic of action. With the latter, imagination becomes a 
latent, embedded moment of praxis itself in the latterʼs perpetual recreative, active 
antagonism to serial conditions. By incorporating the imagination into Sartreʼs living 
logic of action, two results follow: 1) by further explicating the logic of the dynamic 
power relations that make up social life, a more robust set of analytical tools emerge 
with which novel social and political theory can develop and 2) by theorizing ways in 
which such a logic can be deployed in the perpetual transformation of life, a creative, 
forward-looking, utopic thought is developed. This will be done primarily through a 
creative exegesis of Critique of Dialectical Reason: Volume One, as well as key 
secondary texts that have engaged with Sartreʼs mature political thought. There will 
be appeals to Sartreʼs other works as well, insofar as these resources either clarify 
the terms contained in CDR or develop related notions that contribute to the 
overarching development of the logical project of CDR. 
" At the outset, it is imperative to note that this present project will primarily 
focus on Volume One of CDR. Volume Two is a valuable text for fleshing out the 
project that was begun in Volume One. However, it is of secondary importance for 
two reasons. First, Sartre himself abandoned the project. The reasons for this are 
subject to speculation. For example, Robert Bernasconi insightfully argues that 
Sartre left the project of Volume Two to those who were better equipped to address 
the meaning of history, namely the colonized.19 Frederic Jameson suggests that 
existentialismʼs passing popularity in light of the rise of structuralism, its 
transdisciplinary generality, and its “notorious stylistic difficulty” have made it the 
critical target of all manner of philosophers, social scientists, historians, and political 
theorists.20 Sartre himself would later state that he believed CDR was ʻtoo idealisticʼ 
and wanted to engage in projects that were squarely concrete. Hence his move 
towards the massive biographical-historical work on Flaubert. Whatever the reasons, 
what matters for the aims of this project is that Volume Two is an incomplete bundle 
of writings that were not intended to be published, and as such, they will be treated 
16
19 Robert Bernasconi, “Fanonʼs The Wretched of the Earth as the Fulfillment of Sartreʼs Critique of 
Dialectical Reason,” Sartre Studies International Volume 16, Issue 2 (2010).
20 Frederic Jameson, ‘Forward’ in Sartre, CDR, xiii-xvi.
with a sense of caution so as to not risk overvaluing ideas that Sartre himself did not 
take public. 
" The second reason Volume Two is of secondary importance for the present 
project, and more importantly, is that Volume One sets the logical framework for 
future investigation into history. He needed to explore the historical and structural 
conditions of social ensembles by establishing a living logic of action through his 
analysis of the logic of dialectical reason before he could proceed to investigate the 
single meaning of history. Without getting too ahead of ourselves, on the penultimate 
page of Volume One, reflecting on the investigation up to that point, Sartre remarks,
If History really is to be the totalisation of all practical multiplicities and of all 
their struggles, the complex products of the conflicts and collaborations of 
these very diverse multiplicities must themselves be intelligible in their 
synthetic reality, that is to say, they must be comprehensible as the synthetic 
products of a totalitarian praxis.21
Making the logic of these ʻsynthetic productsʼ intelligible through a fresh reading of 
Volume One is thus our primary concern. There will be references to Volume Two, 
but only insofar as they serve this end. As such, the theoretical paradigm he 
establishes in Volume One is the stage on which this present investigation plays out. 
That means that Volume One will not only serve as the primary exegetical source, 
but it will also frame the form of the investigation proper. And despite the difficulties 
of the verbose language, as Jameson states, “with a little practice its rhythms fall into 
place.”22
" By the end, through such an analysis, we will have developed new tools with 
which future theorists can undertake abstract analyses of social ensembles and their 
historical and material effects, and activists will be equipped with a logical disposition 
that will aid them in proposing local action and large-scale policy. This will require 
both the analysis of real, concrete material conditions and an indomitable creative 
imaginative spirit. Without the former, politics is nothing but idealistic utopianism. 
Without a creative imaginative spirit, politics rests in a conservative self-perpetuation. 
By bringing them both together, we develop the necessary tools to resist stasis, 
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develop sensitivities to the ever-emerging concerns of social and political 
communities, and remain optimistic in our abilities to perpetually recreate our worlds. 
" Sartre stated that if his investigation in CDR accomplished nothing more than 
enabling him “to define the problem, by means of provisional remarks which are 
there to be challenged and modified, and if they give rise to a discussion and if, as 
would be best, this discussion is carried on collectively in working groups, then I shall 
be satisfied.”23 Following the path laid by Sartre, the present project seeks to take 
this mantle, expand it further, and lay it at the feet of future groups, with the hope that 
further development of this investigation will lead to 1) a reintroduction and 
expansion of CDR scholarship and 2) a set of fluid practical devices that can be 
employed in future socio-political activities. 
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Part One: 
The Living Logic of Action in Critique of Dialectical Reason
I.  Dialectical Reason and the Paradoxico-Critical Orientation of Thought
" Prior to developing a fresh reading of CDR, it will be crucial to orient our 
practice so we can decode some of the ʻrhythmsʼ of the text. Sartreʼs use of 
particular terms may, at times, seem novel or even obscurantist.24 However, although 
he does not always signal to whom, his arguments arise out of contextual concerns 
within the Marxian tradition. Viewing himself as a Marxian ideologist rather than a 
philosopher proper,25 Sartreʼs entire move is to work within the Marxian historical 
paradigm and to clarify and/or correct certain tendencies that gained ascendency. 
Most forcefully, Sartre argues that if Marxism is to have sustained value it must found 
itself. In the opening pages of CDR, he states, “The totalising thought of historical 
materialism has established everything except its own existence... [We] do not know 
what it means for a Marxist historian to speak the truth.”26 Therefore, establishing 
itself in dialectical intelligibility becomes the task for Sartre. That is, in what way is 
the dialectic both method and movement? And how is this to be understood if we are 
to claim that there is a single meaning to History? The task in Volume One thus 
becomes less about understanding that truth per se than about discovering and 
grounding how to speak that truth in the first instance. This, at least, is where he 
begins. Not seeing himself as a Marxist historian, Sartre intends to investigate the 
philosophical foundations of anthropological history that will reveal the intelligibility of 
the dialectic itself. He refers to this as the “unveiling of being” and the establishment 
of the “validity of this unveiling.”27
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1.1 The Unveiling of Being: The Separation of Logos from Mythos
" How are we to understand what Sartre means by the “unveiling of being”? For 
this, it would be useful to turn briefly to the history of a debate surrounding 
Rationality itself in order to situate the Sartrean project.28 Historian Martin Jay has 
charted the developing notion of ʻreasonʼ from ancient Greece up through the 
Frankfurt School criticisms of formal and instrumental reason. What is sometimes 
termed ʻthe Greek Miracleʼ, Jay explains how the unfolding elaboration of reason 
must be understood within the context of the separation of logos from mythos.29 This 
is not to suppose that there was a decisive split between all the tendencies of the 
two, but to suggest that a shift was initiated that would chart the path of two 
dispositions to the world. The mythological disposition is characterized by narrative, 
allegory, and metaphor, whereas logos depends “on impersonal discursive 
argumentation and inferential deduction to generate not only meanings but also 
knowledge.”30 There is a sense in the autonomous development of logos that bore a 
special relation to the world, one that was able to access deeper truths, or even truth 
in-itself. 
" Sometimes reducible to language as such,31 the separation of logos from 
mythos implies certain metaphysical tendencies. Jay refers to the deepening relation 
between autonomous logos and reality as developing a metaphysical sense of 
Reason. That is, logos develops a perfect metalanguage that “seeks the singular 
meaning of ʻthe wordʼ and claims it can be entirely adequate to whatever it 
references in the world (or beyond it).”32 This adequacy is due to the fact that 
Reason itself, as logos, expresses itself through particular instantiations or 
articulations. This disposition could be termed the Greco-Christian orientation. 
" Plato uses the word methexis, or participation, to explain the relation between 
the Forms and the many. Aristotleʼs charge was that Plato was merely a 
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Pythagorean who unsubstantively changed the idea of mimesis to methexis. Usually 
rendered ʻimitationʼ, Gadamer suggests that mimesis is better read as ʻre-
presentationʼ.33 The significance in the shift, then, from mimesis to methexis in Plato 
is that methexis implies a taking part. Not just re-presenting the thing, but taking part 
in the thing. With regard to the Forms, there is thus a sense in which the many take 
part in the universal. Neoplatonic philosophers, particularly Plotinus and Pseuedo-
Dionysus, would expand on this further by creating hierarchies of participatory Being 
that emanate from the One through the various expressions of itself in the many (and 
then a reversion as well back into the One). While Plato did not develop a system of 
hierarchical Being based on participatory metaphysics, the example highlights how 
methexis implies a shared ontological status. For Plato, the emphasis on methexis 
as opposed to mimesis was on how the many could take part when taking part. 
" Although Aristotle was right to point out the shift from mimesis to methexis, 
this alteration is not merely rhetorical. Rather, as Gadamer notes, the emphasis 
initiates the “Socratic-Platonic ground which Plato entered with the flight into the 
logoi and which he introduced to the world with the name ʻdialecticʼ.”34 When 
mimesis is employed, it is understood that there is an ontological distance 
maintained between the thing and its representation. However, methexis is a wholly 
formal relationship of participatory mutuality. It “implies that one thing is there 
together with something else.”35 And this ontological participatory mutuality opens up  
the space for logos and dialectic (in the Platonic sense) to reason both towards and 
in participation with the Forms. 
" The Christian tradition elevated the significance of logos even further. In the 
Gospel of John, we read that, “In the beginning was the logos, and the logos was 
with God, and the logos was God.” The opening words, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, view 
the logos not only as being a discourse but as being the very foundation, the arche, 
of the world. This logos is that through which everything in the world came to be. And 
as we know from Genesis 1, of which John 1 is an intentional retread, God spoke the 
world into existence. Thus, there is a sense in which logos carries connotations of 1) 
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discourse and language, 2) invocation or the call and 3) the grounds by which points 
1 and 2 are expressed. For Christianity, this expression is the self-revelation of God 
in the person of Jesus, the Messiah. In verse 14 of John we read that this logos 
“became flesh and dwelt among us.” This inbreaking of the transcendent into the 
immanent is the unveiling of the very being of the ground of reality itself – logos 
showing itself through logos. This is not to claim that the Christian use of logos is 
devoid of mythos. On the contrary, the intimate relation between the two can hardly 
be separated at this point. However, what this does indicate is that there was a 
decisive intent to imbue logos with a special relation to Truth: it is both the ground of 
truth and that which makes truth known. 
" If logos, for Plato, was enabled by methexis, the shift in the early Christian 
tradition can be said to be one in which the very thing about which logos reasons is 
the logos in which it participates. What this ultimately means is that there is a sense 
in which the world is rational. It can be known. And in a way, it is meant to be known. 
For Plato, knowing that which is rational comes through dialogue, philosophy, and 
tending towards the Forms in life as one who most closely approaches death. For 
Christianity, it mostly comes through right doxa, believing in the logos who mediates 
our relation to the logos. However, because of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the 
capacity for right doxa is universally enabled by logos itself. The primary point for 
both is that ultimately Reality is rational in se. Later thinkers as historically separated 
as Avicenna, Aquinas, and Leibniz would echo this Greco-Christian sentiment, albeit 
in their own ways, by maintaining that reality itself is always already rational and 
perfect.36 What is more, this metaphysical understanding of Reason carries certain 
demands with it. As Seneca declared, “Virtue is nothing other than right reason.”37 
Thus, there is also an ethical dimension that is embedded within the metaphysical 
idea of Reason. Not only is Reality rational, but it can and ought to be known.
" However, as Max Weber would come to show, the formalization of logos as 
distinct from mythos and unique in its capacity to speak Reality led to the expansion 
of a particular type of Western rationalization that he examined in its categorial 
variations. Distinguishing between many subvariants of rationality, Weber was mostly 
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concerned that instrumental reason “was becoming disembedded, that ongoing 
rationalization had produced a cold instrumentality largely devoid of spirit.”38 The 
disenchantment of the world through the expansion of technical capitalism in 
Weberʼs eyes is the fulcrum point at which mythos and logos became entirely 
distinct. The triumph of instrumental reason, therefore, maintained the metaphysics 
of the Greco-Christian notion of Reason but completely discarded any ethical 
dimension that was implicit in the participatory ontology of Plato or the logocentrism 
of Christianity. Commenting on the negative implications of instrumental reason for 
Weber, Jay notes that the “momentum of technological rationalization, the imperative 
to develop new technical tools whose ends were uncertain [was] an expansion 
whose inexorable power to shape our lives seemed to recognize no limits.”39 
" This endless expansion of instrumental reason would lead the first generation 
of the Frankfurt School theorists to wage an all-out war against the very division 
between logos and mythos that led to this cold rationalization of Reason. Although 
not the primary point of the present project, situating Sartreʼs CDR within this 
trajectory demonstrates its validity as a proto-text of critical theory. To large extent, 
CDR can be read as a forerunner to many of the concerns that the Frankfurt School 
would take up. While the latter engaged in more detail, and more explicitly, with 
instrumental reason, they are nevertheless part of the same family of concern as 
Sartre. 
" This ʻfamily of concernʼ revolves around the status of Reason as such. 
Though the first generation of the Frankfurt School theorists can hardly be 
characterized as dogmatic rationalists, they do share a sense with Greco-Christian 
notions of Reason that Reason is objective. That is, that Reason somehow exists in 
the world and is knowable, or at least that it could be.40 While Sartre would not be 
comfortable with the axiom, ʻReason is objectiveʼ, his investigation in CDR was to 
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make the “rational structure of Being intelligible.”41 And by this ʻrational structure of 
Beingʼ he means the dialectic. 
" The real is rational for Sartre. However, to understand his divergence with 
metaphysical conceptions of Rationality and to signal the differences between his 
own ideas from the Frankfurt School, one has to understand his debate with Lukács 
pertaining to totality.42 
1.2 The Unveiling of Being: Totality and Totalization
" In Search for a Method (SM), Sartre sets out to develop the grounds of a 
ʻphilosophical anthropologyʼ. He argues that the “existing tools and methods of the 
natural sciences, of traditional sociology and anthropology, are not adequate. What 
is needed is a new kind of Reason.”43 What is meant by ʻReasonʼ is the totalizing 
historical relation between Being and knowing: the dialectic. This new kind of 
Reason would eschew the problems that he identifies within the Marxian tradition 
and its efforts to ground its thinking of the world in totality. In CDR, Sartre would 
focus his criticism on positivist/analytical reason and the dialectic of nature. In SM, 
his concern was with what he saw as the enclosed totalized thought represented in 
the ideas of Lukács and articulated by the dogmatism of the U.S.S.R..44 According to 
Sartre, Lukács and the U.S.S.R. were dispositionally blind to the individual and 
variant concerns of the proletariat. For Sartre, “Marxism stopped.”45 It had run into a 
limit that required a re-examination and correction. In his mind, this ʻstopʼ could be 
most clearly seen in the encircling totality of the U.S.S.R. as the party leaders 
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“reserved for themselves the right to define the line and to interpret the event.”46 It is 
worth noting that the historical event that sparked Sartreʼs ire towards the Soviet 
Union and that raised his suspicion toward the orthodox Marxism of the mid 1950s 
was the U.S.S.R.ʼs invasion of Hungary in 1956. Writing for LʼExpress in November 
after the invasion of Budapest, Sartre wrote: 
I completely and unreservedly condemn Soviet aggression. Without blaming 
the Russian people, I repeat that their present government committed a crime. 
[... All] the crimes of history are forgotten, we have forgotten ours, and the 
other nations will forget them little by little. There may come a time when one 
will forget that of the USSR if its government changes and if newcomers try to 
apply truly the principle of equality in relations between socialist nations or 
not. For now, there is nothing else to do but condemn. I reluctantly, but 
entirely, break my relations with my friends, the Soviet writers, who do not 
denounce (or deny) the massacre in Hungary. We can no longer have 
friendship for the ruling faction of the Soviet bureaucracy: horror dominates.47
This ʻhorrorʼ led to his break with the PCF, as they would not waver in their support of 
Stalin: “It is and will be impossible to reestablish any sort of contact with the men 
who are currently at the head of the [French Communist Party]. Each sentence they 
utter, each action they take is the culmination of 30 years of lies and sclerosis.”48 
This seemed to indicate that there was a dogmatic rigidity that characterized a 
particular disposition of Marxism, one that he believed needed to be overcome if 
historical materialism were to remain unscathed from the (rightful) criticisms directed 
toward the Soviet Union in light of their unethical invasion of Hungary. Not 
maintaining any sensitivity to potential truths that would disrupt party dogmatism, 
Marxism was trapped in a reproduction of mediated and self-legitimized totality. 
" Lukács was Sartreʼs target as the source of this dispositional totality because, 
as Jay notes, “Lukácsʼ faith [was] in a wholeness yet to be achieved.”49 As Sartre 
read him, Lukács articulated a fixed telos in which class consciousness would merge 
with Being. Therefore, the future, fixed end of history was already charted. It was 
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merely humanityʼs job – or the partyʼs job – to realize it at whatever cost. This 
immunized the party from any form of criticism, internal or otherwise. For, as the 
possessors of truth, the dogma of the party, the dogma conditioned by totality, 
ensured their legitimacy. The individual components or any potential dissonance 
must therefore submit to the overall “Hegelian idea... which creates for itself its own 
instruments.”50 Instead of this form of subsumption to a transcendent totality-to-
come, Sartre proposed to discover a type of reason that would entail a 
comprehensive study of the complex and variegating manifold of historical forces. 
For him, this meant the irreducibility of concrete subjectivity and objectivity. Or as 
Pietro Chiodi remarks, “Sartreʼs philosophy became not that of the individual but of 
the whole, in the sense of being the problem of a totality in which the individual finds 
himself placed within the perspective of the totalized, while yet preserving his own 
particularity as totalizing existent.”51 
" A fuller investigation into the distinction between totality and totalization would 
receive treatment in CDR. But at the time of SM, Sartre was primarily concerned with 
the Stalinist writings of Lukács from the 1930s and 1940s that he believed valorized 
closed totality over open-ended totalizations.52 This is because the totality of Lukács 
needed to be understood as the paradigmatic orientation of a Marxism in need of 
supplementation. Further to this, it could be argued that what Sartre identified in 
Lukács was precisely a theory of seriality. Termed “objective possibility,” Lukács 
related consciousness to the whole of society which in turn 
makes it possible to infer the thoughts and feelings which men would have in 
a particular situation if they were able to assess both it and the interests 
arising from it in their impact on immediate action and on the whole structure 
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of society. That is to say, it would be possible to infer the thoughts and 
feelings appropriate to their objective situation.53
This ʻimputationʼ of class consciousness is a forcing of class interests onto the 
manifold. By giving the proletariat a means for apprehending society from within, 
Lukács believed that class consciousness reconciled the division between theory 
and praxis. Merleau-Ponty subsequently praised Lukács for defending a “Marxism 
that incorporates subjectivity into history without making it its epiphenomenon.”54 But 
Sartre would only see this incorporation of subjectivity as an embrace that smothers. 
Even though his thought developed to an orientation that could be more intensely 
classified as totalized totality, the early writings of Lukács would not have escaped 
Sartreʼs criticism precisely because, for Sartre, “there could be no original meta-
subject who created history, forgot its original creative act through the mystifying 
effects of reification, and then would regain it in the revolutionary act of becoming 
both subject and object of the whole.”55 In other words, the future totality-to-come for 
Lukács would always be a transcendent analogon, a practico-inert correlative of the 
imagination that limits and demands how life is to be lived by mediating social 
relations, even among the proletariat, through inertia. 
" Class consciousness is an external norm that is always to be attained. It is a 
reified horizon that ultimately alienates those who it is supposed to motivate towards 
liberation. This means that totality is a possibility that is to be actualized; hence 
Sartreʼs reference to Lukácsʼ argument as an “idealist dialectics.”56 What he means 
is that the law of the dialectic is not found in the materiality of subjectivity and its 
mediated relation with the conditions into which it is thrown, but in the future image 
that is posited as the possibility of proletarian actualization. An Aristotelean schema 
of potential and act can be detected here; one that requires a notion of a formal 
cause that Sartre would reject. For Aristotle, an essence is assumed by the formal 
cause. As Kant explains, “Essence is the first inner principle of all that belongs to the 
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possibility of a thing.”57 Thus, the essence of the actual is already contained in the 
possible, which means that the real is given only mediatory status insofar as it is 
already prefigured by its essence contained in the possible. Therefore, Lukácsʼ 
totality mediates any present practical ensemble by pulling them towards that fixed, 
prefigured future possible. Regardless of its makeup, regardless of its complexity or 
variation, any proletarian practical ensemble would therefore be, in Sartreʼs terms, 
anti-dialectical insofar as they are conditioned by seriality. 
" This does not mean, however, that Sartre rejects entirely the Hegelian or 
Marxian notion of a future whole. While he may not project a future Rationality that 
mediates the present and pulls it towards the essence of its actualization, he would 
agree that the world both is and is not rational, and that through dialectical reason it 
could be in the process of becoming more rational. However, the unveiling of being 
does not refer to either a past notion that needs to be remembered (á la Heidegger) 
nor to a future totality that is to be realized (á la Lukács). Instead, Sartre puts forth 
his idea of totalization as a system of interiority.
" In a series of lectures given in Rome shortly after the publication of CDR, 
Sartre explains this system of interiority in mereological terms. Again targeting 
Lukács, someone potentially “damaging for the development of Marxist studies,” 
Sartre explains that his concern is primarily that of “subjectivity, or subjectivation, and 
objectivity or objectivation.”58 What he means by this will become clear. But he 
makes it a point at the outset to note that he is not referring to “subject and object.” 
He continues by saying, “The subject is a different, far more complex problem.”59 
This is a problem that the present thesis will work through in Part One in our 
elaboration of the logic of the group and then in Part Two as we develop the 
imaginative logic of action in the construction of new humanisms. For now, 
understanding what subjectivity means, for Sartre, requires that we understand what 
totalization is in contradistinction to totality. 
" Sartre states that subjectivity is a “certain type of internal action, an interior 
system – systéme en intériorité – rather than the simple, immediate relationship of 
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the subject to itself.”60 This immediate relationship of a subject to itself ought to be 
considered within the entire gamut of philosophical ideas broadly construed within 
the so-called ʻturn to the selfʼ. This would include Descartesʼ cogito, Kantʼs 
transcendental unity of apperception, Husserlʼs transcendental ego, or even later 
ideas such as Michel Henryʼs auto-affectivity. Having already written a treatise 
criticizing Husserlʼs transcendental ego and expelling any notion of the self to 
second-order reflective construction,61 Sartre is not concerned with rehashing his 
argument against this type of subjectivity. Instead, he elaborates on conceptions he 
articulated in CDR pertaining to totalization. 
" Referring to the “Introduction” of the 1857 draft of the Grundrisse, he notes 
that Marx understood the dialectic as being a synthetic connection between ʻmanʼ 
and the material environment. What he means is that there is always mediation 
between a person and the conditions into which s/he is thrown. One is not self-
sufficient, but must look outside oneself in order to survive. Breathing air, walking on 
various terrain, using tools, speaking words: all of these demonstrate that the human 
condition is necessarily a mediatory condition. There is no such thing as immediacy 
in real material terms. Therefore, the “psychosomatic unit” (his new term for 
subjectivity in these lectures), is perpetually engaged in a synthetic process of 
interiorizing and exteriorizing the field of mediations that surround him/her at all 
times. He defines this as a system of interiority in this way:
A material system is defined as having an interior or, if you prefer, as marking 
off a domain within the real world, when the relationship between its parts 
involves the relation of each to the whole. Reciprocally, the whole is no more 
than the sum of its parts insofar as it is involved as a whole in the relations 
that the parts have with each other.62 
Now, letʼs compare the above quote with the following definition of totality:
A totality is defined as a being which, while radically distinct from the sum of 
its parts, is present in its entirety, in one form or another, in each of these 
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parts, and which relates to itself either through its relation to one or more of its 
parts or through its relation to the relations between all or some of them.63
"
These two definitions are extremely similar. Both are mereological descriptions. In 
the first, Sartre presents a material system. In the second, a being. Both the material 
system and the being are described in relations of parts to whole, where the parts 
involve the relation of each to the whole and the whole is involved in the relations of 
each part. But the crucial distinction is in the following clause when speaking about 
totality: “while radically distinct from the sum of its parts.” This clause marks the 
enclosure of totality as a correlative of the imagination. We might say, without too 
much infused conceptual baggage, that a totality is a practico-inert set. It is a set that 
encompasses the totality of objects contained within it. It mediates the relations of 
the objects contained therein, but the totality itself is other than those objects. 
" The material system, by contrast, is defined by this clause: “the whole is no 
more than the sum of its parts.” This implies that there is no enclosure of the whole 
as in totality. Something else is going on with the material system that ensures it is 
not a totality, and this something else is precisely that the material system is a 
totalization. Sartre remarks on the similarity of the definitions between totality and 
totalization in CDR. However, he draws a clear distinction by emphasizing that, “it is 
a developing activity, which cannot cease without the multiplicity reverting to its 
original statute.”64 What he means is that totalization as an act of subjectivity – a 
system of interiority – cannot cease without the parts becoming a totality (inertia). 
Therefore, if totality is a correlative of the imagination as a practico-inert object, then 
totalization is the “undifferentiated correlative of praxis.”65 And it is at this point where 
Sartre wants to found his investigation by remarking that “dialectical Reason is the 
very movement of totalisation.”66 Or said otherwise, subjectivity, as the system of 
interiority, is the arche of dialectical reason. 
" The stakes of this, for Sartre, are thoroughly ethical. If the world is a closed 
totality, then the consequences for our actions are diminished. We are parts in the 
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larger whole, but our individual participation in the coming-to-be of that totality are 
secondary. However, retaining the open-endedness of totalization necessitates an 
ethical responsibility for our action as we are co-creators with history as it also 
creates us. This is why he was so critical of the dogmatism of the U.S.S.R.ʼs self-
legitimized invasion of Hungary. There was ultimately no way for them to be held 
accountable for their actions. Similarly, any orientation that is characterized by 
totality will carry similar implications. The micro-actions of the present and 
subsequent unfolding of history are granted secondary importance to the totality, 
which is itself only an inert analogon to begin with. 
1.3 The Validity of the Unveiling: Dialectical Reason and the Paradoxico-
Critical Orientation
" But this only half of the story. Right up to the point where we can distinguish 
between totality and totalization in the unveiling of Being, we run into a limit, a 
paradox. And this limit is best articulated in the staunch criticisms leveled by Claude 
Lévi-Strauss. It it his indictment of the paradoxical ideas of CDR that reveal to us the 
“validity of this unveiling.” 
" Lévi-Straussʼ criticisms of CDR can be boiled down to two categories: 1) 
ethnocentrism and 2) contradiction/paradox. The former concern of ethnocentrism 
will not be our primary focus. The bulk of the argument will rest on our engagement 
with the second category. However, as to not neglect the charge of ethnocentrism, it 
will briefly addressed.
" In a sense, we grant that CDR is a thoroughly Western text. Most of the 
examples from which Sartre draws are Western examples. However, when 
discussing counter-finality, he does spend time referring to deforestation in China. 
That said, this too could be construed as an ethnocentric reading of a regional 
particularity in order to justify his own ends. Regardless, what Lévi-Strauss really has 
in mind when he charges Sartre with ethnocentrism is 1) a fetishization of the French 
Revolution and 2) a perceived disdain for ʻnativeʼ communities. 
" Sartreʼs fetishization of the French Revolution has more recently been pointed 
out by Badiou as well. Badiouʼs claim is that Sartre is less a thinker of political 
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revolution than of historical revolution.67 Sartreʼs focus on the formation of the group 
in the apocalyptic irruption at the Bastille seems to indicate that his only hope for 
genuine intersubjective solidarity could arise under similar circumstances rather than 
in any organized proletarian effort. This is something we will address in Chapter Five 
and again throughout Part Two. For Lévi-Strauss, the problem of CDR “is reducible 
to the question: under what conditions is the myth of the French Revolution 
possible?”68 Snide humor aside, there is something substantive in this criticism. 
Namely, does CDR merely seek to understand the conditions of a particular history, 
or is it able to investigate human development as such? In a sense, this is precisely 
the question that CDR concerns itself with. Volume One is not concerned with every 
domain of anthropological history in real terms. Rather, Sartre is investigating 
particular expressions of practical ensembles, those that are familiar to French 
Marxists, in order to provide a corrective to the rational foundation upon which 
Marxism might proceed. Of course, this does not excuse one for being limited in his 
analysis. If Sartre is unfairly neglecting alternative forms of practical ensembles to 
the detriment of identifying the source of the intelligibility of history, then such 
sources ought to be announced so the investigation can be strengthened. It is 
therefore not trite to point out that Sartre himself creates space within CDR itself for 
correction and further elaboration.69 This is also perhaps why Volume Two was never 
completed. Perhaps Sartre himself realized the overreach of trying to progressively 
articulate the single meaning of history by analyzing a particular region of world-
history. 
" That said, there is also a sense in which Sartreʼs CDR is a text for this history. 
He is not engaging in ethnography or anthropology as such. He is seeking to 
understand the historical moment of life lived under capitalist hegemony. This is what 
he means when he identifies himself as an ideologist thinking and living in the wake 
of Marx. One cannot exceed the Marxian moment, which implies the critique of 
political economy. Thus, CDR is an intentional project working within the larger 
endeavor of the critique of political economy. In this way, it could be argued that CDR 
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is not merely a prolegomena to any future anthropology, but that it is a prolegomena 
to any future political economy, insofar as political economy must be understood 
from within a revised understanding of subjectivity and the dialectic.70 This is 
because he is not retreading the course of biological organisms that led humanity to 
some point in a general notion of historical development. No, he is seeking to 
regressively analyze the conditions of precisely this history, as it has been 
conditioned by capitalist hegemony, as interpreted through Marxʼs critique.
" The second point about Sartreʼs denigration of ʻnativeʼ peoples is one that 
ought to be considered, because if Sartre is seeking to identify the law of intelligibility  
of history rooted in the relation between the psychosomatic unit that is concrete 
subjectivity and the material world, it would be unfortunate to exclude potential 
sources of information that highlight varying processes of totalization. In a section 
referencing Sartreʼs brief remarks on Deaconʼs work with Ambrym natives and their 
drawing of diagrams in the sand to communicate marriage rules and kinship 
systems, Lévi-Strauss censures Sartre by saying, “It seems even less tolerable to 
[Sartre] than to Levy-Bruhl that the savage should possess ʻcomplex understandingʼ 
and should be capable of analysis and demonstration.”71 Initially, it bears noting that 
the quotation of ʻcomplex understandingʼ is not attributable to Sartre. These words 
are Levy-Bruhlʼs.72 Further, the claim itself seems spurious. In fact, Sartre expressly 
articulates that he is not concerned with whether or not abstract thought is an 
intrinsic human capacity that is expressed to varying degrees of complexity. Rather, 
what he is seeking to demonstrate by mentioning the Ambrym native is that abstract 
thought is not a capacity possessed per se but is intrinsic within the practico-inert 
mediations of the organization. It is important to note that at this section of Sartre's 
investigation he has already explored the logic of the group and the logic of the 
pledge; the latter which mediates through fear and pledged-praxis.73 These totalities 
are part of the analysis of the Ambrym native in that the pledge is always present in 
the articulation of any social schematic; in this instance, the matrimonial schematic. 
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The point that Sartre is making is that when the native draws out the diagram 
explaining the matrimonial relations of the tribe, he is not merely articulating abstract 
knowledge in a vacuum. Rather, as Sartre says, he is "guided by the synthetic 
understanding which defines his membership in the group."74 But this synthetic 
understanding itself is not communicated because the transmission of the 
information takes place through the creation of an inert object. Thus, Sartre's point is 
not to sleight the native's capacity for thought, but rather is to illuminate how 
synthetic knowledge is exteriorized in practico-inertia to one that is exterior to that 
organization (in this case, Deacon). 
" This dovetails with the second category of Lévi-Straussʼ criticisms of CDR. 
Related to this last point, Lévi-Strauss accuses Sartre of inconsistency and paradox 
when speaking about the relations between analytical and dialectical reason. First, 
he claims that Sartre employs analytical reason himself while decrying its status as 
inferior to dialectical reason.75 Second, he asserts that his own understanding of 
dialectical reason is better found in the savage mind, as one that entirely encloses 
everything within its classificatory categories of schematization.76 And third, he 
accuses Sartre of developing a paradoxical system that, “offers not a concrete image 
of history but an abstract schema of men making history of such a kind that it can 
manifest itself in the trend of their lives as a synchronic totality.”77
" In order to understand the crux of this threefold argument about the 
contradictions and paradox of CDR, it will be useful to frame our response through 
the lens of what Paul Livingston, following Alain Badiou, refers to as ʻorientations of 
thoughtʼ.78 In his book The Politics of Logic, Livingston outlines three orientations of 
thought developed by Badiou that establish various relations to the totality of Being 
as such:
1. Transcendent (what Livingston terms the Onto-Theological)
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2. Constructivist (what Livingston terms the Criteriological)
3. Generic (same)
The Transcendent/Onto-Theological orientation 
sets up the totality of being by reference to a privileged being, a “super-
existence” that assures the place of everything else, while at the same time 
obscuring its own moment of institution or the grounds of its own authority. 
Thus, the totality is conceived as the determined order of an exact placement 
of beings, while it is covertly regulated by an exemplary Being, conceived as 
superlative, transcendent to the order of things, and ineffable in its terms.79
Livingston calls this orientation Onto-Theological following Heidegger. And in 
reference to the present section, we might say that the Greco-Christian orientation to 
Reason would fit in this category. The privileged being to which the Greco-Christian 
model refers would be Reason or logos as the ineffable limit of Reality. 
" The Constructivist/Criteriological orientation is seen in the critical tradition 
inspired by Kant and finds its zenith in the twentieth-century linguistic turn.
This is the orientation that relates to the totality of what is sayable about Being 
by means of an explicit tracing of the structure and boundaries of language. 
[... The] totality of existence is regulated by the discernible protocols of a 
meaningful language, comprehensible in themselves and capable of 
distinguishing between the sayable and the non-sayable... drawing [a] 
regulative line between sense and nonsense. [... Here], the totality of the 
sayable is itself understood as comprehended by the determinate syntactical 
rules for the use of the language in question, and thus as not only a bounded 
but a finite whole, outside of which it is possible for the theorist or the inventor 
of languages unproblematically to stand.80  
This orientation of thought will come to be seen below in both Positivistic Science/
Marxism (i.e. Analytical Reason) and the Dialectic of Nature that Sartre criticizes in 
CDR. Although prior to the linguistic turn, Positivistic Science/Marxism and the 
Dialectic of Nature fit within the Kantian transcendental schematic in that they draw a 
line around totality and then formally stand above or outside by asserting their own 
regulative law of articulation. 
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" The third orientation is Badiouʼs own position, the Generic: 
Thus, applying no norm other than formal consistency, the generic orientation 
relentlessly pursues, along the diagonal, the existence of all that which 
escapes constructivismʼs limitative doctrine of thought. [...] Badiou thereby 
shows how the apparatus of set theory leaves open the possibility, beyond 
anything constructivism can allow, of the ʻgeneric setʼ which, though real, is 
completely indiscernible within ontology, and hence also the possibility of the 
extension of any determinate situation by means of a generic ʻforcingʼ of the 
indiscernible which realizes, at its infinite limit, a new truth.81 
The Generic shows the limit of any Constructivist orientationʼs ability to introduce 
genuine novelty beyond what any existing language can articulate. It is only through 
set theory that the radically new can be introduced outside the transcendental 
schematics of Constructivism or the enclosed totality of the Onto-Theological 
orientation.82
" But Livingston introduces one more orientation of thought that he believes 
Badiou has neglected. He terms this the Paradoxico-Critical orientation. It operates 
by tracing the destabilizing implications of the paradoxes of self-reference at 
the boundaries of the thinkable, or sayable. [... Given] the paradoxes that 
force a choice, whereas Badiouʼs generic orientation decides for constistency 
and against completeness, the paradoxico-critical orientation is based on the 
decision for completeness and against consistency.
This is the orientation that most aligns with Sartreʼs dialectical reason in CDR. It 
might not be apparent prima facie, but once we take a closer look into Sartreʼs 
conception of totalization vis-à-vis totality, then aligning Sartre with the Paradoxico-
Critical orientation of thought will make sense. As well, it will help us work through 
Lévi-Straussʼ threefold criticism of the contradictory/paradoxical nature of CDR and 
suggest that perhaps the dialectical reason of the savage mind might be closer to 
Sartreʼs orientation than Lévi-Strauss allows. 
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" If we depict this visually, we can say that the Onto-Theological orientation 
views the totality of what can be known as contained within limits established by an 
ineffable beyond that itself has no ground, or no need of founding. Thus, all thought 
is contained within these established limits.
"
"
" The Constructivist orientation draws a line around all that is sayable and 
demarcates between sense and nonsense. However, the theorist stands outside 
looking in, observing, analyzing, and redrawing the boundaries while remaining 
unscathed from any self-referential criticism.  
" Badiouʼs Generic orientation proceeds quite differently. In this disposition, 
totality itself is questioned. There is no world of all worlds but infinite worlds that 
overlap and interpenetrate. 
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" And finally, the Paradoxico-Critical orientation can be thought in terms of the 
limits of totality itself being stretched and twisted which then perpetually transforms 
the scope, the sense, the relations, and the variations of intensity of the very totality. 
"
" To start, Sartreʼs criticism in the opening pages of CDR is directed towards 
two broad camps:83 the first would be the Positivist Rationalists and Marxists of 
technological science and the second is the dialectic of nature. The Positivist 
Rationalists assert that the real is rational, however can only ever give relative 
expressions that correspond to this reality. Thus, facts become simple correlations 
between observable nature and the measurement of that observation. This is the 
pure saturation of techne and instrumental reason. For Sartre, it is relativism. Facts 
are truth insofar as they relatively describe portions of the Rational. But nevertheless 
the assumption by Positivist Rationalists is that the Rational is knowable as an 
external metaphysical reality to be discovered. However, analytical reason is 
unaware of its own ground. The mind “prejudges nothing... [and] sees Reason as 
independent of any particular rational system.”84 Therefore, positivist rationalism is to 
be understood as anarchic. Unlike dialectical reason, that is squarely concerned with 
grounding itself by unveiling the rational structure of Being and then self-referentially 
investigating the validity of this unveiling, Positivist Rationalists are “unconcerned 
with the ground of their inductions.”85 This is because they do not have a thorough 
conception of subjectivity.
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" But physicists or chemists are not the only ones who draw Sartreʼs criticism 
for being Positivists. Marxists too have “played the Positivist game.”86 By 
incorporating the tools of instrumental reason, Positivist Marxists engage in the 
game of interpretation much like scientists, seeking to predict future events squarely 
based on the sequential causal relations between externalities. The problem here is 
that the dialectic ensures that the future is absolutely new and irreducible to 
observation. Sartre admits that Marx did make predictions, but claims that he 
actually disqualified himself from doing so because positivist rationalism asserts that 
the future is a repetition of the past insofar as the present order of succession 
reenacts a previous one. Thus, for Sartre, “Marxism as dialectic must reject the 
relativism of the positivists”87 insofar as dialectical reason asserts the truth. It is not 
merely a perspective on the truth, but truth insofar as the component parts of 
knowledge are instantiations of the totalizing whole, which in turn mediates the parts 
in a system of interiority.
" Sartreʼs other target in the opening of CDR is the dialectic of nature, which 
similarly asserts a metaphysical form of Rationality. It is an externality. Taking Engels 
as an example, he is unable to think novelty because the Rational is enclosed with a 
totality of which there is no outside. However, unlike the relative rationality of the 
Positivists, the dialectic of nature, similar to Kant, asserts transcendental laws that 
themselves have no foundation. As Sartre states, the dialectic of nature “has a 
curious similarity to those Ideas of Reason which, according to Kant, were regulative 
and incapable of being corroborated by any particular experience.”88 Thus, there is 
an “Eternal Reason” for Engels that establishes a pre-constituted law.89 In a sense, 
the dialectic of nature becomes a reified projection of historical dialectics, for Sartre. 
It becomes a transcendent universal that supposedly governs all particulars. This is 
why he states unequivocally that the dialectic of nature is nothing more than “a 
metaphysical hypothesis.”90 He would elaborate further on the irrationality of this 
anarchic dogmatism:
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The procedure of discovering dialectical rationality in praxis, and then 
projecting it, as an unconditional law, on to the inorganic world, and then 
returning to the study of societies and claiming that this opaquely irrational law 
of nature conditions them, seems to us to be a complete aberration.91
The dialectic of nature is thus a type of dogmatic metaphysical rationality that sees 
the world as itself being Rational as a derivative of an observable dialectic in praxis. 
Accordingly, the dialectic in the world is the rationality of the rational world that is its 
own principle of sufficient reason. Thus, the dialectic of nature ends up subsuming 
'man' or 'dissolving man' into a singular and regulative totality. Contra this position, in 
actual fact, for Sartre, the dialectic must be understood both in its universality and its 
particularity. In Sartreʼs words, the intelligibility of the dialectic is as a totalizing 
system of interiority, not a universal law of nature or a totality. This does not mean 
that he precludes the possibility of science one day discovering a dialectic of nature 
in physical processes themselves. However, his concern is that if such a day comes, 
it will require that the dialectic be found “where it is there to be seen,”92 as opposed 
to, as in the case of the Engelsian dialectic of nature, being discovered in human 
societies and then projected into the inorganic. 
" Simply stated, positivist rationalism/Marxism and the dialectic of nature are 
subject to the same criticism as Lukács: they are closed systems of totality. They are 
beholden to the practico-inert correlative of the imagination that externally mediates 
its relations. In the case of positivism, this leads to relativism and a reproduction of 
the past; for the dialectic of nature, metaphysical speculation and dialectical idealism 
rather than synthetic analysis and dialectical realism. It is the latter two that 
characterize dialectical reason. But this still doesnʼt validate the unveiling of the 
rational structure of Being in dialectical reason. That is, there still needs to be a way 
to ground the investigation into the rational structure of Being. And this is where 
Livingstonʼs orientations of thought provide assistance. 
" It seems quite obvious to assert that analytical reason (as associated with 
positivist rationalism and positivist Marxism) ought to be understood within the 
Constructivist orientation. Livingston includes Russell, Carnap, and Ayer into this 
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schema as prime examples of Constructivists.93 Russellʼs fight against the doctrine 
of internal relations and Carnapʼs and Ayerʼs logical positivism draw a line around 
that which is sayable (or rational) but exclude themselves and their praxis from this 
bounded, finite totality. However, Foucault also fits into this camp. Any intuition that 
asserts that what exists is controlled and determined by that which is sayable is 
Constructivist. For Foucault, this takes the form of unmasking the actual historical 
foundations (i.e. power relations) that constituted institutional power structures. The 
lines, for Foucault, are merely redrawn. This is precisely how Sartre defines 
analytical reason and itʼs inability to reason synthetically. Recall Sartreʼs criticism of 
the U.S.S.R.ʼs invasion of Hungary. In their totalized thinking, they were immune 
from any criticism because they drew the lines around the event, defining it from their 
external position, and justifying their action based on the rules of the game that they 
themselves were not subject to (in fact, which had no meaning to them whatsoever). 
" But so too ought the dialectic of nature be understood as Constructivist. While 
not concerned per se with language, the dialectic of nature establishes a totality 
outside of which the regulative Idea of the dialectic, so construed, stands in 
determining sense and nonsense. This regulative Idea itself is unable to be criticized 
by the manifold of existential concerns over which it determines the sayable contra 
the non-sayable. Thus, the dialectic of nature becomes a “determinate syntactical 
[rule]... outside of which it is possible for the theorist [or party] ... to stand,”94 again, 
precisely because the theorist or party draw the lines in the first place.
" Compared to the Constructivist orientation, Sartreʼs consideration of 
dialectical reason must be thought of within a different schematic for three reasons: 
1) it attempts to think beyond closed totality, 2) it proceeds from a self-referential 
recognition of its own paradoxes, and 3) it discovers and grounds the paradoxical 
nature of the structure of Being – i.e. the dialectic itself. The only question that 
remains is, “In which of the two remaining orientations are we to situate dialectal 
reason?” 
" Remember that the Generic orientation is Badiouʼs description of his own 
system of thought. Relying on the discoveries of set theory, Badiou argues that the 
Generic orientation is different from the Onto-Theological and the Constructivist in 
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that the Generic insists upon the relevance of actual and multiple infinities to 
reasoning about Being. This schema allows for a realist conception of thinking about 
beings as such and Being as a whole. But the whole of Being must not be 
understood as a closed totality. Rather it is ʻwholeʼ as a formal discursive 
consistency. We could say that Badiou, like Sartre, wants to reject any notion of a 
closed totality in favor of an open system (although what this means is different for 
each). He would go so far as to say that, in fact, there is no such thing as a world, 
but infinite worlds. That is, this orientation “lends privilege to indefinite zones, 
multiples subtracted from any predicative gathering of thoughts, points of excess and 
subtractive donations. Say all existence is caught in a wandering that works 
diagonally against the diverse assemblages expected to surprise it.”95 However, for 
Badiou, this orientation differs from Sartre in that although Sartre wants to reject any 
notion of a closed totality he is not actually averse to the idea of a different type of 
totality. That is, his entire argument unfolds within the rubric of a project investigating 
the single meaning of History. This is a type of whole that is not defined by the types 
of indefinite zones and multiples that Badiou articulates in his infinite worlds 
orientation. Precisely because Sartre is not concerned with the ontological findings of 
set theory that Badiou articulates, it cannot be claimed that dialectical reason is 
therefore a formal discursive consistency. Instead, the dialectic is a paradoxical self-
referential emergent that does not position itself, as does the Generic orientation, 
beyond or before its own embeddedness within logos; or what amounts to the same, 
within the dialectic itself. So whereas existence for Badiou wanders ʻdiagonally 
against the diverse assemblages expected to surprise itʼ, for Sartre it is co-
constitutive with the diverse assemblages that surprise it. 
" This difference can be summarized by what Livingston claims is a difference 
in how the final two orientations “consider the status of totality.”96 When given a 
choice between consistency and completeness, the Generic orientation chooses 
consistency. However, the final option that Livingston presents chooses 
completeness instead. This is the Paradoxico-Critical orientation. By affirming an 
inconsistent totality, this orientation documents the inconsistencies that arise when 
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language attempts to speak the whole as One.97 This One is not a pre-constituted 
totality, but rather is itself an emergent multiplicity-as-One insofar as it is synthesized 
in its articulation. There is a self-referentiality that is not merely paradoxical, but that 
is also productive. In Sartrean terms, we can say that this orientation pertaining to 
the relation between thought and Being accords with dialectical reason as the latter 
attempts to make intelligible the whole of history through its own inconsistencies. 
Although it is not concerned primarily with language, dialectical reason can be seen 
as Paradoxico-Critical because it is an orientation concerned with the relation 
between thought and Being insofar as this relation itself is perpetually seeking its 
own ground in its articulation of the very relation. As Sartre explains in SM:
The motivation of the enterprise is one with the enterprise itself; the 
specification and the project are one and the same reality. Finally the project 
never has any content, since its objectives are at once united with it and yet 
transcendent. But its coloration – i.e. subjectively, its taste; objectively, its style 
– is nothing but the surpassing of our original deviations. This surpassing is 
not an instantaneous movement, it is a long work; each moment of this work 
is at once the surpassing and, to the extent that it is posited for itself, the pure 
and simple subsistence of these deviations at a given level of integration. For 
this reason a life develops in spirals; it passes again and again by the same 
points but at different levels of integration and complexity [last emphasis 
added].98
This is Sartre again explaining his system of interiority, subjectivity, totalization. This 
is the logic of dialectical reason, the validity of its unveiling the structure of Being. 
That is, the validity of the unveiling is precisely that which is constructed in the very 
process of unveiling. The law of the dialectic is not a universal a priori. First it is a 
resultant, and then it becomes a redoubled de facto, not de jure, ʻlawʼ of intelligibility 
insofar as totalization synthesizes the movement of the dialectic in subjectivity as the 
latter interiorizes situations of objectivity. As he states, “if dialectical Reason is to be 
rationality, it must provide Reason with its own reasons.”99 And just a couple pages 
later, he states: “if there is such a thing as a dialectical reason, it is revealed and 
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established in and through human praxis.”100 This is because dialectical reason 
establishes its own limits and scope, its own reason and foundation. It is both lived 
and known, with neither knowing or living taking precedence, for they are both 
moments of the same movement of totalization. This is why Sartre would say that 
ʻmanʼ both creates and submits to the dialectic, and that this contradiction must itself 
be lived dialectically.101 
" This paradox of both creating and being created by the dialectic, of working 
with and beyond and thereby stretching the very limits of rationality, is why dialectical 
reason accords with the Paradoxico-Critical orientation of thought rather than the 
Generic. There is no outside of the system of interiority. Thus, while Sartre 
adamantly criticized closed systems of totality, there is a sense in which his own 
method was itself a disjunctive totality, a paradoxical totality – totalization. Thus, we 
can agree with Livingstonʼs simple barometer to help delineate between the Generic 
and Paradoxico-Critical; that given a choice between completeness and consistency, 
Sartre chooses, albeit with qualification, completeness. 
1.4 The Validity of the Unveiling: Lévi-Strauss and Dialectical Reason
" Understanding Sartreʼs orientation of thought in this way, how can we better 
understand Lévi-Straussʼ threefold criticism? The first criticism about the 
contradictory/paradoxical nature of CDR is that Sartre employs analytical reason 
while decrying its inferiority to dialectical reason. He states that it is a “curious 
paradox; for the work entitled Critique de la raison dialectique is the result of the 
authorʼs exercise of his own analytical reason: he defines, distinguishes, classifies 
and opposes.”102 He continues on the next page by saying, “[If] dialectical and 
analytical reason ultimately arrive at the same results, and if their respective truths 
merge into a single truth, then, one may ask in what way they are opposed and, in 
particular, on what grounds the former should be pronounced superior to the 
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latter.”103  While it is certainly true that Sartre utilizes analysis in his regressive 
investigation into the conditions under which history might be made intelligible, it is 
not necessarily the case that such analysis is akin to analytical reason. When we 
frame the issue in terms of the orientations of thought, then it becomes clear that 
what Lévi-Strauss is failing to capture is that analytical reason and dialectical reason 
are not merely different modes of thought at the epistemological level, but tend 
towards completely different orientations of thought at the ontological level. 
" If a given analysis is seeking the relative truths in a metaphysical Reason to 
be discovered, or if it is attempting to stand outside the given field of observation, 
then the analysis tends toward a positivistic/analytical rationality. This is not what 
Sartre is doing. He may begin by using certain tools of analysis that resemble the 
techne of analytical reason, but the goal is to start in media res in order to 
regressively discover the foundations of dialectical reason and its intelligibility from 
within already existing practical ensembles. Therefore, analytical and dialectical 
reason wonʼt reach the ʻsame resultsʼ because analytical reason is a relativistic 
endeavor commenting on the correlation between externalities and the observational 
measurement of these externalities. Whereas dialectical reason is a system of 
interiority – what Sartre comes to call the ʻliving logic of actionʼ – that integrates all 
models of rationality. It constitutes itself while dissolving all other constituted reasons 
(analytic included) in order to constitute new reasons which it then in turn transcends 
and dissolves. This is why when Lévi-Strauss claims that Sartre abandons a solid 
starting point from which to begin his investigation, Jacob Rump writes: “What [Lévi-
Strauss] call the ʻsecondary incidentalsʼ of society – the series, groups and 
collectives differentiated and examined in Sartreʼs text – are insufficient for 
establishing the anthropological foundations of society only if we assume that the 
foundations sought are purely analytic and static.”104 But as we have explained, in 
light of the Paradoxico-Critical orientation of thought, dialectical reason is not purely 
analytic and static but is a perpetual process of self-referential productive 
construction as it founds itself in its creation of itself. 
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" Lévi-Straussʼ second criticism is that his own understanding of dialectical 
reason is better found in the savage mind, as one that entirely encloses everything 
within its classificatory categories of schematization. He bolsters his argument by 
claiming that the savage mind seeks to timelessly "grasp the world as both a 
synchronic and diachronic totality."105 The savage mind, according to Lévi-Strauss, 
creates images of the world "which facilitate an understanding of the world in as 
much as they resemble it"106 – they create images that serve as regulative principles, 
in as much as these principles are representations of the world (i.e. totalities). As 
such, Lévi-Strauss' reading of the savage mind from within his own Constructivist 
orientation does not seem prima facie dialectical in the Sartrean sense. This 
explanation of the savage mind has much more resonance with Charles Taylorʼs 
conception of Social Imaginaries, in that the totalities that mediate social relations 
are static practico-inert externalities rather than systems of interiority.107 Thus, we 
could argue that the logic of the savage mind, as Lévi-Strauss describes it, does not 
have a sufficient notion of praxis that would break the serial mediatory control 
mechanisms introduced through inertia that entrap it within the Constructivist 
orientation. 
" However, how much of Lévi-Straussʼ language describing the savage mind is 
an accurate description of the savage mind as a Constructivist orientation and how 
much is attributable to his own project from within his understanding of the analytical-
dialectical divide? Although there is a distinction between Lévi-Straussʼ own 
orientation and that of the savage mind that he is seeking to defend, in the closing 
words of the book he remarks that
The entire process of human knowledge thus assumes the character of a 
closed system. And we therefore remain faithful to the inspiration of the 
savage mind when we recognize that the scientific spirit in its modern form 
will... have contributed to legitimize the principles of savage thought and to re-
establish it in its rightful place.”108 
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This valorization of the savage mind can only be read as a statement of Lévi-
Straussʼ own self-congratulatory posturing of his position as similarly constructed as 
a ʻclosed systemʼ. His appeal is to the rest of the scientific community to similarly 
adopt the ʻprinciples of savage thought and to re-establish it in its rightful placeʼ. In a 
sense, he is suggesting that the split that was initiated between mythos and logos be 
reversed, and that the totalized thought of the savage mind, which is a genuine 
expression of human knowledge of the world, serve as an example of how to 
overcome the effects of that gap. However, it must be asked: is classifying human 
knowledge as essentially a ʻclosed systemʼ the best way to overcome this gap? And 
further, is it the case that the savage mind or that Lévi-Straussʼ own positions are in 
fact closed systems? 
" As Livingston notes, the seeds of the Paradoxico-Critical orientation lie in the 
Structuralism of Lévi-Strauss and those of his ilk. He notices that there is a 
“fundamental reflexive consideration of the One of language as such... that 
essentially yields the paradoxico-critical orientation.”109 This is because the One of 
which Lévi-Strauss speaks is not a fixed or closed totality. Rather, it draws limits but 
not from an external position. Instead, the limits of Structuralism and the savage 
mind that enclose everything are both within and without the totality it thinks, as it is 
creating its own limits as it transcends them in its construction of them. 
" Later identified as a certain “exercise of structure” by Roland Barthes, implicit 
within the Constructivism of Structuralism is an activity of ongoing movement.110 The 
timeless schematization that Lévi-Strauss identifies in the savage mind and the two-
stage system whereby he claims anthropologists observe and analyze data in order 
to grasp the historical antecedents so they can bring the facts to the present in a 
meaningful totality, only to then repeat this on “a different plane and at a different 
level,”111 is thus better understood by “the functional. [... Subsequently] and 
especially, it highlights the strictly human process by which men give meaning to 
things.”112 This is what characterizes the totalizing schematization and classification 
that Lévi-Strauss notices in the savage mind. He claims that this true ʻdialectical 
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reasonʼ of the savage mind is very different from Sartreʼs, but perhaps if we 
understand the functionality and activity of the ʻfundamental reflexive considerationʼ 
of the savage mindʼs structural system, we can begin to see that Lévi-Straussʼ own 
orientation was not that far off from Sartreʼs. This does not mean that they were 
identical. Nor does it mean that in The Savage Mind Lévi-Strauss was deploying the 
Paradoxico-Critical orientation. But it does suggest that there is greater nuance than 
either may have been willing to concede. Even later in Lévi-Straussʼ life, he 
concedes the need for a stronger role of activity in understanding structural analysis 
that moves him explicitly closer to Sartre and the Paradoxico-Critical orientation. He 
claims, “[The] linguists have taught us this. Every system – linguistic or otherwise – 
is in constant disequilibrium with itself, this is the motor of its internal dynamism... 
But, in addition to this, there are other things, which we can never reduce. History is 
there in front of us, as something absolute in front of which we must bow down 
[emphasis added].”113 This ʻconstant disequilibriumʼ ensures that given the same 
choice between completeness and consistency, just like Sartre, perhaps with some 
qualification, he would choose completeness.
" All of this brings us to the third and final criticism that Lévi-Strauss levels 
against Sartreʼs perceived contradictory/paradoxical work in CDR. The claim is that 
Sartre does not offer “a concrete image of history but an abstract schema of men 
making history of such a kind that it can manifest itself in the trend of their lives as a 
synchronic totality.”114 In a sense, this goes to the heart of the rest of this project. To 
say that Sartre does not offer a ʻconcrete image of historyʼ is not a criticism. In fact, 
as this project will elaborate in the coming chapters, this is almost a tautology. 
Volume One of CDR is an intentional regressive analysis of the conditions of history 
in order to make them intelligible. His project is not to offer a concrete image of 
history itself, but to illumine the intelligibility of concrete history. He does this by 
seeking to unveil the rational structure of Being and then to validate this unveiling. As 
we have been arguing throughout this chapter, Sartre employs what can be termed a 
Paradoxico-Critical orientation of thought towards the relation between thought and 
Being. When we situate him thusly, the ends of this project come into scope. That is, 
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in the construction of a hypo-logical reading of CDR, examining Sartreʼs regressive 
analysis of practical ensembles through the lens of the Paradoxico-Critical 
orientation will enable us to see the text in its pluridimensional complexity as a 
synthetic analysis. We will endeavor to do this by examining the various practical 
ensembles to reveal the various logics that make these ensembles intelligible in their 
totalization. ʻLogicʼ here means simply intelligibility. It is the intelligibility revealed by 
dialectical reason as the latter seeks to discover itself and found itself through the 
investigation into the practical ensembles which are both the results and creators of 
this dialectical reason. 
" Having determined dialectical reasonʼs significance as a system of interiority 
and validated its arche as Paradoxico-Critical, we will follow Sartre by setting out 
“from lived experience (le vécu) in order gradually to discover all the structures of 
praxis.”115 These structures are what we are calling here the formal, logical 
constructions of CDRʼs hypo-logic. These formal constructions, therefore, become 
the dialectical intelligibility of particular moments of totalization. This is why we will 
speak of the ʻlogic of the groupʼ or ʻthe logic of serialityʼ. What this is referring to is 
the dialectical intelligibility of the various regressive syntheses under investigation at 
each stage of the project. To do so is to abstract from their real material existence for 
heuristic purposes; that is, again, to reveal the truth of their intelligibility. What this 
will allow us to do is then rebuild a dialectical logical disposition (i.e. an orientation of 
dialectical reason) that can then become a ʻmotive forceʼ. Sartre himself said that he 
would reconstruct a “progressive definition of ʻthe rationality of actionʼ.” This was his 
intention with Volume Two. However, our project is different from setting out to 
construct a progressive definition as such. Rather, the goal of the present thesis is to 
extract those foundational elements of dialectical intelligibility so as to flesh out how 
this dialectical intelligibility can develop a dialectical disposition that is thoroughly 
regressive and creative – what we will call the imaginative logic of action – so that 
future work can be done in the service of constructing a progressive definition of the 
rationality of action. 
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II.Dialectical Logic and The Pervasion of Seriality – Toward a Fresh 
Reading of Sartreʼs Critique of Dialectical Reason
“Tell [Sartre] that each time I sit down at my desk, I think of him. He writes such important things for 
our future, but he has not found readers at home who yet know how to read and among us he has not 
found any readers at all.”116
" CDR is generally read as a work of ontology and/or normative social theory. 
Thomas Flynn refers to it as a work of social ontology, Christian Klockers and Gavin 
Rae suggest that Sartre prescribes that certain practical ensembles ought to be 
pursued over others, and Nina Power, Alain Badiou, Peter Hallward, and Brian Smith 
present Sartre as primarily a thinker of historical rupture. These three interpretive 
tendencies influence the majority of contemporary CDR scholarship. While there is 
merit in each of these tendencies, and while the theorists mentioned have influenced 
this project in immeasurable ways, they all deploy (in his or her own way) a limited 
and limiting hermeneutic; what we shall name the ontological and normative 
readings of CDR. What this section will elaborate, then, is how this dominant 
tendency has come to be, where it goes awry, and how we can move toward a fresh 
and productive reading. 
" By presenting a survey of a relatively orthodox reading first, we better situate 
the debate. This will allow us to then problematize the ontological and normative 
readings so we can reconstruct the textual resonance prior to investigating the 
formal structures that Sartre makes intelligible. 
2.1 Circularity in the Critique
" A common criticism of Sartreʼs philosophy is that he is unable to escape 
pessimism regarding social relations. In Being and Nothingness (hereafter BN), this 
is undoubtedly the case as he describes the human ʻprojectʼ as consciousness 
surpassing oneʼs present ʻsituationʼ toward the unbounded possibles that might be 
realized through the radical freedom of the for-itself as the latter seeks to create 
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itself, create meaning, and overcome the viscous nature of the present which 
continually threatens the for-itself with the Impossible – annihilation, death, collapse 
into the in-itself. Because other free for-itselfs all have the same 
ʻprojectʼ (structurally),117 there necessarily arises conflict in the social sphere as one 
consciousness seeks its own ends over and against the desired ends of any and 
every other for-itself. Therefore, the for-itself, in the mode ʻbeing-for-othersʼ, is 
haunted by an unceasing competition with others, as individual consciousnesses 
transcend/negate other persons in a field of subjective competition. Unlike Taylorist 
readings of the dialectic, there is no dyadic struggle that results in a ʻhigher 
synthesisʼ.118 There is no hope for resolution. Sartre seems to suggest that the 
conflictual nature of intersubjectivity is irreconcilable – an absolute result of the 
ontological freedom of the for-itself. It is this pessimism that has led many readers to 
focus on various soundbites taken from the massive corpus of Sartre: ʻhell is other 
peopleʼ; ʻman is a useless passionʼ; existence is ʻabsurdʼ. Taken as definitive 
characterizations of Sartreʼs philosophy, such maxims often neglect Sartreʼs most 
ambitious work, Critique of Dialectical Reason, in which he investigates, through a 
regressive analysis, the formal conditions of reciprocal relations between individuals 
and the material conditions in which the former are always-already situated. 
" In CDR, Sartre retains much of the language/structure of his earlier works (the 
project, the situation, facticity, the primacy of freedom, the field of possibles, 
intending toward the beyond, etc). However, he modifies their content significantly by  
turning from consciousness toward human labor to define human existence. The 
conceptual shift from defining human existence as consciousness to praxis is 
profound, primarily because it incorporates the human being completely in facticity. 
In his later work, Sartre characterized facticity as the entirety of material human 
existence in a Marxian fashion – identifying the human with labour: “[The] truth of a 
man is the nature of his work... But, this truth defines him just insofar as he 
constantly goes beyond it in his practical activity.”119 This latter experience of one 
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working, being defined by her work, and surpassing her situation is what Sartre 
would call oneʼs praxis-project. It is the essential identity marker of human existence. 
Like the intending, surpassing, negating consciousness of BN, the human-as-praxis 
is characterized by arising within a given situation of exigence which requires that it 
be surpassed. This necessity is not an a priori mandate derived from analytic reason, 
but arises from the relation between ʻmenʼ and their material conditions (i.e. 
dialectical reason). Comprehending this relation (as do historical materialist 
theorists) is not done from an external position, but is part of the dialectical process 
itself – an internal moment of individual and group praxis, which by its very existence 
marks the “being-past of Being, or the movement by which Being becomes what it 
has been.”120 Rejecting determinist and structuralist readings of Marx alike, Sartre 
re-articulates the paradox of Marxʼs dictum that, “Man makes his own history, but he 
does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen 
by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand.”121 In Sartreʼs words, “[Men] 
make history to precisely the same extent that it makes them.”122 The dialectical 
relationship between ʻmenʼ and their material conditions is thus the source of 
dialecticity. Eschewing any notion of a dialectic of nature he locates the dialectic 
purely in the contingent historical relation between human praxis and the situation in 
which the latter finds itself.123 
" Although a de facto, relational necessity, the dialectic is also comprehended as 
contingent. Arising because of the relationship between ʻmenʼ and scarce material 
conditions, history is always understood in relation to scarcity, “which explains 
fundamental structures (techniques and institutions) – not in the sense that it is a real 
force and that it has produced them, but because they were produced in the milieu of 
scarcity by men whose praxis interiorises this scarcity even when they try to 
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transcend it.”124 For this reason, Sartre remarks that the original contingency (i.e. 
scarcity) “shows us... both the necessity of our contingency and the contingency of 
our necessity.”125 Defined not as temporally, historically, or ontologically prior (at least 
in the first instance), but as formally and logically prior to praxis, scarcity is the 
original situation into which every human being is thrown at each given moment. In 
other words, human beings are always immersed in a situation characterized by an 
original negation in relation to need. Therefore, persons are perpetually embattled by 
transcending their present situation toward a beyond of possibles. This process 
parallels the for-itselfʼs tendential targeting of its own absolute realization as the in-
itself-for-itself in Being and Nothingness; a project which necessarily leads to 
existential angst. Although he implies that perhaps beauty might be that which 
releases humanity from ʻtotal frustrationʼ, beauty must not be conceived as real. 
Rather, it “is no more a potentiality of things than the in-itself-for-itself is a peculiar 
possibility of the for-itself. It haunts the world as an unrealizable. To the extent that 
man realizes the beautiful in the world, he realizes it in the imaginary mode 
[emphasis added].”126 Taken as hopelessness by Ronald Aronson,127 Sartreʼs 
tending toward the ʻimaginary modeʼ is actually rather positive. Although not 
recognizable as such until Critique of Dialectical Reason, oneʼs praxis-project 
interiorizes imagined futures, which means that oneʼs praxis-project continually 
recreates imagined futures through the negation of negation in seeking de-alienation. 
To this we will return.128
" For now, it must be emphasized that the dialectic is a process from 
ʻobjectification to objectificationʼ. As the individual works in a pre-constituted 
situation, her subjectivity is inscribed on the objective world. Matter is therefore 
understood as ʻworked-matterʼ. By storing labor, the material world becomes a field 
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interiorizes the pre-existent material conditions in her praxis as she totalizes herself 
and the field of objective possibilities with which she is faced. This activity of 
interiorization, exteriorization, re-interiorization, re-exteriorization is what Sartre 
terms ʻtotalizationʼ. It is the accumulating, spiral movement of praxis that creates new 
situations of exigence and freedom in the unfolding of historical praxis at both the 
individual and group levels. In other words, ʻtotalizationʼ can well be described as the 
particular Sartrean notion that redefines the dialectic in the formal terms he 
establishes in CDR.
" At this point, it is crucial to note that – in itself, as a formal notion – worked-
matter is not a threat to praxis. However, once worked-matter takes on the alienating 
characteristics that condition it in the milieu of scarcity, it becomes ʻpractico-inertʼ. 
For Sartre, the practico-inert is a field of de-humanizing mediations that act as the 
source of ʻnegative reciprocityʼ. According to Pietro Chiodi, the practico-inert is the 
field produced by the praxis-project as the latter imprints itself upon
 
the inertia of [matter]... which, in escaping the finality of the constituting 
dialectic, becomes available for insertion into heterogeneous dialectical 
totalizations whose orientation is counter-final relative to the finality of the 
constitutive process. The effect of this is to render material external to the 
project and opposed to it as necessity to freedom.129
Through counter-finality, in the milieu of scarcity, a serial collective is formed. 
Externally objectified by its own product (i.e. the practico-inert), the series is a 
collective of inhumans insofar as they are robbed of freedom over their product and 
its finality, as the product is utilizable by others in a field of objective competition. 
That is, a serial collective is characterized by inhuman-actors, whose projects are 
stifled by the stasis arising from confronting projects in a given horizon which in turn 
marks each person in competition and alterity in relation to one another.
" Since therefore the practico-inert is the necessary negation of ʻmanʼ, it must 
itself be negated. There must be a “reaffirmation of man.”130 Such occurs through the 
irruption of the ʻgroup-in-fusionʼ. The group-in-fusion is established by its common 




collective by the necessity of the practico-inert), the group-in-fusion rehumanizes its 
constituents through an ʻapocalypseʼ131 whereby it freely snatches from the practico-
inert field its inhumanizing power of “mediation between men in order to confer 
power on each and everyone in the community, and thus establish itself... as the 
means whereby the materiality of the practical field is placed again in the hands of 
free communized praxis.”132 When such occurs, alterity is curbed and the members 
of the fused group are viewed as Same insofar as they are each products of the 
group and the common activity of the free individual praxes that constitute the praxis 
of this particular formal mode of group formation.
" Through the ʻapocalypticʼ upsurge of group activity in the face of an imminent 
threat (i.e. the Impossible), Sartre espouses a theory of social relationality that is 
able to skirt a destiny that is bound for mere repetition of alienation. Achieved 
through ʻmediated reciprocityʼ, de-alienation occurs through the communized, free 
praxis of the group- in-fusion. Their primary task being “to snatch from worked-upon 
material its inhuman power of mediation between men in order to confer it on each 
and everyone in the community,”133 the group embodies a novel social arrangement 
in which the dehumanizing powers of seriality are dissolved in the irruption of 
humanity, perhaps even for the first time. Thus, Sartreʼs method in SM and CDR is to 
preserve the irreducibility of human subjectivity (á la Kierkegaard) and the concrete 
objectivity of human situatedness (á la Marx).134
" However, a pressing question arises: how is such a group able to sustain itself 
as a system of interiority through its perpetual totalization in a field of practico-
inertia? And this is where interpreters claim that we again encounter Sartreʼs social 
pessimism. After the initial, free, instantaneous upsurge (i.e. the apocalypse), the 
group is then threatened with dissolution into seriality. As Frederic Jameson notes, 
there are at least three ways the group can dissolve: (1) “it can... disperse back into 
seriality,” or, by institutionalization, it can develop (2) bureaucracy, and/or (3) 
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dictatorship.135 Not wishing such a fate, an oath (or ʻpledgeʼ) is sworn: “when 
freedom makes itself the communal praxis of establishing the permanence of the 
group by way of producing itself its own inertia in mediated reciprocity, this new 
statut is called the oath.”136 Although there is a momentary experience of de-
alienated sociality in the group-in-fusion, this instant is fated to dissipate after the 
oath is made (if not prior). In the face of the event, the pre-constituted group was 
faced with the Impossible, which instigated a united front against a violent foe. By 
negating this violence with violence and revolutionary resistance, the moment of 
apocalypse offered a glimpse of absolute de-alienated communized praxis (mediated 
reciprocity). However, after the initial upsurge, the group is faced with simple and 
sudden dissolution or ossification into a serial collective or an institution because of 
the absolute presence of the practico-inert in the milieu of scarcity. Therefore, an 
oath is made to preserve the group. However, the very effect of the sworn oath 
produces a ʻpermanenceʼ which fails to maintain the pure freedom of the apocalypse. 
In other words, the oath is a ʻreflective actʼ, instituted by the group to retain the 
affective impetus that was initially experienced during the apocalyptic moment. 
Unfortunately, the reflective act is insufficient in three ways:
1. It is a forced reproduction (re-presentation) of a previous spontaneous, affective 
experience. 
2. It establishes a being of the group, which negates the free becoming of the 
apocalypse.
3. It creates an image whose object is both absent and present; one that is inert and 
completely produced by the collective imaginative consciousness of the group; 
that has no creative capacity in itself (it teaches nothing); and that is devoid of the 
infinite depth of the real (spatio-temporality).137
As such, the ʻpledged groupʼ begins to mineralize, and roles or functions are 
delineated. This self-imposition of inertia – in itself – is not to be viewed as opposed 
to freedom, for each individual ʻfreelyʻ swears the oath in order to preserve her 
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freedom and the commonality of the group. However, its insufficiency comes 
precisely as an unintended consequence (i.e. counter-finality) of the introduction of 
inertia into the life of the group.138 As the group settles into its permanence (whether 
merely perceived or actual is of no consequence at this point), it becomes more and 
more organized, and each member becomes identified by her function in fulfilling the 
role that pre-destines her action in the objective of the organized group. Still though, 
the organization is not viewed as itself an alienated ensemble. It isnʼt until 
institutionalization becomes formalized that inertia and alterity inhere as the 
constitutive and affective mediators of the institution. In the institution, each member 
becomes a cog in the larger wheel. Like the experience of the collective in basic 
seriality writ large, the members of the institution are inessential. By contrast, the 
institution is essential. 
2.2 Rejecting Pessimism
" This is the basic formula that we find in CDR. Groups emerge in antagonism to 
serial conditions that constitute basic human existence. However, basic human 
existence is really understood as inhuman existence, as each individualʼs life is pre-
destined by the milieu of scarcity that ensures competitive relations of alterity in its 
social expression. Freedom is possible through the irruption of the group-in-fusion, 
but that soon collapses once permanence creeps back into the group, and 
institutionalization is the ultimate outcome of the life of the group. Thus, there is a 
path from series, to group, to institution. At least this is how CDR is generally read. 
Even the most sympathetic readers of Sartreʼs revolutionary work read it through this 
pessimistic lens. As Nina Power notes:
In the end, for Sartre, revolts will always crystallise. The fusion of the group 
will always reach a certain point and coalesce. Things fall apart, or rather, 
things slip back into seriality, often on a grander scale... Whilst this appears to 
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be a wholly pessimistic conclusion, creeping inertia destroying all possibility of 
active change, nevertheless it is inescapable.139
While it is true that this is the dominant reading of CDR, there is something missing 
in such a pessimistic interpretation: hope and a proper understanding of the 
pluridimensional logic of dialectical rationality that is espoused in CDR; or, referring 
back to Chapter One, we might say that there ought to be greater attention paid to 
the system of interiority that we articulated as Paradoxico-Critical.
" It is not a trivial point to note that Sartre himself never averred from his hope 
for the revolution. In his final interview with Benny Lévy, although unable to firmly 
ground his reasons for being hopeful, Sartre remarked that, “The world seems ugly, 
bad, and without hope. That is the tranquil despair of an old man who will die within 
it. But that is precisely what I resist, and I know that I will die in hope; but it is 
necessary to create a foundation for this hope.”140 Although this final interview has 
been the subject of much critical scrutiny, and instigated controversy upon its original 
publication, the elements under examination pertain to claims that Benny Lévy 
manipulated the older Sartre through loaded questions and that through his sheer 
will and youthful vivacity overran Sartre, who had always been known to be 
accommodating to the views of his interviewers anyway.141 Of particular concern are 
indications that Sartre may have adopted a form of Jewish Messianism, which was 
curiously close to Lévyʼs own views. 
" Not under scrutiny are the instances of Sartreʼs future-oriented outlook 
(except those explicitly pertaining to a version of Messianism). Considering a great 
motive force of his intellectual and political career was driven by empowering human 
beings with the freedom of choice in the midst of a constraining world, it hardly 
seems out of character that Sartre would retain a hopeful outlook. Beyond this, the 
desire to create a ʻfoundation for this hopeʼ fits precisely within the paradoxical self-
referential productivity of dialectical reason that characterized Sartreʼs thought. His 
hope was not in some pre-figured future as in mystical Messianism, but rather in 
founding the hope that was always-already hoping. This Paradoxico-Critical hopeful 
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tendency in the Lévy-Sartre interviews is an echo of Sartreʼs invocation of Malrauxʼs 
conception of ʻapocalypseʼ that he employs to describe the irruption of the human out 
of the domination of inhuman seriality.142 In a sense, there is nothing one can do but 
hope. This is what the apocalypse indicates. Under situations of great pressure, 
when threatened by the Impossible, the very impulse of life facing death is hope 
against hope. This will be clarified and elaborated more fully below. For now, what 
matters is that this ʻfoundationʼ for hope is precisely what the pessimistic readings of 
CDR overlook (or at least deemphasize). For although ʻrevolts will always crystalliseʼ, 
the persistence of freedom-as-praxis ensures that this crystallization itself is only one 
part of the logic of totalization. 
" More substantively, the pessimistic readings of CDR are due to a positional 
misreading of the text itself. That is, these readings underestimate the formality of 
the text. The result is that they tend to read CDR as though it were an analysis of 
history itself, or as a linear logic, rather than a synthetic logic – the terms (group, 
praxis, series, collective, institution) are actually better understood in their enfolded 
and enfolding synthesis (with both diachronic and synchronic moments contained 
therein). As such, what we have in CDR is theory construction. He is developing 
abstract formal constructions to help us think through concrete material historical 
actualities. There are of course going to be historic, ontic, and epistemic implications 
that can be drawn from this construction (as the proposed second volume of CDR 
was supposed to do). But first and foremost, Volume One of CDR must be 
considered in its heuristic purposes: exploring the formal conditions of 
anthropological history.143 In the end, what Volume One of CDR develops is not so 
much a definite system (à la Hegel or Badiou) but a set of theoretical constructions 
that allow future theorists and activists to apply them (in so far as they are deemed 
useful) to social and historical realities. In Sartreʼs words
Volume I of the Critique of Dialectical Reason stops as soon as we reach the 
ʻlocus of historyʼ; it is solely concerned with finding the intelligible foundations 
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for a structural anthropology – to the extent, of course, that these synthetic 
structures are the condition of a directed, developing totalization.144 
That is, Volume One stops at the point when we reach the constellation of meanings 
that open up history for further analysis. And this further analysis is done through 
dialectical reason. If a locus is the site where something occurs, then we must take 
Sartre to mean that Volume One brings us to an understanding of how and why 
history occurs. In other words, Volume One examines the mechanisms that drive 
anthropological historical movement (i.e. the mechanisms of totalization). These 
mechanisms are the 'intelligible foundations' for a structural anthropology. They are 
'synthetic structures'. And these synthetic structures condition a directed and 
developing totalization. In other words, totalization is conditioned by the synthetic 
structures (praxis, practico-inert, worked matter, collective, group, organization, 
institution, etc), which means that totalization, as the movement of history-as-
dialectical, can only be made intelligible through analyzing these synthetic structures 
in the first instance. And, as this thesis will defend, the synthetic structures of Sartre's 
ʻstructural anthropologyʼ are the structures of 1) diachronic history and praxis and 2) 
synchronic situatedness and structuralism. Another way of phrasing this is that 
Sartreʼs structural and historical anthropology is grounded by a logic that refuses to 
reduce either the absolute of concrete praxis or the absolute of objective material 
conditions into its opposite. Both praxis and objectivity must be maintained as co-
constituting absolutes in dialectical relationality without resorting to any sort of 
orthogonal privileging. 
" This concept of 'orthogonal privileging' needs to be unpacked a bit in order to 
understand a common tendency in readers of CDR. Peter Caws claims that there is 
an ʻorthogonal reciprocityʼ between existence and structure. In Being and 
Nothingness, there was a swing toward the side of existence, whereas CDR moves 
the pendulum back towards the middle.145 However, the notion of orthogonal 
reciprocity only has abstract conceptual explanatory value when considering terms 
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that are externally related.146 This is the very approach that CDR rejects. In Sartreʼs 
dialectical project, the two notions donʼt shift in inverse proportion to one another, but 
rather infuse one another in totalization. This is not to say that they can be reduced 
to one another. Rather, it is to say that the two terms themselves are never 
separated (except abstractly), and as such there is no law whereby oneʼs increase 
necessarily implies the otherʼs decrease. In fact, CDR could be said to give primacy 
to both. It is not a perfectly balanced theory, where existence and structure are given 
equal priority as terms in relation to one another. Rather, Cawsʼ setup (and those that 
follow a similar logic) must be rejected in favor of thinking of the two terms as 
enveloping and infusing one another in a co-constituting synthetic relation. Instead of 
there being an external relationship, there is an internal chassé-croisé between two 
modes of Being. Again, we must bear in mind Sartreʼs rigorous criticism of analytical 
reason, which is defined precisely by relations of externality. Orthogonal reciprocity 
must therefore be thought of in terms of the Constructivist orientation of thought; 
whereas our goal must be to maintain the Paradoxico-Critical orientation in order to 
resist the tendencies of analytical reason. 
" Once orthogonal reciprocity is eschewed, a space is opened wherein non-
pessimistic readings of CDR can emerge. First of all, Sartre's negativity regarding 
human freedom in situations of scarcity is not necessarily inversely proportional to 
the possibility for de-alienation. Rather, the two have a relationship of cross-
contamination, like two intensities that co-constitute one another within the same 
field of possibilities. Sure, there are methods of analysis that will focus on the depths 
of alienation and the ubiquity of scarcity. And at the same time, such analyses will 
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produce a seemingly dire sense of overcoming such alienation.147 But Sartre must 
also be read as an emancipatory thinker in the midst of such critical pessimism. For 
every serial condition necessarily contains the latent potency of transformation and 
re-creation. Freedom (praxis/existence) and seriality (objectivity/structure) are not 
two concepts in external, inverse, proportional relation to one another. They are 
interpenetrating synthetic material realities that imbue one another with the efficacy 
of the other. They are internal to one another, and one's strength doesn't mean the 
necessary depletion of the other. In fact, there is no a priori law of necessity 
regarding their proportional relation. 
" This leads to a second and more basic point: CDR isnʼt a pessimistic reading 
of history, or practical ensembles, or inter-subjective relations precisely because it is 
not a theory of history in se. That is, CDR develops a pulsating, spiraling, dialectical 
logic – not a linear or progressive view of the way things unfold, or even could 
unfold. To suppose that CDR is pessimistic is to suppose that Sartreʼs theory moves 
from group, to series, to group, to series, always ending up in seriality. And while 
seriality is pervasive and inescapable in many ways, serial relations are just as 
exposed to dissolution through the emergence of the group logic as groups are 
threatened by the serial logic. That is, the relation between alienation and de-
alienation is one where neither has primacy in terms of its possible realization. They 
are both possible, logically. The group is always threatening irruption within serial 
conditions. And likewise, seriality is always there to threaten the dissolution of the 
group. But this dissolution isnʼt final, because another group can and will emerge. 
" Sartreʼs point is to make intelligible the conditions under which group freedom 
can emerge, with the hope of equipping humanity with a set of formal, logical 
constructions that can aid it in overcoming serial conditions (whether finally or at 
least to as great a degree as possible). But this final end desire (so far as we can 
surmise that such is his desire and in so far as it is not realized in his logical 
investigation) does not mean that the circularity between alienation and de-alienation 
is somehow pessimistic. It is neutral. It is an investigation and development of a 
logic. The only pessimism is in the eyes of his readers who have no hope in using 
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the ʻliving logic of actionʼ that he places at the feet of the future reader for them to 
further develop.148 As Andrew Dobson claims, “To the extent that philosophers have 
only interpreted the world and never changed it, the Critique is no guide to social 
revolution.”149 The pessimism is therefore in the interpretation and application of the 
text. But in itself, CDR is an open and logically neutral formal investigation.150 As 
Sartre says, groups have a “serial destiny” but also that it is always the case that 
“seriality may... be transformed into a community.”151 Therefore, a rejection of 
pessimism in the establishment of a proper dialectical logic is the first guiding 
principle of this chapter and will serve as a crucial foundation for the elaboration of 
the imaginative logic of action in Part Two. 
2.3 In Media Res: Kaironic Seriality and Problematization
" Once the negative baggage of pessimism is cleared, CDR is able to speak 
forth afresh. With that, the second guiding principle of Part One: the depths of 
seriality are so pervasive that it is not a rhetorical flourish to claim that our history is 
aptly characterized as the age of seriality. To be clear, Sartreʼs notion of history is 
somewhat ambiguous and has been the subject of much scrutiny. Aron and Lévi-
Strauss are perhaps the two most notable critics of Sartreʼs understanding of history. 
For Aron,
the Critique tends towards the following objective: to establish ontologically 
the foundations of methodological individualism... Sartre also intends to 
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reduce all human, socio-historical reality to individual praxis, which, according 
to him, is the sole ontological reality or, at the very least, is the ontological 
origin of practice-oriented ensembles or of the anti-dialectic wherein individual 
praxis is alienated and seems to disappear.152
The first thing of note is a point that was discussed in the previous section. Aron is 
operating under the orthogonal logic of interpretation. As such, his reading is both 
reductive and pessimistic. 
" The second point to note is that Aronʼs reading of CDR is really just an 
uncharitable reading of BN superimposed into the text of CDR. As he states, “The 
reconciliation of ontological individualism and dialectical totalization... lends itself to a 
pessimistic reading; it presents us a new version of the myth of Sisyphus.”153 
Obviously for Aron, this means that Sartreʼs effort to wed together Existentialism and 
Marxism is a piece of wishful thinking. Or, as Edouard Morot-Sir put it, “la mariée est 
trop belle.”154 But the idea that ʻontological individualismʼ is primary in CDR misses 
the complexity with which Sartre investigates the terms of the text. More egregiously, 
it ignores the persistent statements by Sartre that the terms in the early development 
of his argument are merely ʻsimpleʼ and ʻabstractʼ, with the dialectical complexity and 
concreteness accumulating towards a crescendo in the middle and later parts of the 
text. Therefore, it takes patience to not judge the early, simple, abstract terms as 
encompassing the entirety of Sartreʼs work in CDR. Instead, a more complete 
reading will transform the simple and abstract notions once they have been folded 
into the more complex and concrete notions that are developed in the later portions 
of his text. More on this below.
" For now, it needs to be emphasized that CDR is not a work of Cartesian 
individualism. In fact, for Sartre, the individual is itself an abstract notion. As he 
would come to say in the Second Volume of CDR, “[There] is no atomic solitude. 
There are only ways of being together. Solitude appears within ways of being 
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together.”155 As Nina Power quips, it is “capitalism that creates the ʻerroneousʼ 
impression that there are only individuals.”156 Therefore, what we see from this is 
that individualism is a particular contingent phenomenon that arises within this 
particular history – the capitalist history. And this thread of thought is crucial to keep 
in mind throughout Sartreʼs work in CDR as a whole. He is not trifling with universals 
or metaphysical absolutes. Rather, he is developing a transcendental historical 
materialist account of anthropology. As such, the facts of history are contingent in 
their necessity, and likewise necessary in their contingency. This harkens back to his 
maxim from “Existentialism is a Humanism” that ʻexistence precedes essenceʼ, but 
without the Cartesian phenomenological ontological baggage. Quoting Power: 
What Sartre was obliged to do, therefore, in the Critique, was use 
existentialism to unblock the ʻstoppedʼ really existing socialism, and the 
abuses of Marxism, without letting the Cartesianism of the earlier project seep 
back in and reify the dialectical comprehension he was trying to pursue. He 
thus introduces a hierarchy of mediations which make up the Critique and 
allows it to grasp the process which produces the person within a given 
society at a given moment.157
Thus, while BN was undoubtedly a work that fits within the Cartesian individualist 
legacy, CDR proceeds from a different foundation; one that develops a logic of 
totalization that asserts both the complex system of interiority of subjectivity and the 
concrete situatedness of objectivity in mediatory co-constitution and integration. It 
starts by assuming that “the concept of Man is an abstraction,”158 claims that 
individual actions are “acts without an author,”159 and ends by re-emphasizing that 
individual and group actions are “constructions without a constructor.”160 It is these 
notions that have led some readers of CDR to claim that it is a text that “occupies a 
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transitional space between modernist and postmodernist categories, integrating 
elements of each into a constellated and synthetic whole.”161 
" While it isnʼt the primary concern of the present project, one thing must be 
emphasized at this point: Critique of Dialectical Reason is not a work of Cartesian 
individual ontology. In fact, it is not a work of ontology at all (in the first instance). As 
was mentioned in the previous section, Sartre was engaging in theory construction 
first and foremost. This means that the primary purpose of CDR was to investigate 
the formal conditions under which an historical and structural anthropology might be 
made intelligible. And even though Sartre does place emphasis on individual praxis, 
this is better understood as an entry point into the investigation, which would get 
progressively more complex and more concrete, thereby replacing the simple and 
abstract terms and notions from the earlier portions of the investigation to establish a 
living logic of action in a pluridimensional reality. Not that individual praxis would 
become obsolete at the deeper stages of complexity, but that it be understood in its 
proper place in the entire movement of totalization.  
" Therefore, Aronʼs interpretive mistake (as well as Flynnʼs, Desanʼs, and even 
Foxʼs) is that he fails to grasp the extent of the formal and theoretical nature of CDR. 
Flynn comes closest by claiming that CDR is “hypothetical.”162 However, it does a 
disservice to the concreteness of Sartreʼs investigation to say that CDR is 
ʻhypotheticalʼ.  While there are hypothetical applications drawn from the formal 
investigation, CDR is not investigating a world that could be. No, he is regressively 
investigating the formal conditions of the world that is, and then providing the reader 
with tools to create therefrom. As we will explore further, what is crucial for Sartre is 
both concrete analysis of real material conditions and an imaginative logic that can 
create new worlds – with neither receiving primacy. Therefore, it would be better to 
speak of CDR as hypo-logical. 
" Lévi-Straussʼ criticism comes from a different direction. For Lévi-Strauss, 
Sartre is an historicist who valued “history above the other human sciences and 
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formed an almost mystical conception of it.”163 Perhaps because he did not have 
access to the Second Volume, but this mystical conception that he perceives misses 
Sartreʼs designation of history as being essentially aporetic. As the result and creator 
of integrated systems of interiority – that is totalizations within totalizations – history 
is problematic, for Sartre, because every practical ensemble is riven with splits and 
contradictions. “Society, from afar, seems to stand unaided; from close to, it is riddled 
with holes.”164 Scarcity of time, scarcity of means, and scarcity of knowledge – plus 
the grounding scarcity that conditions these subvariants – ensure that every praxis 
must struggle in a milieu of antagonism that is itself unintelligible from the 
perspective of analytical reason. This is because analytical reason reduces history to 
a mathematical formula. When discussing military academies studying past battles, 
Sartre writes: “A certain schematization... is enough to transform the comprehensive 
study of the battle into a formal theory, into a quasi-mathematical calculus of 
possibles. The reality of the conflict fades – ultimately we find a calculus of 
probabilities.”165
" We discussed this approach in Chapter One with reference to the 
Constructivist orientation of thought that totalizes a given field but that reserves a 
privileged outside position for the theorist to analyze the given totality. When history 
is examined in this way, it becomes a mathematical formula and loses the unique 
elements of totalization (i.e. system of interiority/subjectivity), particularization, and 
contradiction; which Sartre refers to as the three features of dialectical intelligibility in 
Volume Two.166 The once lived totalization with all its nuance and particularities of 
passion and circumstance, strategy and maneuver, stakes and intentions, is totalized 
into a multiplicity of external variables. This will not give us access to the dialectical 
intelligibility of totalization. This is why the investigation in Volume One into the 
formal elements of dialectical intelligibility is so crucial to found before examining the 
meaning of history. It illuminates the complexity of totalization and reorients the 
investigation from the Constructivist to the Paradoxico-Critical disposition. The 
former can only ever give an analytical intelligibility of totalized parts as mediated by 
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the totality (i.e. the singular historical event). The latter is what enables processes-in-
becoming to be made intelligible in their pluridimensional complexity. But a 
Paradoxico-Critical orientation, in this case the particular Sartrean expression of it as 
dialectical reason, also provides a way of investigating concrete historical realities 
rather than imputing any idealism onto the field of study. By starting by examining a 
given situation and then regressively investigating the synthetic conditions of that 
situation, elemental structures are revealed as the intelligibility of that particular 
situation. These elemental structures are purely derived from the situation itself as 
resultants. They were discovered, if you will. Only then, only once the logic of that 
given situation is discovered, does the investigation proceed towards history writ 
large. Thus, the aporia of history is precisely in its complexity as a totalization 
composed of totalities and totalizations in concrete material situations.
" Thus, for Sartre, history isn't mystical at all. He is not placing history in the 
realm of Geist à la Hegel. Rather history is the result of concrete human relations 
between ʻmenʼ and between the material conditions in which ʻmenʼ find themselves 
thrown at all times. In other words, history is merely the result of concrete relations 
between (in)human actors and situations in which they are perpetually thrown. 
History then is the result of the dialectical movement between (in)humans and their 
overcoming of their situation as they tend toward future possibles. This is where 
Sartreʼs investigation begins and ultimately ends. He is seeking to make the 
conditions of history intelligible so that he might be able to understand if there is a 
single meaning of history. Simply divided, Volume One is concerned with the former 
and Volume Two with the latter. However, the conditions of historical intelligibility and 
the single meaning of history are not something known a priori. Nor can they be 
described as having any sort of mystical characteristics, as they are exclusively the 
result of concrete (in)human reality. They are only known through a dialectical reason 
because history is a material result of the dialectical movement itself.
" Lévi-Strauss seems to further confuse this fact by drawing a strict a line 
between history (diachrony) and anthropology (synchrony).167 He then proceeds to 
criticize Sartre for supposedly camping in the historical/diachronic theoretical realm 
while ignoring the anthropological/synchronic. The problem with this argument is 
that, for Sartre, neither diachrony nor synchrony has priority. They are both held in 
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dialectical tension. That is why Sartre claims to be investigating the formal conditions 
for a structural and historical anthropology. Diachrony and synchrony characterize 
his investigation. As Jacob Rump states, 
The Critique of Dialectical Reason is thus able to recognize the important role 
that structure plays in our world and in our history, without subsuming the 
possibility of free human praxis to an outright determinist and structuralist 
account that would reduce history to the playing out of a deterministic 
rationality, a history that would be, in effect, not really ours.168
"
In other words, what Rump is saying is that Sartre skirts both Lévi-Straussʼ and 
Aronʼs criticism in the same move: he is able to preserve the freedom of praxis and 
the objectivity of material conditions without reducing history to either voluntarism or 
determinism. And this is done not by hypothetical theorizing or by grand system 
creation, but by a formal investigation of the history that we live – this is what Sartre 
calls his regressive analysis of the formal conditions of history. 
" This leads us to what is perhaps the most unique aspect of this investigation 
so far. Outside of few exceptions, readers of CDR get trapped in the simple and 
abstract moments of investigation.169 They are too wedded to an orthogonal logic. 
That is, they read CDR from their own Constructivist orientation. The results are that 
readers either emphasize praxis or objectivity (with the overwhelming majority of 
readers emphasizing praxis). In order to avoid this pitfall, this project will endeavor to 
maintain an equal footing between praxis and objectivity. However, since the majority 
of literature expositing or engaging with CDR spends the majority of time on the 
freedom of praxis, the irruption of the group out of serial conditions, and the 
pessimism of group life as it falls back into seriality, the rest of this chapter will take a 
different approach. Thomas Flynn claims that, “The two most significant conceptual 
innovations in the Critique are the practico-inert and the mediating third.”170 By 
contrast, the present claim is that the single most significant conceptual innovation is 
ʻserialityʼ. 
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" In order to give this notion its due exposition, by the end of this chapter, it may 
seem that the pendulum has swung from the ʻprimacy of praxisʼ to the ʻprimacy of 
serialityʼ. However, this is not the case. The purpose in focusing on seriality is to 
problematize the historical situation to its utmost so that the stakes of political action 
can be properly understood in their urgency. And the notion of seriality is a very keen 
notion in revealing the depth of alienation that inheres in bodies and that impinges 
upon social, political, and economic life. This is where the term Kaironic Seriality 
becomes useful. As will be explained further below, Sartreʼs notion of seriality has 
both diachronic and synchronic characteristics. ʻInhumansʼ find themselves 
embedded in various levels of seriality based on temporal activities and structural 
realities. Moving from one series to the next is not a simple linear activity whereby 
the serial ties are cut off from one statut to the next. Rather, the layers of horizontal 
and vertical serial complexity are so replete that seriality is not a minor fact that 
threatens human freedom in flashes or instants. It is the very truth of our existence – 
this is what is meant by Kaironic Seriality. We live in an age of serial alienation under 
capitalist exploitation. Like total depravity in Calvinist theology, seriality runs through 
each person and threatens each group to their very core. However, this is where the 
similarity with Calvinism ends. For in the latter, God is required to have chosen the 
elect from eternity past in order to redeem them from the sure fate of eternal 
separation from Godself. Sartre requires no appeal to transcendence. Instead, it is 
the exigency, terror, and rage that arises from the impossibility of living under serial 
conditions that sparks the apocalypse. Life lived in Kaironic Seriality therefore also 
means that it is always the opportune time to act. And this apocalypse is what opens 
up space for “a new and positive humanism.”171 
" Since therefore Volume One of CDR is a ʻprolegomena to any future 
anthropologyʼ, or better, since Sartre was seeking to ground an historical and 
structural anthropology, the most productive way to read CDR is as a formal, logical 
investigation into the grounds by which we might be able to develop new 
humanisms. That is, it is a formal investigation into the social and historical, in order 
to ground the development of ways by which humans might come to exist. Since, for 
the Sartre of the Critique, ʻmanʼ does not exist, CDR gives reasons why ʻmanʼ does 
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not exist (Kaironic Seriality) and provides tools for thinking through how ʻmanʼ could 
come to exist under conditions of scarcity (the apocalypse).
" Therefore, the rest of Part One will proceed from where Sartre ended CDR: in 
media res. Because the first volume of CDR is the regressive analysis of the 
regressive-progressive method, it is appropriate to read it somewhat out of order, 
backwards even at times. As discussed above, many commentators misinterpret the 
extent of the logic of group formation because they are stuck within an orthogonal 
logic. Also, they often approach the text as though Sartre were developing an 
historical or linear theory of the emergence of institutions. This was clearly not his 
intent, nor does it provide the most fruitful orientation for mining the depths of the 
theoretical content provided. Instead, Sartre was looking at alienation and 
institutional oppression all around him. He then regressively worked backwards to 
unpack the complex pluridimensionality of social relations so as to break them up 
into intelligible components. Thus, what Sartre develops in CDR is a ʻliving logic of 
actionʼ, with the purpose being that political action could be both understood, 
grounded in real material conditions, and wielded appropriately against the violent 
forces of exploitation and oppression. Now, it is crucial to turn to the key components 
of this living logic of action so that we can understand precisely what Sartre saw as 
the formal conditions of an historical and structural anthropology. 
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III. The Field of Possibles – the Practico-inert and the Exigency of 
Objective Conditions
“A materialist dialectic will be meaningless if it cannot establish, within human history, the primacy of 
material conditions as they are discovered by the praxis of particular men and as they impose 
themselves on it.”172
3.1 Scarcity as a Human Fact
" Scarcity is not an ontological fact. This is crucial to understand. It is not the 
original sin of the world that presents a natural lack as an indomitable force of 
Nature. Rather, scarcity, for Sartre, is a contingent fact of history. Granted, it is a fact 
of our history. But nevertheless, scarcity must not be treated with metaphysical or 
ontological significance that makes it a monstrous power that cannot be defeated. As 
Sartre makes clear, scarcity is a human fact rather than the “malignity of a cruel 
Nature.”173 But what exactly does this mean, that ʻscarcity is a human factʼ? 
Elizabeth Butterfield nicely explains:
As long as we are free, we are changing, and we are never satisfied, whole, 
or complete. Scarcity therefore arises from the fact that in our freedom, 
humans always demand more. In this way, we create a field of scarcity around 
us. Sartre is not implying that scarcity does not arise from actual objective 
lacks in the environment; some lacks really do exist. But it is our human 
projects which interpret these lacks in terms of our needs and desires, 
defining the field around us as ʻscarceʼ in some way. For this reason, Sartre 
understands scarcity to be a contingent human fact, and not the evil of a cruel 
Nature.174
Here we encounter two crucial points for understanding Sartreʼs notion of scarcity: 1) 
scarcity is created and 2) scarcity is necessary. The extent to which scarcity is 
necessary is understood, first, through the relation of the biological organism to basic 
material needs: hunger and thirst. Second, scarcity is necessary in that our particular 
history is one that is only understood as a history driven by the conflicts arising within 
the milieu of scarcity. As Butterfield was quoted above, ʻ[Some] lacks really do exist. 
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But it is our human projects which interpret these lacks in terms of our needs and 
desiresʼ. That is, as basic biological organisms, there are needs that arise based on 
lack. But this lack itself is something that developed both in terms of our 
embeddedness and connectivity with the material environment in which we find 
ourselves, and also because of the ways in which human beings have totalized the 
material environment at each point of the dialectical flow of history (and ultimately 
because of the accumulating results of this movement over long periods of time). 
" This canʼt be reduced to mere psychological longing based on unsatisfied 
desires (although psychological longing is a result of the milieu of scarcity). Nor is 
scarcity a fact of subjective constitution (at least in the first instance).175 Rather, it is 
best to understand the logic of scarcity as being a relational fact that exists as a 
mediatory result developed over time, in our history. In Sartreʼs words, scarcity is 
what has made us “these particular individuals producing this particular History.”176 
Again, Sartre emphasizes both the necessity and the contingency of scarcity. This 
history is the de facto result of scarcity, insofar as (in)humans in scarce material 
conditions have produced it as such. This is the typical dialectical language that 
tends to spin readers of CDR in circles. But it ought not do so. What Sartre is 
developing is not so much pure foundational universals, but rather seeking to give 
explanatory power to the real, material conditions of this historical experience. And in 
relation to scarcity, what Sartre wants to focus on is the ways in which scarcity 
conditions our relations with others and with nature. Therefore, Sartre is making a 
similar move as his parry in BN when he refused to do metaphysics in favor of 
phenomenological ontology; except in CDR he refuses to do ontology in favor of 
formal investigation. The result is that he defines scarcityʼs necessity, not as being a 
fundamental fact of the state of Nature or Being, but rather scarcity becomes a 
necessary formal construct that can aid social theorists in understanding the 
conflictual nature of social reality. And he is content to let it lie there. 
" Scarcity is also created. This is a unique point that Butterfield rightly 
emphasizes. This is not merely to say that scarcity is contingent. To say that scarcity 
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is created is to say that scarcity is a social construction. That is, scarcity, as a logical, 
formal condition of human relations, is a condition that is created by the perpetual 
totalizing flow of the dialectic. It is “a certain moment of human relations, which is 
constantly being transcended and partially destroyed, but which is always being 
reborn.”177 This is crucial, because what Sartre is effectively saying is that scarcity as 
such is not an ontological precondition so much as it is constantly being reproduced 
through totalization. It is praxis that reconstitutes scarcity in its efforts to transcend 
the present situation of scarcity, only to then reconstitute scarcity anew in the next 
moment of objectification. Thus, from objectification to objectification, scarcity is 
being transformed and reproduced based on the multiplicities that are being 
transformed and reproduced in praxisʼ aiming toward the possible in its creative 
project. 
" Sartre does muse about the possibilities of alien species or other practical 
organisms living in conditions outside of scarcity: “relations of immediate abundance 
between other practical organisms and other milieux are not inconceivable a 
priori.”178 However, such ideas are merely speculative and theoretical, and therefore 
they do not really concern him in understanding the formal conditions of this history. 
Thomas Flynn suggests that Sartre leaves room for theorizing about a possible 
“socialism of abundance.”179 For Flynn, sustained freedom is only possible under 
such conditions.180 However, for Sartre, in a world without scarcity “our quality as 
men [would disappear] and since this quality is historical, the actual specificity of our 
History would disappear too.”181 Thus, scarcity is what has defined us as ʻmenʼ (or as 
ʻhumanityʼ – as these terms are interchangeable ʻaccording to tasteʼ for Sartre). Thus 
a post-scarcity world would be a world in which ʻhumanityʼ itself would be re-created/
re-cast as something other than what it is and has been in this history. Likewise, 
history itself would be other, for this history is and has been characterized in relation 
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to scarcity. Therefore, a post-scarcity world would be a new ʻhistoryʼ, with a new 
ʻhumanityʼ.
" Until then, the whole of (in)human development must be understood in 
relation to scarcity. Scarcity explains fundamental structures, institutions, and 
techniques, “not in the sense that it is real and that it has produced them, but 
because they were produced in the milieu of scarcity by men whose praxis 
interiorises this scarcity even when they try to transcend it.”182 The result is that the 
history of humanity – in the milieu of scarcity – is the history of “non-human man.”183 
ʻManʼ is non-human, not merely in an abstract sense, or in a relation of exterior 
social relations (although such do hold). But more emphatically, ʻmanʼ is non-human 
because of oneʼs interiorization of the conditions of scarcity through totalization, 
which then come to mark each inhuman body as beings defined by scarcity in 
themselves. One can almost be excused for thinking that ontologically non-humans 
are imbued with scarcity. Sartre makes it clear however, that this non-humanity is not 
a depletion of some pre-existent human nature to which humans must return. Rather, 
non-humanity as such is only understood through ʻhumanityʼ as non-humanity, as not 
in fact being that which is called ʻhumanʼ. It is therefore a negative designation based 
on the negation of the image(s) of the human that are proffered in philosophical, 
anthropological, and scientific discourses. This is the ʻman of scarcityʼ.
3.2 Worked Matter, the Practico-Inert, and the Emergence of Exigency
" There is an oft missed distinction between worked matter and the practico-
inert. The practico-inert is that intractable inertia that arises from othersʼ praxis on 
worked matter. Although the distinction is slight, it is important to note that worked 
matter, as such, is not an alienating mode of being. If it were, then all praxis would 
lead to alienation (à la Hegel's notion of objectification). But this isn't the case for 
Sartre. Objectification in itself is not alienating. It is only when confronted by the 
mass of stored labor from others, culture, past history, etc. that ʻmatter' becomes 




" In itself, worked matter “functions as an inert universal memory [that] records 
and conserves the forms impressed on it by earlier labour.”184 It is the material 
fingerprint of (in)human activity upon the material world. Worked matter, therefore, is 
an abstract notion that designates the ways in which matter stores praxis, preserving 
it in itself as the new objective mediation that (in)humans encounter at each moment 
of totalizing praxis. Sartre does not have a term for matter that is non-worked. All 
matter for him is worked matter. This makes obvious sense in cultural environments, 
where material objects are tools of past labor that persons employ in their perpetual 
activities to create new tools or work upon material environments. The hammer, for 
instance, is an obvious worked tool. In itself, it bears the past praxis of the craftsman 
or the machines that built it. When a person uses this hammer, she is using an 
already-worked material device. She can either use this tool to create other tools (for 
example, fix a wheelbarrow), or she can perform a simpler task of hammering a nail 
into a board.185 
" However, understanding natural environments is where Sartreʼs idea 
becomes a bit more complex. For Sartre, all matter has already been ʻworkedʼ. “If it 
is true that matter effects an initial union between men, this can only be to the extent 
that man has already made a practical attempt to unify it, and that it has passively 
received the seal of that unity.”186 In other words, there is no conception of ʻnatureʼ in 
the typically modernist sense whereby there is a split between the world of humans 
and the pure world of nature, for nature itself has already been worked. One way of 
thinking about this is with regard to rainfall. Rain can be seen as a natural 
phenomenon. However, within the Sartrean paradigm, rainfall is already worked 
matter. From the chemicals in the air that affect its acidity, to the regional gathering 
techniques in locations around the globe, rainfall can only be understood as being a 
product of past praxis. Likewise, the oceans on the face of the Earth are polluted 
with oil and agricultural farming runoff; they are charted on maps to signal paths 
between continents; they are named and divided up into national territories and 
international waters respectively; they have been the sites of military conflict; they 
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have been plundered for resources – and all of this modifies (i.e. works) the material 
space. Therefore, the logic of worked matter reveals it to be a “passive synthesis 
whose unity conceals a molecular dispersal [which] conditions the totalisation of 
organisms whose deep bonds of interiority cannot be masked by their dispersal. This 
synthesis, therefore, represents the material condition of historicity. At the same time, 
it is what might be called the passive motor of History.”187 It is this ʻmolecular 
dispersalʼ that Sartre calls the practico-inert. And it is only by first understanding the 
basic logic of worked matter that the practico-inert becomes intelligible.
" There is a real sense in which matter, as objectified praxis, takes from 
individuals their ʻtemperatureʼ (la chaud).188 This ʻtemperatureʼ could also be called 
their impetus, their vitality. And as such, it pacifies bodies by making them inert in 
relation to the external inertia, as the former exteriorizes itself as an inert object to 
comport itself with the instrument. In this sense, there is a ʻtransubstantiationʼ 
between matter and praxis, a chassé-croisé where praxis takes on the inhuman 
inertia of matter at the same time that matter takes on the vitality of praxis. This 
cross-contamination results in the construction of the practico-inert field when other 
transubstantiated praxis-inertias are synthesized into a static totality. Therefore, the 
practico-inert field is replete with indefinite amounts, intensities, and variations of la 
chaud. As Elizabeth Butterfield states, “[Unlike] being-in-itself, the practico-inert is 
not separate from free human praxis – just the opposite: the practico-inert bears the 
marks of praxis through and through, as it is invested with human meanings.”189 
" The practico-inert field, therefore, becomes the fundamental realm of sociality 
for Sartre.190 Inhuman actors, in the milieu of scarcity, are mediated by the practico-
inert field. At the same time, matter is mediated by the praxical relations of inhuman 
actors as they seek to overtake (dépassement) their present statut in aiming towards 
future possibilities. 
" In this future-oriented activity, praxis interiorizes the practico-inert situation, 
appropriates it, makes it oneʼs own (ʻfreelyʼ), and then re-exteriorizes it through 
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in turn be re-interiorized by praxis and subsequently re-exteriorized. This division 
between ʻinteriorizationʼ and ʻexteriorizationʼ must be understood as an abstraction, 
for in practice, the activity takes place simultaneously at varying velocities of 
appropriation and flight. As such, to speak of it as though it were a temporal, 
sequential process is merely a heuristic device to establish the internal logic of 
totalization. 
" What is crucial to grasp at this point, however, is the resuscitating power of 
the interiorization of totalization. That is, not only does worked matter have the power 
to mineralize the vitality of praxis and then synthesize it into the practico-inert field, 
but praxis, in the same totalizing movement, breathes life into the stored praxis in the 
practico-inert field. The reason we can speak of it as coming to life is because the 
reader of a book, for example, appropriates the mineralized praxis of the author as a 
moment of her praxis (which itself is life), thus resuscitating the inert praxis in a new 
mode, a mode that now belongs to the praxis (i.e. life) of the reader – this is why 
Sartre refers to it as practico-inert. When this is done, counter-finality has been 
introduced, for even if the finality of the author was to have the piece written and 
read, one's specific interiorization as a moment of totalization is unique to her 
project, and as such, is counter-final to the ends of the original praxis-project. Thus, 
there is both life and death, both human and inhuman in the totalization at every 
step. It is only in the abstract that we can separate these 'moments' of the dialectic 
and speak of them as moments of totalization; in reality, they occur simultaneously.
" Once the practico-inert is understood as both practico and inert, its logic as 
the basic mediator of social relations becomes useful. There are two ways practico-
inert logic functions as a mediator: 1) in exigency and 2) in seriality. The former 
creates the conditions of the latter. The practico-inert is the logic that grounds both 
and reveals their intelligibility. And the entire logical chain is what threatens social 
existence with perpetual alienation. 
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3.3 Exigency and the Demands of Returned Praxis 
“Is it still necessary to state that not technology, not technique, not the machine are the engines of 
repression, but the presence, in them, of the masters who determine their number, their life span, their 
power, their place in life, and the need for them?”191
" Early in CDR, Sartre claims that, “Everything is to be explained through 
need.”192 For him, need is the real rationality of action – it is what motivates action. 
[Need] is the first totalising relation between the material being, man, and the 
material ensemble of which he is part. This relation is univocal and of 
interiority... Need is a negation of the negation in so far as it expresses itself 
as a lack within the organism; and need is a positivity in so far as the organic 
totality tends to preserve itself as such through it.193
In relation to the need of the organism, the material environment presents itself as an 
infinite field of possibilities of satisfaction. In this sense, Sartre seems to preserve at 
least some semblance of his earlier notions of freedom from Transcendence of the 
Ego, Being and Nothingness, and Existentialism is a Humanism. However, it must be 
kept in mind that at this stage in his investigation he is using simple, abstract 
concepts so that he can build his accumulating dialectical investigation towards the 
concrete and complex. What is important about his understanding of ʻneedʼ at this 
stage of his argument is the logical framework that it establishes between a basic 
understanding of individual praxis and the material conditions within which praxis 
totalizes. This basic understanding is what Kenneth Anderson refers to as ʻorganic 
subjectivityʼ.194 
" However, ʻorganic subjectivityʼ is only Sartreʼs foray into his investigation of 
the relation between praxis and the objective material conditions in which praxis 
acts. Another way of saying this is that, at the outset of his investigation, Sartre uses 
the notion of need in this simple manner so that he can start his discussion and then 
complicate it further, leading to its eventual transformation in a more concrete and 
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complex notion of the dialectical investigation. Like the ladder that gets one to the 
second floor and is then brought up to help climb to the next floor once the second 
floor is reached, so too does the basic formulation of the term ʻneedʼ become 
transformed in the deeper phases of the dialectical investigation. This does not mean 
that a notion of ʻorganic subjectivityʼ is itself discarded. Rather, praxis must be 
understood in every level of abstraction and complexity as the various levels inhere 
within one another in a given body. Therefore, an individual is at the same time 
organic, serial, and common to varying degrees of intensity, at various times. 
" Sartre admits as much when he notes in these early pages that this basic 
notion of need is “ignoring for the moment the collective constraints” that defines 
concrete need in its historical, material reality.195 But what needs to be understood is 
the basic logic that governs Sartreʼs understanding of need. And this logic is that of 
ethical motivation. That is, need is the basic cry of an organic subject that acts and 
moves in the milieu of scarcity, overcoming its present situation in seeking to satisfy 
a perceived lack. This is the basic motivation for praxis: to transcend the present 
statut, in aiming towards a future-not-yet-realized, in order to satisfy a need. Quoting 
Butterfield, “[The] experience of needs leads us to constitute the world as a place in 
which something must be done – or, morally speaking, in which something ought to 
be done... ʻtrue moralityʼ arises from the most fundamental human needs, and makes 
progress toward an ideal future of ʻintegral humanity.ʼ”196 Therefore, what is most 
useful in Sartreʼs formal investigation into organic subjectivity is that there is an 
indomitable ethical spirit at the core of the (in)human condition. 
" That said, this so-called ʻethical spiritʼ is impotent. It is buried under layers of 
alienation. The reason this ethical spirit is impotent is because of the mediatory 
particularities of the practico-inert field. If history werenʼt lived under conditions of 
scarcity, and if relations between men and women werenʼt mediated by the practico-
inert field, it would be possible to speak more fruitfully about a free ethical spirit in 
which human actors could seek ethical ends. However, because of the de facto state 
of affairs, there are demands that are placed upon (in)humanity that determine the 
conditions of their action. This is what is meant by exigency. 
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" As was mentioned at the end of the previous section, there are two ways the 
practico-inert functions as a mediator. The first of these ways is exigency. For Sartre, 
in order to understand need in the abstract, we must first understand how praxis is 
subordinated to the field of exigencies. This field presents the demands placed upon 
praxis that predestine the possibilities for the (in)human in any given situation. As he 
states,
[In] so far as [one] is dominated by matter, his activity is no longer directly 
derived from need, although this remains its fundamental basis: it is 
occasioned in him, from the outside, by worked matter, the practical exigency 
of the inanimate object. In other words, the object designates its man as one 
who is expected to behave in a certain way.197
In a very simple sense, this can be understood in terms of pure functionality. An 
object has a limited array of options for its use. These options are imposed on a 
potential user and ultimately dictate the way(s) in which the user can operate with 
the object. Of course, the user can always create new ways of using the object – this 
is the freedom of praxis. However, there is an inscribed set of parameters that 
impinge upon the freedom of the user at first. Certain objects of course have more 
demands placed upon them. These options are the result of various possibilities: 
size, quantity, legal parameters, cultural expectations, personal pleasure, etc. But the 
important point for Sartre is that these exigencies exist first as a limit, then as a 
demand, and are then interiorized by praxis in totalization. Even one who creates a 
new use inscribes new exigencies onto the object. In Sartre words, individuals 
“interiorise the exigency of matter and re-exteriorise it as the exigency of man.”198
" This must not be taken as dire hopelessness. According to Thomas Flynn, 
although it is true that exigency “restricts the effective choices which lie open to... 
praxis,” it is also the case that exigencies “generate solidarity as they convey 
responsibility”199 – again, an appeal to the ethical spirit. With this, Flynn introduces 
both a limiting and an opening up of freedom within the logic of exigency. It has a 
bivalent nature. It both limits freedom by placing demands upon praxis, and also 
calls forth to praxis, beckoning it to come – to transcend oneʼs present statut in 
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solidarity with those who are experiencing the common demands of the practico-inert 
field. Thus, without jumping too far ahead, but also hinting at the future of this 
unfolding investigation, it might be accurate to say that there are ʻserial exigenciesʼ 
and ʻfree exigenciesʼ. However, in order to firmly ground these two modes of 
exigency, it will be crucial to develop respective logics based on a solid 
understanding of the depths of seriality and the power of freedom in the irruption of 
the apocalypse. 
" To that end, it is first necessary to investigate the formal nature of exigency 
itself. That is, why is it that exigency demands? 
" In an excellent recent article, Christopher Turner expounds on this very 
problem. Illuminating a fact that is rarely discussed in the literature, Turner states 
that it is the return of stolen praxis itself that confronts praxis in a new situation of 
exigence. He remarks, 
[If] the matter that acts against the praxis of the human being is matter that 
has been acted upon by the human being and transformed, and if in this 
praxis matter has been invested with its efficaciousness by being stamped by 
human aims, then what really opposes human praxis is not so much matter 
itself, not even ʻprocessed matterʼ, but rather human praxis itself through 
matter.200
Although a simple enough observation, the implications are vast, and foundational 
for understanding the logic of exigency (and seriality). Summed up by Sartre in this 
pithy quote, “Man is mediated by things to the extent that things are mediated by 
men.”201 For Sartre, as for Turner as well, inscribed in the matter that mediates ʻmanʼ 
is the multiplicity of ʻmenʼ. Worked matter becomes an alienating mediation (i.e. the 
practico-inert) because of the presence-absence of the multiplicity of others in it.202 
So as the past praxis of others is turned against new praxes in the practico-inert 
field, the exigent demands become, at once, more clearly intelligible, and 
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simultaneously shadowed. The demands become clear in that their source has been 
identified: ʻmenʼ. But this clarity is muddied by sheer complexity. For, this is more 
than a simple understanding of counter-finality. Yes, in one sense, the return of 
stolen praxis is understood as being counter-final. However, this haunting by past 
praxis means that the multiplicity that confronts praxis in mediated reciprocity in the 
practico-inert field of sociality is a seemingly infinite molecular dispersal of the praxis 
of others. 
" Therefore, what confronts praxis in each moment of totalization is the 
indefinite scope of praxis itself. As Christina Howells succinctly states, “Human 
alienation and lack of individual control over history arise not because man is not 
making history but because he is not making it alone.”203 Therefore, the logic of the 
practico-inert as conditioned by exigency has been made intelligible: it is precisely 
the return of stolen praxis that confronts praxis as a multiplicity, setting infinite limits 
and making infinite demands as praxis both interiorizes and overcomes the 
molecular dispersal of mineralized praxis saturated by the milieu of scarcity.
But this logic is merely the penultimate step in the logical chain of alienation. The 
final step is seriality. Seriality is the formal, synthetic notion that encapsulates 
scarcity, need, worked-matter, the practico-inert, and exigency in one. But in 
Trinitarian fashion, seriality itself has a tripartite nature: diachronic, synchronic, and 
Kaironic. The next section, therefore, will investigate the logic of seriality in its 
synthetic pluridimensionality, with the hope being that the predicament of ʻhumanityʼ 
will be made intelligible.
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IV. Pluridimensional Seriality
“Reality, at the level of serial impotence, is the impossibility of living.”204
" This chapter presents an analysis of Sartreʼs development of the broad term 
seriality. Although Sartreʼs use of the term is complex and often unclear, this chapter 
develops a tripartite division of abstract terms that clarify the logic of seriality in its 
pluridimensionality. These terms are not Sartreʼs, but are derived from a close 
reading of the variant intensities in his deployment of ʻserialityʼ. Diachronic and 
synchronic seriality describe the variations within the alienating social force that 
Sartre singularly refers to as ʻserialityʼ. Kaironic Seriality refers to the impossibility of 
living under serial conditions any further. It both describes the Impossible and 
heralds the opportune moment to overcome this predicament. 
" At times, he does use modifiers to tinge his use of the term, but he is 
inconsistent in his deployment of these modifiers and doesnʼt spend any time 
developing how they function in their particular instantiations. That said, the terms 
diachronic and synchronic do appear throughout CDR, mostly referring to the 
movement of totalization which is “both synchronic (in the ensemble of the present) 
and diachronic (in its human depth).”205 However, twice Sartre does seem to attach 
the terms diachronic and synchronic to seriality. In the chapter “The Place of History” 
he remarks that, “group action is always doomed to synchronic alienation except 
when the practical community is identical to all the individuals in the common field; 
then it is doomed without qualification to diachronic alienation.”206 Here, he clearly 
separates the two terms as though the diachronic and synchronic experiences of 
alienation are distinct. Teasing out the specifics of these distinct terms in their 
relation to seriality will be the task of the second and third sections of this chapter. 
" The only other time he aligns the terms diachronic and synchronic with 
seriality is on the previous page where he avers that “objectified praxis must 
necessarily allow itself to be modified by a double alienation (both synchronic and 
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diachronic).”207 It is this experience of ʻdouble alienationʼ that is developed below as 
Kaironic Seriality. This term is useful in that it brings together the temporal and 
spatial, the singular and structural, and the horizontal and vertical dimensions that 
are contained within the terms diachronic and synchronic. However, whereas the 
latter two terms are useful only insofar as they make intelligible the distinct 
experiences of seriality under either lateral or vertical conditions, Kaironic Seriality 
fuses the two dimensions together to help us better understand the compressed 
nature of the Impossible and the virtual potency articulated by the logic of the 
apocalypse that dissolves the alienating force of seriality. As such, Kaironic Seriality 
will come to be seen as the complex, polyvalent experience of alienated existence 
that Sartre develops through an exploration of the logic of seriality in the milieu of 
scarcity, and it will also indicate how it is always the opportune moment for the 
apocalypse to irrupt. 
4.1 The Tripartite Nature of Seriality!
" There is a Trinitarian logic at work in Sartreʼs notion of seriality. The 
perichoretic relationship between the diachronic, synchronic, and Kaironic ensure 
that abstraction does not dominate the investigation into the formal conditions of 
concrete material existence. Of course, Sartre is still wont to utilize the simple and 
abstract for the purpose of building his dialectical argument. However, it bears to be 
repeated until it becomes a mainstay in Sartre studies: CDR is only concerned with 
the abstract insofar as it brings the reader from the simple to the complex. Therefore, 
this section will proceed in like fashion. Seriality will be examined in each of its levels 
of abstraction, enfolding them into one another as each stage of the investigation 
progresses. In the end, the logic of seriality will reveal a robust theory of alienated 
social existence that will give insight into the depths of the ʻhuman predicamentʼ.208  
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" Seriality is the social fact of alienation. It describes the ʻunityʼ of individuals 
within a social field that is conditioned by scarcity and the practico-inert. Sartre calls 
this ʻunityʼ a “unity of flight.”209 It describes the gathering of impotent individuals who 
are in relations of alterity in the social field. Thus, this ʻunityʼ is hardly solidarity. 
Returning to a point suggested by Thomas Flynn, there is a sense in which exigency 
unites individuals. However, this unity is non-directional in its formality. Only under 
particular conditions does the logic of exigency become intelligible in its concrete 
material reality. And for Sartre, real history must be understood in relation to scarcity. 
As such, under serial conditions, in the milieu of scarcity, the logic of exigent unity 
leads to the ʻhuman predicamentʼ of negative reciprocal relations between 
individuals, and simultaneously hints at ways this predicament can be overcome. 
" The exigence of seriality conditions all persons within a given social context. 
The extent to which such persons are conditioned, the scope of the demands that 
impinge on their freedom is the subject of this section. For now, it is sufficient to note 
that the products of (in)human striving are all structured by a serial logic. Sartre puts 
it thusly, “There are serial feelings and serial thoughts; in other words a series is a 
mode of being for individuals both in relation to one another and in relation to their 
common being, and this mode of being transforms all their structures.”210 That is why 
it is appropriate to speak of the ʻhuman predicamentʼ – the inhumanity of life on Earth 
– as being conditioned thoroughly by a serial logic. 
" For Kristian Klockars, seriality is a ʻtypologyʼ that makes any “concrete social 
field, real constellation of social formations or any society intelligible.” Thus far, we 
are in agreement. However, he further claims that seriality only “describes society as 
a static field, and not on the level of practices and history in process.”211 This is 
precisely where Klockars fails to comprehend the perichoretic nature of the abstract 
variations of seriality. For Sartre, totalization is intelligible as both diachronic and 
synchronic. It is diachronic insofar as totalization is temporalization, and synchronic 
insofar as the conditions of praxis in the practico-inert field are structural. Another 
way of stating this is that the diachronic accords with horizontality and micro-
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totalization, whereas the synchronic accords with verticality and macro-totalization. 
As Thomas Flynn writes,
Sartre distinguishes micro- and macrototalizations... the former refers to the 
concrete totalizing praxis of the organic individual whereas the latter denotes 
the social, cultural world as a network of significations occupying the space 
between the individual agent and physical nature, that conditions individual 
praxis and connects it with a web of meanings it may not have chosen.212
Therefore, totalization has both micro and macro components. What this means with 
regard to seriality is that totalization takes place under both micro and macro serial 
conditions. At the same time, the perichoretic nature of seriality conditions micro- and 
macrototalizations. 
" In real, concrete, material praxis, however, these layers or modes are 
concretized into a concrete universal. Flynn explains that “the concrete universal is 
the ʻincarnationʼ of this web of meanings in both its temporal (diachronic) and its 
structural (synchronic) dimensions.”213 Incarnation is therefore the most contracted 
or compressed point of pluridimensional seriality. In this sense, the diachronic is the 
Holy Spirit, the synchronic is the Father, and the concrete universal (what I will term 
ʻKaironicʼ) is the Son (i.e. the incarnation). As with the Holy Spirit, the diachronic 
flows through the immanent life of history. The Father is the transcendent stasis that 
bears the laws and codes. And the Son is the dépassement. 
" Comprehending this perichoretic Trinitarian logic prepares the investigation for 
the problematization to come. That is, in what follows, the basic components of serial 
logic will be unpacked and examined for their intelligibility and efficacy. The result will 
be that each component will be grasped in its own alienating capacities. However, in 
the end, once they are enfolded back into one another, a monstrosity will emerge. 
And the impossibility of continuing to live inhuman life under monstrous serial 
conditions will pave the way for the only hope of resurrecting human life. 
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4.2 Diachronic Seriality!
" Diachronic seriality is the most basic form of serial logic. It is understood as 
temporal and horizontal. And it produces the inhuman gathering that Sartre calls the 
collective. According to Nik Farrell Fox, “collectives are not substances but a set of 
ongoing practical relations between individuals.”214 They are fleeting unities that 
emerge through temporal succession depending on the collective object around 
which a particular group of persons is united. So collectives rise and fall based on 
the external object that unites them as a series. However, this object is understood 
as an “index of separation.”215 In other words, it imposes a serial exigency upon the 
members of the collective. In this way, Sartre insists that the collective is ʻanti-
dialectical.ʼ216 As anti-dialectical, the collective is a site of isolation with others. What 
this means is that, for Sartre, the collective shares a common being; but one that 
alienates by uniting individuals under the forced exigence of an external Other (i.e. 
practico-inert) that limits the free praxis of the individuals by making them inessential 
(i.e. interchangeable), conflictual, and other (i.e. every Other is other than himself 
and other than the Others). 
" The most notable example that Sartre uses to describe the collective is the 
bus queue. In the bus queue, individuals are united by the collective object, the bus. 
Each has a place in the queue, a particular number that defines this person by a 
quantity in relation to every Other. Each person, therefore, is an Other to every other 
Other. Because there are a limited number of seats (scarcity), there is a conflictual 
relation between the members of the collective. And because each person is a mere 
quantity, each is replaceable by another number. Therefore, in relation to the 
collective object, as united in flight under these particular temporal conditions, the 
individuals are impotent. Their actions are constrained by the demands established 
by the logic of the series. 
" According to Flynn, collective objects “keep serial individuals apart under the 
pretext of unifying them [in a horizontal inhuman relationship called] ʻrecurrence.ʼ”217 
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This recurrence infects the individuals across the collective and creates a false 
sense of solidarity. This false unity is what Sartre calls their ʻunit-beingʼ or their 
ʻidentityʼ.218 Identity, therefore, is ultimately an alienating self-imposition whereby 
members of a collective are united in alterity by an external object that limits their 
freedom by imposing exigency upon them. They, in turn, interiorize this exigency and 
become cogs in the diachronic serial wheel of recurrence. What is more, it bears 
noting that the logic of the series is produced in advance of any particular individuals 
arriving to enter into it in a given moment (as the aggregate of past praxis turned 
practico-inert). One then ʻfreelyʼ enters into the series by ʻqueueingʼ and as such self-
serializes oneself as one “actualises his being-outside-himself as a reality shared by 
several people and which already exists, and awaits him, by means of an inert 
practice, denoted by instrumentality, whose meaning is that it integrates him into an 
ordered multiplicity by assigning him a place in a prefabricated reality.”219
" That said, the bus queue, for Sartre, is a limited and superficial example.220 It 
serves its purpose in establishing the logic of basic seriality. But he moves to add 
complexity by discussing what he terms ʻindirect gatheringsʼ. His example of an 
indirect gathering is a radio broadcast. With the radio broadcast there is a genuine 
“lack of two-way communication [which inhibits] group formation and engenders 
feelings of extreme impotence and passivity.”221 The result of these feelings of 
impotence and passivity is that a collective – as united by public opinion – becomes 
defined by contagion. And as Sartre states, public opinion as a common material 
object in its practico-inert development “creates the unity of the discontent.”222 This is 
a social reality that produces various serial effects: fear, anger, riot, stagnation, 
resentment, complacency, etc. The point being that this complex variation of the 
ʻformula of the seriesʼ does not create an identity of commonality, but rather an 
identity of alterity. This argument prefigures the potential rejoinder that one might 
contest by suggesting that common public opinion about a political candidate, for 
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example, is uniting in a commonality. For Sartre, such a ʻunityʼ is merely another 
example of a fleeting unity, as such public opinion remains conditioned by the 
practico-inert field. The truth of the opinion is something prefabricated by Others in 
the collective and then imposed on the members in the series as the collective 
object.
" However, individuals are not constrained by a unilateral relation with the 
collective object. One is alienated first by the interiorization of the situation (or one's 
complicity with the serial condition) that is imposing itself from without, thus creating 
an alienation from oneself, a destruction of one's humanity. One is also alienated 
from the Other, as one is made an Other to oneself. As an Other, as an interiorized 
alienated non-human, one is marked in alterity as the Other non-human (who has 
undergone the same process of alienation) is Other in relation to the external 
system. This is what Sartre would later call ʻthe self-domestication of manʼ through 
interiorization (and subsequent exteriorization) that is crucial to the understanding of 
hostile social relations under conditions of seriality. 
" The logic of diachronic seriality is now intelligible. Individuals are united 
externally by practico-inert objects. A collective is formed. The members of the 
collective are marked by competition, alterity, and inessentiality. Individuals enter in 
and out of various prefabricated series in temporal succession; some of which are 
more basic (the collective/bus queue) than others (the indirect gathering/radio 
broadcast). These serial conditions are interiorized and exteriorized in a process of 
micrototalization. And the result of all this is that the passive activity of the series 
(both the individual members of the series and the series in its fleeting unity) is 
driven, not by need, but by destiny. That is, the basic logic of diachronic seriality 
reveals the foundational fact that life under serial conditions is not free – but 
predestined. In Sartre words, “destiny is an irresistible movement [that] draws or 
impels the ensemble toward a prefigurative future which realizes itself through it.”223 
Again, we see the logic of the practico-inert in its exigency on display in the 
collective. The latter is formed as a fleeting unity, through the compulsion imposed by 
the collective object, that establishes limits and demands on the collective, and then 
introduces the basic social experiences of competition, alterity, and inessentiality. 
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4.3 Synchronic Seriality!
"
" Although ʻlimitedʼ and ʻsuperficialʼ, the example of the bus queue creates a 
space for understanding the complexity of real material conditions. Each collective, 
at each queue, is part of a larger structural system that has both lateral and vertical 
components. Laterally, each particular queue is a stop on a route that further widens 
the scope of the collective. Sartre refers to this as the ʻinert conducting mediumʼ of 
inertia. This is the lateral relation of serial collectives dispersed throughout a given 
practico-inert field in so far as they are united indirectly. So, while the bus queue is 
an example of a direct serial gathering, and the radio broadcast is an example of the 
indirect gathering, this lateral inert conducting medium combines the two. For 
example, the members of the bus queue are not only directly gathered in relation to 
the collective object in their diachronic experience, but they are also united 
(fleetingly) to others within the broader public transportation system. Thus, 
diachronic seriality takes place both directly (in relation to presence) and indirectly (in 
relation to varying degrees of absence). In this sense, not only are the individuals 
within a given collective serialized, but the collective itself is serialized, as it is part of 
a larger diachronic serial process. Oneʼs place in a particular queue is further 
dependent on the other individuals in other collectives that are united by the 
collective object – the bus on this particular route. Therefore, scarcity is magnified in 
a broader milieu. This scarce bus-milieu becomes a field of indeterminacy. There is 
no way of knowing how busy it is, or how busy it will be, at various points along the 
route. Competition becomes intensified as quantity increases across temporal zones. 
Interchangeability magnifies as the route is enlarged to include greater density of the 
population. And inessentiality become more embedded as the number of potential 
replacements is increased. 
" Vertically, oneʼs place in the bus queue is part of a massive economic, civic, 
political, and cultural machine. Not only are individuals and collectives in a particular 
queue united with others in a large lateral relation by a collective object, but each 
individual, each collective, and the aggregate of them all, along a particular route, 
throughout a particular day, and over the course of the life of the public transport 
system, also share a deeper ʻidentityʼ as members of a systemic institutional logic. 
The collective object (i.e. the bus) is itself a particular appendage of a large complex 
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body of social relations. Other appendages include (but are by no means limited to): 
the other buses on the same route; other buses on the various intersecting and 
parallel routes; the management team who draws the routes; the city planners and 
legislators who approve the routes and determine the areas that are best suited for 
service; the commercial lenders who provide the business loans for the bus 
company; the banks who support the lenders; the civic authorities who determine 
subsidies for the bus company providing a public service; the insurance company 
that covers the corporation in case of accident and injury – examining the tangled 
web of structural relations continues ad infinitum. The point is this: there is a vertical 
(i.e. structural) logic that needs to be understood under conditions of seriality. This is 
the synchronic logic of seriality. 
" If the diachronic logic of seriality is abstractly defined by its temporality, the 
synchronic logic of seriality must be understood in its atemporality. That is, 
synchronic logic reveals the layers of structural complexity that impinge on 
individuals in serial conditions at each moment of lived experience. The extent of this 
structural complexity is immense, but suffice it to say that it includes the entirety of 
the relations that constitute the practico-inert field that unites the collective or indirect 
gathering. Sartre calls this structural complexity ʻobjective spiritʼ.
" Introduced towards the end of CDR, objective spirit refers to class-being in a 
Marxian sense. Engaging a passage from The German Ideology, Sartre says that 
[Individuals] find an existence already sketched out for them at birth; they 
ʻhave their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by  
their class.ʼ What is ʻassignedʼ to them is a type of work, and a material 
condition and a standard of living tied to this activity; it is a fundamental 
attitude, as well as a determinate provision of material and intellectual tools; it 
is a strictly limited field of possibilities.224
Again, Sartre appeals to the notion of destiny in relation to the demands placed upon 
workers in a field of limited possibilities. ʻObjective class spiritʼ is therefore the 
structural condition that predestines class life. Sartreʼs use of ʻobjective spiritʼ would 
continue in his psycho-biographical work on Flaubert, The Family Idiot (hereafter FI). 
There, he defines objective spirit as “nothing more than culture as practico-inert.” He 
would continue on to say, “The Objective Spirit represents culture as practico-inert, 
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as the totality to this day (in any day) of the imperatives imposed on man by any 
given society... For the Objective Spirit tells us, contradictorily but imperatively, who 
we are: in other words, what we have to do.”225 
" At this point, it is important to note that Sartreʼs use of objective spirit has 
more resonance with Dilthey than Hegel. It is worth quoting Butterfield in length:
Dilthey was critical of all constructionist approaches, from Comteʼs sociology 
to Hegelʼs philosophy of history, because he was opposed to the project of 
imposing an inhuman order onto human history by means of artificial 
constructions. In order to remove its idealist connotations, Dilthey redefined 
Objective Spirit in terms of concrete human expressions. Objective Spirit, he 
claimed, is constituted by both simple expressions, like the wind of an eye, 
and expressions that exist on a larger scale, such as language, customs, 
styles of life, the state, law, morality, economic systems, and science. In 
Diltheyʼs work, Objective Spirit also includes those human expressions that 
Hegel had included in Absolute Spirit: philosophy, art, and religion. When 
Dilthey used the term Objective Spirit, it did not designate any sort of ideal 
collective consciousness of a people; rather, he used the term to refer to the 
concrete collection of expressions that form a unity of context, like a 
ʻcommunity of ideasʼ.226
In this sense, objective spirit is like a 'Big Other' – the grand practico-inert that stands 
over history and that imposes itself upon the individuals within it. It is not an 
immaterial power guiding history, nor is it to be conceived as a group consciousness. 
Rather, it is the complex synthesis of the totality of praxis that has been stored in the 
practico-inert field. This includes all its laws, codes, cultural norms, political histories, 
economic theories, religious expressions, legal formulations, business models, etc. – 
and all the variegating complexities that each of these expressions of history 
represent. What matters for Sartre is that “the word ʻspiritʼ is shorn of its spiritualistic 
associations so that it simply means a medium for the circulation of significations 
[emphasis added].”227 
" This is where Sartreʼs renewed understanding of language becomes 
important. For Sartre, in CDR, “words are matter.”228 They are practico-inert totalities 
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that (in)humans use in totalization as they interiorize the cultural field (objective 
spirit) and then re-exteriorize a modified cultural field (objectifications of spirit). As 
Butterfield states, “Language always refers to the entire context of meaning, and for 
this reason, Sartre claims that when we read words we are actually swallowing 
society whole.”229 She would continue, “As the collection of human expressions in 
the world, Objective Spirit can be understood as a human creation. It constantly 
develops and changes, further enriched everyday by new expressions and creations 
of meaning. Each new action, when added to the collection, alters it slightly.”230 This 
process of swallowing society whole and then altering it in ʻeach new actionʼ is what 
brings together both the diachronic and the synchronic. Between objectifications of 
spirit, there is a temporal movement that separates the two (and that unites them in a 
relation of synthetic disjunction). What matters at this point, however, is that the 
complex structural condition that is objective spirit is understood as the serial force 
that conditions each moment in concrete material life. Therefore, as language is 
imposed on individuals as a practico-inert, it must also be taken up and expressed 
as praxis. This taking up and expression however cannot be understood as a free 
human action. Because language is conditioned by objective spirit, the words that 
are used are appropriated from the practico-inert field (conditioned by the milieu of 
scarcity) and then expressed in ways that themselves are conditioned by the limiting 
power of the totality that is objective spirit. So not only do words have inherent 
limitations, but the limiting possibilities that are presented by objective spirit ensure 
that life under serial conditions will remain inhuman. 
" This is not to say that there is a conscious awareness of this inhumanity in the 
interiorization and exteriorization of objective spirit. On the contrary, the radical 
unconsciousness of this inhumanity is a prerequisite for life under serial conditions. 
In lived experience (le vécu), there is a necessary unconscious comprehension of 
psychic life, as the latter is a totalization.231 And this unconscious comprehension is 
what gives identity to those who are united in inhumanity by objective spirit. Kenneth 
Anderson frames this comprehension this way: “We are united to others by inter-
94
229 Butterfield, 51. 
230 Butterfield, 54. 
231 Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Itinerary of a Thought,” in Between Existentialism and Marxism, trans. John 
Matthews (London, Verso, 2008), 41. 
individual structures of materiality, the most fundamental of which is signification, the 
most concrete and universal of which is language. A profound comprehension 
underlies the incommunicability and alienation accompanying the reality of language 
as an external public institution.”232 This ʻprofound comprehensionʼ is what Anderson 
refers to as a ʻpre-linguistic reciprocityʼ. Therefore, not only are individuals 
themselves alienated in relation to objective spirit, but they are alienated in relation 
to Others. This is because, under serial conditions, communication in any real sense 
is impossible as the expressed ideas are “not presented as the determination of 
language by the individual himself, but as his other opinion.”233 That is, the ideas that 
are expressed have been conditioned by objective spirit. 
" This is not to reduce objective spirit to language, but to give a profound 
instantiation. Objective spirit is the entirety of culture at any given moment, at every 
given moment, that impinges upon individuals and predestines their lives. Therefore, 
synchronic seriality drastically diminishes any notion of freedom under serial 
conditions. As objective spirit conditions praxis, inhumans appropriate those 
conditions as their own, creating identities in the process that have been externally 
determined by praxis that is not their own. This is the return of stolen praxis in the 
practico-inert. Words are spoken. Thoughts are thought. Activities are enacted. But 
all these expressions of life are no more notions of free human expression than the 
actions of a slave. 
" Diachronic seriality presents a temporal logic of alienation that is only 
deepened and complicated by the addition of synchronic serial logic. The result is 
two modes of alienation that dehumanize the anthropological predicament to the hilt. 
But there is yet one more step in the logical chain of seriality before the depths of the 
human predicament can be made intelligible. It is the admixture of the two into a 
grand synthesis of serial complexity. In passing, Sartre refers to this as ʻInfinite 
Serialityʼ.234 However, he does not explore the implications of this convergence as a 
formal notion. Therefore, in order to better understand the full extent of serial logic, it 
is crucial to investigate the interpenetrative effects of the lived experience of Infinite 
Seriality; this is what is being termed here Kaironic Seriality. 
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4.4 Kaironic Seriality!
" The term Kaironic Seriality is not a term used by Sartre himself. It is a term 
that this author derives from a close reading of Sartreʼs often ambiguous references 
to the social experience of seriality. In the abstract, this manifold experience can be 
divided into diachronic and synchronic modes. However, in real material terms, 
seriality is a constitutive pluridimensional field of alienation that impinges on inhuman 
bodies at infinite levels of interpenetrating variation. Kaironic Seriality is our effort to 
make the latter intelligible. Therefore, to understand its usage in the present project, 
it will first require us to understand the etymology behind its construction. Then we 
can look to CDR to see how and in what ways seriality is ʻKaironicʼ. 
" There are three layers of meaning to kairos that are most interesting in 
relation to Sartreʼs formal investigation into seriality. Two are theological and the 
other more properly philosophical, although the former two are also reproduced 
within the philosophical. The theological meanings pertain to the apocalyptic time of 
the Messianic Event, whereas the philosophical meaning pertains to the invocation 
of prescriptive action. Taking these two meanings together, Kaironic Seriality should 
be understood as the impossibility of life and the ever-present call for the apocalypse 
to irrupt from within the conditions of infinite serial alienation.
" There a sense in which kairos in the theological sense relies upon an ontology 
of peace. Restoring the world to rights is based on the assumption that the world 
was created in peace and that the ground of material reality is therefore peace in se. 
It is just that at the ontic level, antagonism has been introduced through sin. On the 
philosophical level, this ontological assumption is discarded. This is why our 
investigation of kairos moves from the descriptive to the prescriptive. The descriptive 
presumes that action in the opportune moment is known: it is meant to bring the 
world back into a peaceful relation with God whose law has been written on the 
hearts of men. But philosophically, there is no preformed ontological necessity that 
discloses precisely how to act. Thus, there is an openness and contextuality that 
characterizes the prescriptive understanding of the kaironic moment.
" Historically, the term kairos emerged in distinction to chronos. It is first found 
in the theory and practice of rhetoric, designating the ʻproper timeʼ, or ʻopportune 
momentʼ for an action. As Janet Atwill writes, “Kairos signifies, on the one hand, the 
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exact or critical time, season, opportunity, but it can also mean advantage, profit.” 
She would continue, “In mythic accounts... the opportune moment may be a matter 
of waiting for a god to fall asleep or turn his back.”235 Such a moment is opportune 
because the material conditions have created a space wherein acting becomes right. 
And what is more, the right action is not ambiguous, but is known by those in the 
situation who are at an advantage that was not present prior.  
" The term derives its significance from the Sophists who made it their 
responsibility to be able to exhort and intervene when the time was right. Protagoras 
is credited as being the first “to expound the importance of the right moment 
[kairou].”236 And later Aristotle would articulate the importance of knowing when the 
right time to speak was:
Making the audience attentive is a feature common to all parts of a speech, if 
there is need of it [at all]; for these remedies are sought everywhere, not just 
when beginning. Thus, it is ridiculous to amass them at the beginning, where 
all listeners are most paying attention. As a result, whenever there is an 
opportunity, one should say [things like] “And give me your attention, for 
nothing [that I say] pertains more to me than [it does] to you” and “I shall tell 
you something strange, the like of which you have never heard.”237 
In a very simple sense then, in its historical emergence, kairos, as distinct from 
chronos, was a qualitative rather than quantitative temporal designation denoting an 
opportune time to act. In rhetoric, this meant being aware of the appropriate time to 
wield oneʼs learned skills of articulation and persuasion to affect an audience toward 
desired ends. While we are not reproducing the rhetorical sense regarding a single 
speaker knowing how to rouse an audience, our usage of Kaironic Seriality does 
echo the importance of knowing when and how to act. This will be particularly 
important when we get to Part Two. But first, if we are to make the logic of Kaironic 
Seriality intelligible, we must understand the theological and philosophical resonance 
of kairos itself. 
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" Theologically, kairos is used in various ways. In the New Testament, Jesus 
declares that, “The kairos is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand.”238 This time 
of which he refers is the Messianic time of Jewish expectation. Jesusʼ ministry, then, 
can be seen as the self-proclaimed material instantiation of the kingdom of God. Of 
course, this fulfillment does not mean that the time of the kingdom is fully revealed. It 
is proleptically revealed, both now and not-yet. Thus, there is a dual tension that 
must be maintained in this use of kairos. The kingdom is both now-here and 
nowhere. There was still work to be done in order to bring the Earth to rights and 
create the single people of God promised in the Abrahamic Covenant. That said, this 
dual meaning does not explicitly refer to eschatology in terms of the chronological 
end time when the world would be brought fully back to rights fulfilling the Abrahamic 
Covenant. 
" The events that would lead to the death of Jesus would cause the early 
Christian church to consider this eschatological sense more fully, ultimately giving 
the futural sense more value over that which was already instituted in the life and 
ministry of Jesus. This is not to say that the ʻnowʼ element of the kingdom was 
erased, but rather to note how the emphasis shifted from the utterances of Jesus to 
those of Paul and then the early Christian community. Origen for instance deploys 
kairos to encapsulate both meanings relatively equally. For him, “kairos denotes a 
quality of action in time, when an event of outstanding significance occurs... a 
moment of time when a prophecy was pronounced... when a prophecy is fulfilled.”239 
This is when kairos begins to take on an apocalyptic intensity, one that would 
become the focus of post-Messianic expectation; a sort of post-Messianic 
Messianism. However, the Church rapidly sought to quell this sense of kairos in 
order to maintain stability and institutional legitimacy over the eschaton as such. That 
is, the Church viewed itself as the fulfillment of this second meaning that was 
instituted by the incarnation. And only through the sacramental system would the 
eschaton, or the age to come, be realized. As Koselleck notes, “A ruling principle of 
the Roman Church was that all visionaries had to be brought under its control.” This 
requirement to control the prophetic imagination was because, “The Church is itself 
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eschatological. But the moment the figures of the apocalypse are applied to concrete 
events or instances, the eschatology has disintegrative effects.”240 These 
disintegrative effects are precisely what occurred with the rise of the nation state and 
the market system as conditions of new forms of salvation that preclude the futural 
eschaton from ever coming, since this future fulfillment would mean the end of 
capitalism and/or the state.241 
" Philosophically, this dual sense of the now-here and nowhere of kairos is 
articulated by Nietzscheʼs Zarathustra. Philip Goodchild articulates this well when he 
muses:
I have not endeavored to write about his world, I have written about 
something outside, something future – a menace, a nightmare – but one that 
rapidly encroaches upon this world, that fills its interstices, that mediates its 
relations. I have written of the universal solvent that flows across our surfaces, 
into our pores, our gaps, our distances, our hesitations, and intervals. I have 
written about the power that has no time or place of its own, but remains 
forever to come – and yet its gravity is real and absolute.242
"
This Nietzsche-inspired aphorism tells of a future hope, a hope for a time to (forever) 
come. This ‘time’ must not be read as pertaining to chronos, but rather to kairos. It is 
an epoch, an ontological shift in piety, if you will. It is the kairos of the Overman. 
Nietzsche considered himself an ‘untimely’ philosopher. As such, his thought was an 
affront to the dominant pieties of the day. Perhaps this is the reason he has been 
viewed as such a threat to the religious establishment. However, his negativity 
toward religion and metaphysics (particularly the Lutheran Christianity of his geo-
historical context) must not color our interpretation of Nietzsche as a ‘nihilist.’243 Such 
would be a gross misinterpretation. After all, it was the ‘nihilism’ of Christianity and 
dogmatic Platonism that replaced the density of life, nature, and history with pity and 
weakness and with arid, grammatical inflation that is the true Nihilism. Resisting the 
‘nihilist’ reading of Nietzsche then, we must view him as a pious thinker of the 
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impious. In other words, his refusal of Christianity and metaphysics is not the 
affirmation of the nothing – it is the affirmation of the nowhere/now-here.
" To say that Nietzsche espoused an eschatology may in itself be impious 
among Nietzsche scholarship. But one ought not to be resistant to terminology 
merely for its accepted, canonical reception among the majority. Therefore, re-
appropriating the term ‘eschatology’ outside the preconceived bounds of 
metaphysical dogmatism and in direct contradistinction to such preconceptions might 
actually clarify Nietzsche’s future hope as an apocalyptic vision.
" Nominating Nietzsche’s eschatology as the nowhere/now-here is an 
intentional play on the traditional eschatological formula of the now-and-not-yet. As 
mentioned earlier, this eschatological formula celebrates the initiation and partial 
realization of the kingdom. For Christian theology, this now/not-yet tension is both 
the hope for the future fulfillment of God’s divine intervention and also a challenge to 
reposition oneself and the Christian community as participants in this divine 
intervention.244 In contrast, nowhere/now-here does not derive impetus from extrinsic 
sources. There is no ‘divine life’ to which participants of life, nature, and history must 
correspond. There is only the active flux of immanent life that equips and determines 
possible futures to come.
" The ‘now-here’ dimension of Nietzsche’s eschatology is the immediate 
presence of immanent life. Corresponding with Sartreʼs sentiment that man makes 
history to the extent that history makes man, Nietzsche believed that human beings 
were both products of fate and creators of life. As Keith Ansell Pearson claims, 
“Although fate is nothing other than a chain of events, as soon as we act we create 
our own events and come to shape our own fate.”245 This means that there is no 
future point from which humanity must derive its present purpose. There is no 
externality that can give meaning to life – life qua activity is meaningful. This also 
means that the eschaton is now-here. The flow of received energy that constitutes 
life is only to be affirmed as is. And in this affirmation of life, humanity is able to 
create itself without viewing life – to any degree – as instrumental. 
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" Although the Christian legacy has long sought to derive human solidarity from 
the universal commonality of the imago dei, such a formula is entirely instrumental. 
For instance, John Milbank asserts, “As theology puts it, we are to love people 
because – and even only insofar as – they display the image of God.” He continues 
on by claiming that this universal commonality is “unique and particular.”246 The 
significance here is that, for Milbank, only that which is ‘unique and particular’ can 
provide real value as it ‘stands out’ in marked contrast to the ordinary. Questions 
arise however: Is he trying to derive the ‘unique and particular’ from the universal? 
And in the process, is he not merely reducing the value of immanent life to a 
derivative? No doubt, his answer would be that he is not viewing human life in 
instrumental terms, but in participatory terms. However, is he not always already 
betrayed by the very framework within which he works – namely, the Onto-
Theological orientation of thought? Anticipating Milbank’s (and the entirety of 
orthodox Christianity’s) apologia, Nietzsche wrote the following:
To love mankind for God’s sake – this has so far been the noblest and 
remotest sentiment to which mankind has attained. That love to mankind, 
without any redeeming intention in the background, is only an additional folly 
and brutishness, that the inclination to this love has first to get its proportion, 
its delicacy, its grain of salt and sprinkling of ambergris from a higher 
inclination: – whoever first perceived and ‘experienced’ this, however his 
tongue may have stammered as it attempted to express such a delicate 
matter, let him for all time be holy and respected, as the man who has so far 
flown highest and gone astray in the finest fashion!247
Therefore, a Nietzschean response to Milbank would be that loving others ‘for God’s 
sake,’ regardless of any qualification (i.e. appeals to participatory ontology or the 
universal commonality of the imago dei), is folly because appealing to ‘higher 
inclinations’ only misdirects human attention (i.e. piety). Instead, Nietzsche’s impious 
piety leads him to a rejection of transcendence as such in favor of a radical 
affirmation of life; the resultant process being that humanity is able to create itself 
and recreate itself through endless valuation.
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" Without transcendence governing the open process of valuation, the eschaton 
must also be viewed as nowhere. Prolepsis is the idea that best encapsulates the 
nowhere’s relation to the now-here for the precise reason that Nietzsche’s future 
humanity is always virtually existing before it actually does – this is the untimely 
character of his philosophy. What this anticipatory representation signifies is that 
immanent life is both the condition and the hope of Nietzsche’s apocalypse. His 
doctrine of the ‘eternal recurrence of the same’ is his shorthand for this hope.
[W]e have to put the past—our past and that of all humanity—on the scales 
and also outweigh it—no! this piece of human history will and must repeat 
[wiederholen] itself eternally; we can leave that out of account, we have no 
influence over it: even if it afflicts our fellow-feeling and biases us against life 
in general. If we are not to be overwhelmed by it, our compassion must not be 
great. Indifference needs to have worked away deep inside us, and enjoyment 
in contemplation, too. Even the misery of future humanity must not concern 
us. But the question is whether we still want to live: and how!248
Baffling as this doctrine may be, ‘eternal recurrence’ is as crucial to Nietzsche’s 
corpus as is ‘Will to Power.’ For, eternal recurrence is the fate that articulates life, 
nature, and history – it is its motor and its schema. With the latter in mind, eternal 
recurrence must not be understood as either stasis or bland repetition within linear 
time. In many ways, Eastern understandings of cyclical time may actually provide us 
with the best analogy of what Nietzsche was expressing. This is because eternal 
recurrence “has a ‘transforming effect’ not through the creation of any new energy 
but simply by creating ‘new laws of movement for energy.’”249 And it is this latter 
possibility of recreation that enables human beings to order themselves differently – 
both as singular assemblages of forces and as a group. 
" Although this fate is daunting for humanity, it must also be understood as the 
greatest test of human resolve. As creature-creators, acting within the conditions of 
fate that precede us, we inherit all the possibilities of life with which we are 
responsible to create – endless valuation. To whom are we responsible? Ourselves 
and none other. And it is this mantle of responsibility that humanity must take up in 
order to create itself as more than human – the Overman. Thus, the future of ‘man’ is 
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a ‘man of the future,’ one that is a result of humanity’s continual creation and 
recreation of values. In this sense then, in the sense of a reconstitution of humanity 
as such, is Nietzsche’s eschatology to be understood; for, the conditions of life are 
always now-here and nowhere – the affirmation of life and the Overman:
This man of the future, who in this wise will redeem us from the old ideal, as 
he will from that ideal’s necessary corollary of great nausea, will to 
nothingness, and Nihilism; this tocsin of noon and of the great verdict, which 
renders the will again free, who gives back to the world its goal and to man his 
hope, this Antichrist and Antinihilist, this conqueror of God and of Nothingness 
– he must one day come. But what am I talking of? Enough! Enough? At this 
juncture I have only one proper course, silence: otherwise I trespass on a 
domain open alone to one who is younger than I, one stronger, more ‘future’ 
than I – open alone to Zarathustra, Zarathustra the godless.250
So while Nietzscheʼs conception of the nowhere and now-here is crucial to 
understanding the first two senses of kairos, the articulation of this ʻday to comeʼ is 
still unclear. That is, the necessity of this ʻconqueror of God and of Nothingnessʼ 
needs to be understood in its material manifestation as irrupting into the now. And 
this is why the term Kaironic Seriality has use in relation to diachronic and 
synchronic seriality. For, whereas the diachronic and synchronic remain at the level 
of description, Kaironic Seriality also implies prescription. It implies that the time is 
now to act, so there must be an act. In this way, it mediates between the diachronic 
shift from collective object to collective object and the synchronic structuration of 
objective spirit that conditions these diachronic shifts. 
" Analogously, we might say that kairos acts as the shifter or the invocation 
between the semiotic (synchronic) and the semantic (diachronic). According to Émile 
Benveniste, speaking is formally impossible. This is because language is divided into 
the semiotic and the semantic. The semiotic are names/signs and the semantic is 
discourse (logos). In the semantic, we enter the mode of signification proper of 
discourse. Discourse is not the sum of signs. Rather, it is the global sense which 
realizes itself in signs. But how is this paradox of the formal impossibility resolved in 
material speech? In a sense, this has to do with the invocation, the call to act. 
Benveniste refers to this invocation as ʻenunciationʼ. Enunciation is what makes it 
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possible for each person to express his or her subjectivity. Through the use of ʻdeictic 
indicatorsʼ (I, you, etc.), one is able to designate him/herself as participating in the 
inter-subjective discourse: “Language is possible only because each speaker sets 
himself up as a subject by referring to himself as I in his discourse.”251 The power of 
the deictic indicator therefore is precisely in its bridging the gap between the semiotic 
and semantic, the synchronic and the diachronic, as it enacts a performative 
utterance. 
" Deleuze refers to these indicators of enunciation as ʻpragmatic factorsʼ:
Besides studying the structures of language, linguistics has had to address a 
whole semantic domain that does not result from these structures and keeps 
them open indefinitely. But increasingly, this affirms the importance of 
pragmatic factors, which are not outside the language, or secondary, but 
which are internal variables, agents of enunciation with which languages or 
change occur [emphasis added].252
Passing from potentiality to actuality then is the problem that Kaironic Seriality 
corresponds to. If seriality were only understood in diachronic and synchronic terms, 
the movement of totalization would have no way to speak about real material 
seriality. It would remain purely at the formal level. But seriality is not merely formal, 
even though its logic must be understood as such in the first instance. As part of the 
living logic of action in CDR, the logic of seriality must also have a lived component. 
In other words, how are the formal and logical conditions of serial life mediated by 
the practico-inert field embodied in praxis? And what is more, could it be possible 
that this embodied experience of seriality produces the conditions of its own 
dissolution?
" So, if kairos designates the opportune time to act, the issue becomes how to 
enact this moment. And if kairos also indicates a dual sense of both now-and-not-yet, 
understanding how to attune ourselves to the opportunity of the moment in order that 
we act is paramount. Bourdieu refers to knowing the right moment as the 
ʻembodimentʼ of an art. It is not something one has, but something one is. Only this 
embodiment “makes it possible to appreciate the meaning of the situation instantly, 
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at a glance, in the heat of the action, and to produce at once the opportune 
response.”253 As we will discuss in the next chapter, Sartre describes the action of 
the response to seriality through the logic of the group in the wake of the apocalypse. 
However, we cannot understand the logic of this rupture if we do not understand the 
perpetual presence of the threat of the Impossible insofar as it constitutes inhumans 
entirely in their social relations. 
" To sum up the relation of the above discussion of kairos in its relevance to the 
logic of seriality: kairos describes the the age of pluridimensional seriality; it heralds 
the opportune moment and a sense of the perpetual presence and absence of the 
apocalypse; kairos also calls for action under particular conditions. Therefore, 
Kaironic Seriality is a useful term in that it encapsulates the complexity of the 
opportune moment whereby the apocalypse can break forth under extreme 
conditions of serial alienation (i.e. the Impossible). 
" Turning back to CDR, although Sartre does not use the term ʻKaironic 
Serialityʼ, he hints at its meaning. Referring to collective and basic sociality, Sartre 
claims that he had to simplify matters to make the formula of seriality intelligible. And 
while simple collective structures do exist diachronically, life in concrete material 
conditions is more complex. What Sartre calls a massified dispersal of serial 
conditions is what is encompassed in the descriptive component of Kaironic Seriality. 
This massified dispersal is made up of “complex chains and polyvalent systems” 
through which multiplicities change position, making new connections and 
establishing new orders of relation within the varying layers of complex chains and 
polyvalent systems.254 In other words, as individuals move through their daily lives, 
they engage in an endless repetition of connectivity with various serial conditions – 
both diachronic and synchronic. A woman in a bus queue, for example, is serialized 
in relation to the direct collective object, the indirect series, the structure of the public 
transportation system, and all the complex layerings that constitute objective spirit in 
each contracted moment. This massified dispersal compresses down on inhuman 
bodies, creating a monstrosity of alienation that mediates all social relations under 
conditions of scarcity in real history – this is the concrete universal. Every new 
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temporal expression of totalization creates a new network of massified dispersal, 
shifting individual components in and out of a network of serial alienation, with some 
elements dropping out of the network and others entering it, creating new 
experiences of alienation. 
" As the network of alienation is reordered in its constant state of flux, serial 
powers also increase and decrease in intensity. For example, a personʼs religious 
commitments will shift depending on her proximity to particular persons and 
locations, or depending on the day of the week. Likewise, when a lawyer leaves her 
office for the day, she leaves behind certain direct series and collective objects and 
picks up new ones as she gets into her car, fills her gas tank, and meets friends for 
after-work drinks; all the while retaining her identity as a lawyer (as well as a lover, a 
daughter, a Muslim, a runner, a Democrat – and all these to varying degrees of 
complexity and intensity). This results in a variegating serial existence. That is, 
Kaironic Seriality is not to be understood in homogenous terms. It may be acceptable 
to speak of it as hegemonic, but only if it is understood that this hegemony is itself 
more akin to a shifting network of power relations than a static web. 
" Sartre calls the total field of seriality “Earth.” It is the “Elsewhere of all 
Elsewheres,” or even better ʻthe series of all series of series,” which he says will 
“either crush me or ensnare me.”255 There is a hint of humor in referring to the total 
field of seriality as ʻEarthʼ, but only in the sense that it recalls feelings of absurdity. 
Sartreʼs point is that life on Earth is lived in paralysis, practical impotence. In his 
words, “[All] men are slaves in so far as their life unfolds in the practico-inert.”256 
Freedom, then, in this context, is a pipe dream. It has nothing to do with any 
possibility of ʻfreedom of choiceʼ. Rather, freedom under serial conditions is only “the 
necessity of living these constraints in the form of exigencies which must be fulfilled 
by a praxis.”257
" But there is still a sense in which individuals bear a uniqueness in Kaironic 
Seriality. And this uniqueness is what hints at the impossibility of living serially in 
perpetuity. This is where the second sense of kairos becomes relevant. Kaironic 
Seriality does not just describe the time or age in which we live, but it also indicates 
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the source of its own overcoming. If life were merely dominated by a homogenous 
monstrosity, then there would be no hope for novelty. The famous maxim, ʻThe 
masterʼs tools will never dismantle the masterʼs houseʼ would ring unquestionably 
true. But because “life is a perpetual (horizontal and vertical) re-totalisation,”258 the 
dialectic creates space for novelty to emerge through the irruption of ʻdifferentialsʼ. In 
other words, within the structures of Kaironic Serialityʼs dominant logic exists the 
flows of life from which freedom can break forth. Elizabeth Butterfield signals the way 
forward:
There is both similarity and difference in the way individuals internalize the 
external. The external practico-inert structures which are internalized are 
stable enough to allow the use of concepts such as the ʻspirit of the 
generation,ʼ a certain ʻFrench attitude,ʼ or the ʻCatholic mindset,ʼ for example. 
Yet, at the same time, each individual internalizes these entities from his or 
her unique position, and an individualʼs perspective on the greater Objective 
Spirit cannot be replicated... An individualʼs expression always reflects the 
particular ʻspinʼ of his or her unique understanding and perspective.259
" This unique spin is what Sartre refers to as ʻthe differentialʼ. Yes, objective 
spirit conditions each moment in a common way. After all, it is the entirety of culture 
objectified in a monstrous practico-inert field that is mediated in a social milieu. So 
there are limited possibilities in the objective material life of individuals. They are 
predestined. However, the returned praxis that haunts life in the present and 
demands that life be lived according to the dictates of Kaironic Seriality can cause a 
break. This is the impossibility for Sartre. It becomes “impossible that this should 
continue; it is impossible that it should be unchangeable; it is impossible that there 
should be no way out, that I should continue to live like this.”260 And with a 
resounding, “No!” the tyranny of Kaironic Seriality can and must be contested. As the 
common condition is interiorized, a transformation takes place which creates a space 
for freedom to emerge. This is not to suppose that freedom will emerge. For as Nina 
Power rightly states, “For Sartre, it is eminently possible to live ʻseriallyʼ... and never 
have an experience of humanity.”261 But it is to signal that the hegemonic control of 
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Kaironic Seriality is not without its own dissonance. In fact, Kaironic Seriality contains 
its own internal contradictions. As the shifting network of Kaironic Seriality creates 
new connections and deepens intensities of alienation lived on ʻEarthʼ, unconscious 
exigencies of resistance begin to form when a chord is pricked through the unique 
ʻspinʼ of totalization. Perhaps this prick is better understood as a spark – a spark of 
life. This spark is the source of freedom that emerges within the opportune moment 
of life lived in Kaironic Seriality. As the latter expands its constitutive control over life, 
so too does the pressure it exerts, making the opportune moment a perpetual fact of 
Kaironic Seriality. In a sense then, the logic of Kaironic Seriality both describes the 
times as being thoroughly conditioned by pluridimensional mediatory relations (i.e. 
the practico-inert field) and infused with a corresponding variegating experience of 
social alienation (seriality), and it also also describes the necessity of 'humanity'. Not 
that this necessity is experienced by all, but that this necessity is always looming, 
always part of the process of totalization itself. The time to act – kairos – is always 
now because of the compression of seriality, which perpetually creates a situation of 
impossibility. But becoming better aware of this impossibility is another issue, one 
that will concern Part Two. For now, we just need to reiterate that it is never not a 
moment that requires action and that the spark for this action is the result of seriality. 
" Before examining the logic of this spark, an analogy will be helpful to clarify 
the logic of Kaironic Seriality. In the middle of 2015, as the Supreme Court of the 
United States was preparing to rule on Obergefell v. Hodges, a large cohort of 
American Evangelicals compared the looming legalization of gay marriage to the rise 
of fascism in Nazi Germany. Then-president of the Southern Baptist Convention 
(SBC), Dr. Ronnie Floyd, charged SBC disciples that “this is a Bonhoeffer moment 
for every pastor in the United States.” 
" At the time, Bonhoeffer scholar, Stephen R. Haynes, wrote a concise article262 
arguing that such a designation is a radical distortion of the Bonhoeffer legacy, one 
that serves the presuppositions of the Evangelical political narrative more than any 
faithful rendering of Bonhoefferʼs own outlook. The article is a cursory introduction 
into the life of the pacifist theologian turned attempted Hitler assassin, Dietrich 
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Bonhoeffer, who was arrested by Nazi forces in 1943 and subsequently executed 
after an investigation revealed his involvement with the failed 20 July Plot. 
" The primary point of Haynesʼ article was singular: to re-situate Bonhoefferʼs 
legacy, wresting it from the pious hands of individualist religionists to set it free in the 
ethico-theo-political arena where it belongs. Quoting Bonhoeffer from his 1933 essay 
“The Church and the Jewish Question”: “[The] church has an unconditional obligation 
to the victims of any ordering of society — even if they do not belong to the Christian 
community.”263 What Bonhoeffer does not say is that “The church has an 
unconditional responsibility to convert individual souls for the Kingdom” or that “The 
church has a responsibility as moral arbiters of world politics.” What Bonhoeffer does 
say, repeatedly, is that a truly costly discipleship is one in which the Christian 
community treads the narrow path of social life by aligning with those who are the 
“weakest and most defenseless brothers of Jesus Christ.”264 
" Foreshadowing the Liberation Theology movements that would emerge in the 
50s and 60s in Latin America and that would take on various forms up through the 
present day, Bonhoefferʼs theology, his gospel, was necessarily ethical and social. 
His ministry was directed towards social malaise in the material world. Aligning God 
with the suffering man on the cross, Bonhoeffer believed that God allowed himself to 
be “edged out of the world.”265 As such, a faithful Christian witness is one lived in 
solidarity with the weakness of suffering humanity, not in the vindication of personal 
piety through theurgic practice. Combatting the German Christianity of his day, 
Bonhoeffer was appalled at the self-indulgence of private religion. This is why 
Haynes was compelled to challenge the hyper-individual sensationalism of the 
Evangelical misappropriation of Bonhoeffer when faced with what they saw as a 
threat to the moral laws of God. To claim that it was a “Bonhoeffer moment” in 2015, 
as a reaction to the perceived moral decline of American culture, is to misunderstand 
the logic of the original “Bonhoeffer Moment” – or kairos. 
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" One year later, an historical moment stoked the flames of fear in such a way 
that the call for the opportune moment resurfaced. This time, however, Haynes 
himself was wielding the image. Although far from a clarion call, Haynes wrote a 
follow-up article entitled, “Has the Bonhoeffer Moment Finally Arrived?”266 Haynes 
implies that the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States might just 
be a more accurate context in which to apply the kaironic designator. A stimulating 
article, Haynes doesnʼt lavish energy debating Trump-Hitler comparisons (in fact, he 
outright states, “Trump is not Hitler”). Instead, he illuminates a common structural 
tendency between Bonhoefferʼs historical ʻmomentʼ and the present. 
" This tendency is a broad logical paradigm that emerges in a milieu of crisis. 
As Haynes states “we cannot forget that [Trump] came to power reiterating promises 
that appealed to the most racist and xenophobic elements of the American 
electorate, promises that have instilled anxiety and fear in millions of Americans.” 
Thus, it is the potential threat of racist and xenophobic rhetoric become policy and 
vigilante action that kindles Haynesʼ exhortation to embrace “our responsibility to 
those under threat.” For Haynes, the logic of a Bonhoeffer Moment requires that 
there be an immediate threat to life; in particular, to those who are marginalized, 
underrepresented, oppressed, threatened. 
" This is all well and good as a rhetorical device to stimulate the hearts and 
minds of liberal Christians with predilections for social justice. But Haynesʼ 
exhortation would benefit from both a deeper analysis and a broader appeal. This is 
not to suggest that there is no use-value in this type of Social Gospel appeal. Surely 
there is. We also must not disregard any affective pull through the deploy of 
Bonhoefferʼs legacy. Rather, it is to suggest that, as was noted above with regard to 
Milbank, there is a restricted and restricting logic at play that stifles the potency of 
social solidarity percolating on the surface of any given social context. To truly 
engage in effective social action there must be an appropriate awareness of the 
material conditions that produce crises, and a narrative that can rouse a large 
swathe of participants.
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" In a recent Boston Review Article,267 Ronald Aronson argues that there must 
be both a warm and cold stream that characterizes liberatory politics. The warm 
stream is akin to subjective affects, motivation, and transformation; whereas the cold 
comports itself toward objective material conditions. Aronson suggests that both of 
these streams lost their impetus in previous decades, but that the Occupy 
movements and the Bernie Sanders campaign during the most recent election cycle 
in the United States signal a spark to life of the streams of transformative social 
praxis. In particular, it is a nascent future-oriented hope that Aronson finds so 
promising. Although not clearly defined, this ʻNew Politics of Hopeʼ indicates a site for 
growth that mustnʼt be downplayed. The germinal seeds of a revolutionary logic are 
at play – it is our responsibility to bring them to flower. 
" Towards this end, we must seek a dispositional re-orientation; one that is able 
to palpate the surface of simmering liberatory praxis and that also has a sensitivity to 
objective conditions. To appeal to the former requires a concern for subjectivity; to 
the latter, patience in analysis. This is what Haynesʼ article misses. His focus is 
squarely on a limited, pre-defined understanding of the ʻwarm streamʼ. Yes, he does 
feign at analysis by referring to a material crisis in an attempt to draw a throughline 
to the contextual conditions that led to Bonhoefferʼs resistance. However, to speak of 
a particular Bonhoeffer moment is to Romanticize or fetishize a cultural 
phenomenon. This tends to drudge up dramatic popular responses more than 
vigilant engagement. It also implies that there are moments which arenʼt 
ʻBonhoefferianʼ, which creates conditions for self-legitimized complacency. This must 
be resisted; not to proffer an alternative fetishized mantra of perpetual revolution, but 
because attunement to material conditions reveals the perpetual state of crisis under 
the conditions of Kaironic Seriality. 
" Further, the problem with the type of appeal exhibited by Haynes is that it 
actually ignores the perpetual, intrinsic crises of serial existence. As such, any 
appeal to a particular moment only offers reactionary solutions to a given situation, 
rather than active engagement. The point is not to dismiss Haynes or those of his ilk. 
Rather, this criticism is to force the conversation into deeper realms of emancipatory 
political thought and engagement. Toward this end, it would be better to speak of the 
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warm stream and the cold stream as being refracted through one another. Material 
conditions and subjectivity must be seen as co-inhering – as co-constituting 
tendencies that can only be understood in their relation to one another, as two 
factors contributing to the present holistic mise-en-scène. 
" Here is where we come full circle: it is never not a Bonhoeffer moment. That 
is, there is always an immediate threat looming, haunting us with destruction: 
destruction of values; destruction of freedom; destruction of equity; destruction of 
flourishing; destruction of hope; destruction of creativity; destruction of Life. In the 
words of Sartre, we are perpetually threatened by the Impossible. And it is being 
attuned to this monstrosity that will overcome the Romanticism that Haynes (et al) 
espouse. There are no special moments that require awakened activity. There is only 
a permanent state of crisis that requires endless vigilance, engagement. 
" This isnʼt to suppose that there are no geographical or temporal sites that 
require particular attention. Certainly there are contracted points of pressure within 
this matrix of crises. But these points are better understood as indicators that show 
us exactly where to direct our forces. They heighten our sensitivity so that we can 
focus our attention elsewhere, to different locales and times. But the logic of the 
Bonhoeffer moment persists. Under conditions of Kaironic Seriality, there is never a 
time for complacency or rest. The threat of the Impossible ensures that life is stifled – 
we are inhuman, in Sartreʼs words. 
" But this inhumanity also bears the emergence of humanity through the spark 
of the differential. We can transform our situations. In fact, thereʼs a sense in which 
we must – the descriptive analysis of crisis also contains the prescriptive invocation 
to act. By attuning ourselves to the perpetual threat of the Impossible, the 
impossibility of impossibility wakes us from our slumber. We no longer unknowingly 
embody crisis, but feel it as a disease. Sparked to life, we can create afresh, both the 
warm and cold streams. Refusing to stay neutral on a moving train, we can engage 
in transgressive praxis that experiments with our material conditions and ourselves. 
We can create new humanisms – that is, new logics about what being human might 
become. We can build new structures. And more than anything, we can stand in 
solidarity with those who similarly feel this threat. As Alain Badiou once remarked, for 
Sartre, “there was always some war to be fought.”268 But understanding how this 
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spark-to-life skirts the destiny of serial repetition by becoming a blaze of vitality 
requires an investigation into another type of logic altogether: the logic of the group. 
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V. Freedom and the Logic of the Group 
“The transformation therefore occurs when impossibility itself becomes impossible, or when the 
synthetic event reveals that the impossibility of change is an impossibility of life. The direct result of 
this is to make the impossibility of change the very object which has to be transcended if life is to 
continue.”269
5.1 Praxis, the Logic of (In)Human Activity ! !
" No discussion of freedom can take place without first investigating Sartreʼs 
understanding of praxis as freedom. In CDR, praxis is defined as “man – man 
making himself in remaking himself.”270 There is a practical self-referentiality in this 
maxim. ʻManʼ, for Sartre, makes oneself in the continual process of remaking 
oneself. There is an unceasing activity that is fundamental to the project of praxis. 
Praxical life is never settled. There are no moments of stasis in any real sense. Of 
course, abstractions can be made, snapshots can be taken, but these are only useful 
for particular conceptual ends, not for concrete dialectical investigation (except as 
moments within the broader dialectical investigation itself). As such, praxis must be 
understood outwith any reductive abstractions. The difficulty in this is that by 
speaking and writing about a process that is in perpetual flux, the very investigation 
itself can be seen to be an abstract reduction. This goes to the heart of one of Lévi-
Straussʼ criticisms of CDR: that Sartre uses analytic reason in his investigation of 
dialectical reason. The retort, of course, is that Sartre is not employing analytic 
reason (although CDR is a ʻregressive analysisʼ). Rather, CDR is a moment of the 
dialectic itself. Keeping in mind the Paradoxico-Critical orienation, this means that 
CDR is a self-referential productive paradoxical and critical exploration of the 
dialectic as such and also the grounds of the dialectic. Therefore, it must be 
perpetually upheld that what Sartre is attempting to investigate (expérience) are the 
conditions of an ever-flowing process of becoming. That is why he employs the term 
praxis (which in itself is a term that inherently includes a notion of movement) to 
define ʻmanʼ. 
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" In this sense, Sartre remains consistent with his earlier formulation of the for-
itself. Likewise, the practical project of praxis also works ʻfor oneself.ʼ That is, praxis 
creates oneself in the perpetual recreation of oneself. But this self-creation must not 
be understood in any primary sense. Self-creation is better understood as the self-
transformative process of totalization. What this means is that self-creation is not 
understandable apart from considering its relation to the situation, which itself is both 
praxis and inertia. Therefore, what praxis implies is also anti-praxis – and vice versa. 
The self-transformative process of totalization is the ʻdifferentialʼ that was mentioned 
in the previous chapter. It is the ʻunique spinʼ that praxis enacts in the totalizing 
activity. The point being this: the self-transformative process of one making oneself 
by remaking oneself is not a dualistic conception whereby one is separate in any 
ontologically meaningful sense from the material condition in which s/he is 
embedded. Rather, the self-transformation is an effect of totalization, which, as 
dialectical movement, can never be purely understood in its abstract components. 
This is why it is better to speak of praxis as being a structural and funtic notion, 
rather than an individualistic and ontic notion.  
" Against this idea is the dominant interpretation of praxis supported by thinkers 
like Raymond Aron and Thomas Flynn who see a primacy of praxis in CDR.271 For 
Flynn, it starts with the idea that, “Praxis, like consciousness, is ontologically free.”272 
Fitting praxis into the for-itself model, Flynn takes praxis to have a primary 
ontological status as a negating (i.e. transcending) activity. This is why he states that 
the subtitle for CDR could be ʻAn Essay on Social Ontologyʼ. Like in BN, what Flynn 
sees Sartre as doing in CDR is constructing an ontology. Therefore, praxis replaces 
the for-itself in content but not in form. As he sees it, praxis is a negating, 
transcending, free ontological activity that mirrors the ontological activity of the 
ʻproductive voidʼ that is consciousness in BN. The problem with this is twofold: first, 
praxis is not free. Praxis is predestined. Its ʻfreedomʼ is therefore a conditioned 
freedom that is rooted in the mediation of the practico-inertʼs relation to praxis. That 
is, the limited field of possibilities, as presented in Kaironic Seriality, limits the 
ʻfreedomʼ of praxis by determining what this very ʻfreedomʼ might mean. To speak of 
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praxis as being ʻontologically freeʼ is to claim a foundational purity that is absent in 
Sartreʼs understanding of mediation in CDR. There is only an abstract notion of 
praxis-as-free in the early stages of Sartreʼs development. As his investigation 
develops, however, this abstraction is itself complicated and transformed as he shifts 
from the abstract to the concrete material realities of the underlying logic of praxis. 
Therefore, praxis is better understood as – conditionally free in situations that are not 
of its own choosing.  
" The second oversight in Flynnʼs reading is that praxis is not ontological but 
practical. CDR is not an investigation into the ontology of praxis or social ensembles. 
It is a theory of the formal conditions of praxis. This does not mean that ontological 
considerations must be withheld. What it does mean is that such considerations can 
only come after the formal investigation has been undertaken without first assuming 
the basis as being ontological. Consciousness is understood as ontologically free 
because Sartreʼs understanding of consciousness was rooted in an individualistic 
notion of the human. Therefore, his basis was predetermined by his Cartesianism. 
Praxis, however, is a multiplicity, it is embedded, and it is expressed as totalization, 
which means that – formally – praxis is first and foremost the logic that explains (in)
human activity in history. This is how we must understand the basis of praxis. Praxis 
is the logic of (in)human activity as a system of interiority. This is where an 
investigation into freedom must begin. 
" But this logic of (in)human activity cannot be considered in isolation. As was 
investigated in the previous chapter, praxis is embedded in an age of seriality. And 
this serial conditioning radically limits any possibility for freedom. Under serial 
conditions, praxis is mediated by the practico-inert. The result is that one is alienated 
from oneself and from Others. However, through the ʻdifferentialʼ, as one interiorizes 
oneʼs situation in totalization, a space is opened up for genuine freedom. In isolation, 
the differential is meaningless. It is only when this differential is able to spread in a 
group setting that it can become a free (common) praxis. This spreading is the 
upsurge of affective antagonism emerging within Kaironic Seriality. And this affective 
antagonism is the logic of group praxis that will be investigated throughout the 
remainder of Part One. 
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5.2 The Apocalypse! !
" As early as 1946, Sartre began exploring the group logic that would come to 
be fully developed in CDR. In his essay “Materialism and Revolution” (MR) Sartre 
states, “It is precisely in becoming revolutionaries, that is, in organizing with other 
members of their class to reject the tyranny of their masters, that slaves best 
manifest their freedom [emphasis added].”273 What is most notable about this quote 
for present purposes is the notion of antagonism that Sartre states best manifests 
freedom. This is an idea that would follow him for the rest of his political career and 
that would influence later thinkers such as Fanon and Badiou.274 Freedom is the 
rejection of control from without, which in turns instigates a free action from within. 
This is the shift from compelling to impelling. However, a problem immediately 
arises: how can free praxis impel if the Sartre of CDR eschews individualistic notions 
of freedom? How are we to understand freedom if there is no ontological primacy of 
individual praxis à la Aron and Flynn? That is, how can Sartre maintain a notion of 
freedom that is both committed to subjectivity and that is consistently materialist? To 
understand this requires an investigation into Sartreʼs notions of the apocalypse and 
the group-in-fusion. 
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" Apocalypse, for Sartre, is not to be understood eschatologically. Rather, the 
apocalypse is the revealing or appearing of the novel.275276 Sartre derives the term 
from André Malrauxʼs novel on the Spanish Civil War, Days of Hope,277 in which the 
characters are torn between the dire reality of their situation and the undeniable 
hope they know to be delusional. They describe this ambiguity as an “Apocalypse of 
fraternity.” The story continues: “[The] apocalyptic mood clamours for everything right 
away... [But] itʼs in the very nature of an Apocalypse to have no future... Even when it 
professes to have one.” 278 This is a hope against hope, a hope that lays one bare to 
the situation. In this hope, there is both resilience and defeat. As Officer Garcia 
ruminates, “Apocalyptic fervor is ingrained in every one of us, and thereʼs the danger. 
For that fervor spells certain defeat... Our humble task... is to organize the 
Apocalypse.”279 This is perhaps the best definition of the tension between Kaironic 
Seriality and the apocalypse that one could hope for. It also recalls our attention to 
the perpetual hope embedded with the Sartrean project that we mentioned when 
distancing the present project from the pessimistic readings of CDR. By invoking 
Malrauxʼs use of “Apocalypse,” Sartre expresses an unwavering commitment to 
hope despite – or perhaps precisely because – of dire circumstances. Therefore, 
echoing officer Garcia, we must see CDR as largely concerned with organizing the 
apocalypse.280 
" There is a double movement in the apocalyptic moment: 1) negative and 2) 
positive. The negative movement is the dissolution of seriality. The positive 
movement is the transformation of subjectivity. Again, these two notions are only 
abstractly separate. In reality, they are simultaneous moments of dialectical 
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totalization. As Sartre states, the apocalypse is “the dissolution of the series into a 
fused group.”281 Here we see that Sartre does not equate the apocalypse with the 
group-in-fusion, but rather characterizes the apocalypse as the trigger that opens up 
a space for the group to be possible. It is the condition that is required for group 
praxis to emerge. But what exactly is the apocalypse? How does it function? And 
from whence does it come?
" The apocalypse is best understood as the initial break in Kaironic Seriality. As 
was discussed above, Kaironic Seriality is not a monolithic whole. There is an 
inherent dissonance within Kaironic Seriality. This dissonance is the differential that 
occurs in totalization when objective spirit (or the practico-inert more generally) is 
interiorized and given a unique spin. Objective spirit is common for all as objective. 
However, when appropriated by individuals (who are themselves uniquely 
compressed by serial conditions based on the variations of intensities of material 
relations impinging upon them at any given/every given moment), objective spirit is 
transformed through praxis. The multiplicity that inheres within the massified 
dispersal of Kaironic Seriality ensures that from objectification to objectification a 
mere repetition of the same is resisted and that novelty can emerge. 
" One way of thinking about the apocalypse is that it is a tear in the fabric of 
both horizontal and vertical seriality – what Sartre calls ʻInfinite Serialityʼ.282 It is the 
space opened up by the differential writ large. That is, the apocalypse is the 
intensification of the differential – the spark of life become combustible and 
contagious. As the impossibility of continuing to live life under Kaironic Seriality 
becomes more deeply felt, the fact of apocalypse becomes more actual. The 
potential for apocalypse is always there under Kaironic Seriality; people are 
thoroughly exploited; they are inhuman – this is the moment! However, there is a 
lack of awareness of this alienation. To some degree it may be understood. But this 
apprehension is not comprehension. Apprehension can still be repressed by the 
compression of Infinite seriality. This is how false solidarity arises, how social 
identities, class identities are constituted. They are genuine actions by individuals 
with genuine concerns, but they arenʼt transformative enough – they arenʼt violent 
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enough. Comprehension only arises once the Impossible becomes impossible 
through a radical irruption of common antagonism against seriality. 
" In the Preface to Fanonʼs Wretched of the Earth, Sartre shows how the 
colonized have reached this comprehension:
Terrified, yes. At this new stage colonial aggression is internalized by the 
colonized as a form of terror. By that I mean not only the fear they feel when 
faced with our limitless means of repression, but also the fear that their own 
fury inspires in them. They are trapped between our guns, which are pointing 
at them, and those frightening instincts, those murderous impulses, that 
emerge from the bottom of their hearts and that they donʼt always recognize. 
For it is not first of all their violence, it is ours, on the rebound, that frowns and 
tears them apart; and the first reaction by these oppressed people is to 
repress this shameful anger that is morally condemned by them and us, but 
that is the only refuge they have left for their humanity. Read Fanon: you will 
see that in a time of helplessness, murderous rampage is the collective 
unconscious of the colonized”283
Again, two things are apparent: 1) the compression from without and 2) the 
differential. But here Sartre takes the discussion one step further. Now, the 
differential is collective. And this is how he describes the logic of group fusion. Yes, 
there is still an external threat under which it is impossible to continue living. But 
more than that, there is the internal fury that is inspired by this impossibility. And this 
internal fury is what becomes contagious, what becomes the ʻcollective unconsciousʼ 
of common praxis. 
" Therefore, the apocalypse is the moment of irruption whereby individuals, in a 
novel sense, comprehend the impossibility of living the Impossible any further. As 
noted in the quote from Wretched of the Earth, this comprehension is unconscious. 
This is because what is actually taking place is a subjective transformation. There is 
a shift from inhuman to human. As Sartre would later state in “The Itinerary of a 
Thought,” subjectivity is “the small [gap] in an operation whereby an interiorization 
re-exteriorizes itself in an act.”284 This gap is the differential that was noted in the 
final pages of the previous chapter. It is also what was analogously described when 
discussing the performative capacity of Benvenisteʼs ʻdeictic indicatorsʼ and 
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Deleuzeʼs ʻpragmatic factorsʼ. Now, it can be classified as subjectivity itself. In other 
words, subjectivity, as the gap between interiorization and exteriorization, is the 
differential. The moment of totalization whereby praxis interiorizes and then re-
exteriorizes objective spirit and uniquely appropriates the latter by transforming it in 
novel objectification(s) is subjectivity. And this subjectivity under apocalyptic 
conditions is the root of freedom. Therefore, the apocalypse is the first moment of 
genuine subjective constitution in the creation of the human, coming to life out of 
conditions of previously indomitable inhuman serial existence. Thomas Flynn refers 
to this as the awakening of the “dormant seed of organic praxis in the humus of 
seriality.”285 While he doesnʼt talk of subjective constitution, what he is describing is 
the same awakening, the awakening of the power to truly, and for the first time, act. 
This logic will become clearer and more defined by investigating the group-in-fusion. 
But first, a question regarding how and when this apocalyptic Event breaks forth 
needs to be briefly discussed in relation to praxis and the logic of the group.
" In the previous chapter, the term kairos was explored in relation to the 
compression of Infinite Seriality to produce the effects of its own dissolution. Termed 
Kaironic Seriality, the argument was made that inhuman life is perpetually 
conditioned by historical circumstances that impinge upon it in such a way as to 
make living impossibly as inhuman itself impossible. The chapter concluded by 
suggesting that it is never not the opportune moment to act in antagonism to Infinite 
Seriality.  However, articulating how to act remains a problem. That is, what is the 
actual experience of an Event like, and can one be forecasted or even consciously 
created?
" According to Badiou, Sartreʼs theory of the ʻcollectiveʼ (he uses this term 
loosely to refer to groups) describes a “multiplicity of individuals whose unity is a 
passive synthesis.”286 What is more, Badiou claims that because Sartreʼs subject 
only emerges in antagonism to seriality, “the human is nothing more than the 
dissolution of the inhuman.”287 This infra-politics between flashes of humanity that 
emerge under historical circumstances of passive synthesis is insufficiently political. 
For his own part, the early Badiou wants to think the continuity of politics through the 
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moment of the Event and into the preservation of subjectivity in the political party. 
Sartreʼs purely subtractive humanism, therefore, is incapable of being truly 
affirmative and creative, in Badiouʼs eyes. Thus, what Badiou wants is to develop a 
theory of the political subject that is not merely an historical and revolutionary agent, 
but one that is political and consistent. 
" Commenting on Badiouʼs indebtedness to Sartre, Brian Smith criticizes the 
ontological status of Sartreʼs theory of practical ensembles.288 For Smith and Badiou, 
it is Sartreʼs persistent commitment to the in-itself/for-itself phenomenological 
ontology of Being and Nothingness that prevents CDR from grounding a properly 
materialist political subjectivity.289 As Smith states at the outset of his essay on 
Badiou and Sartre, Badiou finds Sartreʼs philosophy of the Event (i.e. apocalypse) 
useful, but only up to a point.290 Badiouʼs early fidelity to Sartre is primarily focused 
on revolt and group formation under aleatory historical conditions. He quotes Sartre 
on the reasons for the revolt: “[There] has to be a conjunction of historical 
circumstances, a definite change in the situation, the danger of death, violence.”291 
This focus on chance will be carried over by Badiou in his own development of the 
group subject.
" However, the ontological assumption of the imaginative structure of the for-
itself is problematic for Smith because Sartreʼs group formation can only ever end up 
with a “group of subjects rather than a group subject.”292 The stakes of this are 
crucial for Smith and Badiou. Without a group subject, political action cannot be 
sustained. Dissolution into seriality is inevitable as the competing projects of free for-
itselfʼs transcend one another in imaginative conflict. Badiouʼs solution is to preserve 
the chance of historical contingency of the aleatory but without preserving the 
phenomenological ontological structure of the for-itself. In Theory of the Subject 
(ToS), Badiou elaborates on this rejection of individual praxis in favor of a “subject 
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effect.”293 This subject does not preexist its own formation, but creates itself out of 
contingent historical circumstances. Thus, what Badiou most transposes into his own 
work from Sartre, up through Logics of Worlds (LoW), is that he is a philosopher of 
the decision.294 Badiou agrees with Sartre that hyper-organicism is problematic, but 
both he and Smith misread the conditionality of the logic of the group. That is, Smith 
claims that, “[Badiou] thinks that there is more to the idea of a group subject 
motivated by unconditioned activity than Sartre allows for.” He continues, “[The] 
theme of unconditioned activity... is central to all Badiouʼs later work... This move on 
Badiouʼs part is a move to affirm the second form of freedom, which creates a 
subject in response to a chance event. This, for Sartre, is always hypothetical or 
impossible, existing only at the margins of human existence.” And then Smith would 
conclude this section with, “The existence of the fused or unconditioned group must 
be extended beyond the finite bounds of its appearance and first struggle.”295
" Although Smith is elsewhere critical of Badiouʼs philosophy of the subject,296 
his following of Badiouʼs lead through ToS peppers his reading according to the 
ontological and normative hermeneutic that we have been critical of through this 
project. Without rehashing that argument here, what is most important for this 
section is the notion of conditionality in the logical construction of the groupʼs 
collective unconscious. Smith, following Badiou, criticizes Sartre for remaining 
committed to the individual praxis and imaginative structure of the for-itself. Badiou is 
happy to flesh out the decisionism that he admires in Sartreʼs existential thrust, but 
he underemphasizes the perpetual presence and conditioning of material conditions 
according to the logic of seriality (as Kaironic Seriality). 
" In the first place, the emergence of the group is not unconditioned. It is 
precisely conditioned by Infinite Seriality, which perpetually threatens inhumanity with 
the Impossible. To think of group formation in terms of decision is to impose a 
recognition onto an unconscious pattern formation. Yes, there is an irruption of 
freedom as the spark of the differential spreads through mediated praxis, but to 
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speak of this in terms of decision or unconditionality is to remove this process of 
subjectivization and group formation from the conditions under which it emerges, 
which is precisely what the investigation into the logic of the group is most centrally 
concerned with. The second point pertains to the persistence of the logic of Kaironic 
Seriality that ensures that it is always the condition for the spark to ignite. This 
means that the ʻexistence of the fused groupʼ is not beholden to a fleeting moment 
as in the ontological readings of CDR, but can be understood as explaining the logic 
of how seriality is dissolved under conditions of Kaironic Seriality. And the third point, 
for now, is to note that the logic of the group cannot be reduced to its phenomenal 
circularity from group to series, but must be understood in its logical form as a way of 
making intelligible group formation in the first instance.
" Badiouʼs reading of Sartre is both critical and sympathetic. He admires the 
chance emergence of the group out of the apocalyptic Event. This continues through 
all of his works. However, his early admiration for the aleatory historical 
circumstances shifts slightly. After ToS, Badiou focuses less on the historical 
circumstances and more upon the flash of the unconditioned. In Being and Event, 
Badiou would assert, “Man is not a political animal: the chance of politics is a 
supernatural event.”297 This reference to a ʻsupernatural eventʼ distinguishes 
Badiouʼs theory of the subject in that the Event is not a conditioned passive 
synthesis arising from the dissolution of historical serial conditions. Rather, the Event 
must be understood as unconditioned and ahistorical. What he admires in Sartreʼs 
theory of the apocalypse and the group is that an irruption creates a novel Event. 
However, contra the position argued in this project, for Badiou, Events are 
unconditioned, ahistorical, and rare; which, in turn, means that subjects are 
themselves rare emergents.298 This does not mean that we are supposing that full 
human subjects, in the Sartrean sense, arenʼt rare in their actuality. Rather, the 
developing point will come to fruition in that structurally the logic of CDR differs from 
Badiouʼs project in that the logic of subjective constitution is not something 
ʻsupernaturalʼ or ʻrareʼ. Rather, the conditions of subjective constitution are 
ubiquitous, and ultimately the degrees of subjectivity shift and vary depending on the 
confluence of forces impinging on a given body within a pluridimensional existence. 
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This goes to the heart of the different orientations between Badiou (Generic) and 
Sartre (Paradoxico-Critical) that we established in Chapter One. As such, the logic of 
the group will not be understood as a unique phenomenological event, but rather will 
articulate the virtual potential for subjective constitution to emerge under conditions 
of Kaironic Seriality.
" The debate that is underlying this formulation of the Event as we tend toward 
an elaboration of the logic of the group can be situated between the ideas of Alain 
Badiou and his béte noire Gilles Deleuze. James Williams has neatly outlined the 
differences between Badiou and Deleuze pertaining to their uses of ʻEventʼ:299
Badiou Deleuze
Rare Ubiquitous
Come from the excluded part Processes of becoming
Related to truths Prior to truths
Logical unfolding Non-logical




Unfolding and decision Interrelated in complex ways
While it would be anachronistic to squarely situate Sartreʼs logics of the apocalypse 
and the group within either column, a reverse engineering of Badiouʼs and Deleuzeʼs 
work in relation to Sartre would be more productive. That is, both Badiou and 
Deleuze have claimed some semblance of a Sartrean lineage.300 With moments of 
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criticism and praise disbursed throughout their oeuvre301 and with direct statements 
claiming indebtedness to Sartreʼs investigation into the group logic,302 bringing 
Badiou and Deleuze together might help elucidate a common source in CDR that will 
help interpret a more nuanced reading of the logic of the group than is generally 
espoused. 
" As Williams explains, Badiouʼs theory of the Event is based on his essentially 
binary ontology. That is
We either have a well-ordered and consistent structure that admits of no 
events, or we have a line of militant moves from point to point that are 
generated by a named event and a corresponding truth (such as ʻall men are 
equalʼ) that can never appear as such, even within the new structure that 
emerges with the militants and that will eventually disappear with them. There 
is therefore always a series of radical oppositions at work in his philosophy, 
such as the pure philosophical one of event and state or the derived political 
ones of reactionary and militant.303
This means that, for Badiou, there is the non-Evental state of affairs and the post-
Evental state of affairs. This is essentially a logical binary causal relation that 
depends on the status and emergence of an Event, which in turn produces a binary 
state of affairs. In Logics of Worlds (LoW), Badiou articulates the non-Evental states 
of affairs in terms of transcendental coordinates that condition phenomenological life 
lived within an infinite plurality of worlds. These worlds are composed of infinite 
relations of identity and existence that things hold in relation to others.304 The degree 
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to which these identities appear is based on the intensity of relations that compose 
the particular network of relations, ranging from minimal to maximal appearance. The 
minimal appearance is the inexistent, whereas the maximal is absolute. The 
inexistent object is not to be understood as ontologically non-existent. Rather, the 
inexistent, or minimally apparent existent, exists as though it were not there. It is a 
real object but it is a situated void. It is a parallel at the ontic level of the void at the 
ontological level. As such, it is a function of a particular ordered world and therefore 
can be brought to greater or maximal existence. An example of an inexistent would 
be any subaltern person or group within a given world. Thus, the task for politics is to 
understand how such persons and/or groups are able to gain maximal existence. 
The point of the Event in relation to this is the introduction of that which is not 
always-already situated in the world (or in any world) to allow for a truth to emerge 
that will absolutize the inexistent. 
" If the Event were understood as the reorganization of these relations of 
appearance, then the world would merely be reordered, without actually transforming 
the status of the relation between inexistents and existents. But through the irruption 
of the Event, the transcendental coordinates themselves that condition 
phenomenological worlds are eroded. 
" What emerges in relation to the Event is the subject. As mentioned above, in 
ToS, the subject is understood as a ʻsubject effectʼ. It is constituted through the Event 
itself, in naming the Event, and holding fast to it (i.e. fidelity to the Event). But the 
subject must not be understood as an object. The subject is not of the order of 
relations or identities of the world. An object is any entity that both appears and 
exists and is defined by a place/identity in a world. A subject, by contrast, is not just 
an object – it is in the world but not of the world. Similar to Sartre, there is a negative 
or subtractive sense that defines the subject in Badiou. The subject emerges in 
relation to the dissolution of the transcendental coordinates of the world (similar to 
the dissolution of relations within the pluridimensional field of Infinite Seriality) as the 
subject becomes less and less identified by the divisions of the world. The subject 
essentially dis-identifies with the world. However, and this is key, the subject is not a 
person per se. Rather, it is a position in the world. And anyone can occupy it. The 
subject then is not a worldly being plus a surplus of political activity. The subject is a 
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subtraction from a place in the world insofar as it occupies the position opened by 
the Event. 
" For Deleuze, there is a distinction that needs to be drawn between events and 
the capitalized ʻEventʼ. As Williams notes, Badiou misses this subtle distinction when 
criticizing Deleuze in LoW and ends up missing something of central import: namely,
[All] events communicate in one Event where communication is not in terms of 
set meanings but in terms of processes. Events set each other in motion with 
no limits in principle; they therefore communicate in one great Event 
constituted by this multiple, mobile and ever-changing series of relations. It 
can therefore be argued that this latter Event should not be thought of as the 
ʻOneʼ but rather as a multiple that cannot be represented as a unity or identity; 
the Event is in the communication of all events rather than in their collection or 
as their essence.305 
What this means is that there is a sense in which each event communicates with one 
another and that these communications are not reducible to or extrapolated into an 
overarching singular Event. Rather, they are various sense-instantiations or 
expressions of unique communication of the unfolding of Life itself. This highlights 
the difference between Badiouʼs essentially binary ontology and Deleuzeʼs univocal 
process ontology of difference. For, Deleuzeʼs events are articulations of the 
unfolding of Life insofar as Life is expressed to varying degrees of intensity and 
appearance across an immanent plane. As such, an event is any shift in intensity 
between actual relations or virtual potencies. This is not to suggest that events are 
themselves meaningful, but that rather meaningfulness itself is conditioned by the 
prior shift in intensity (i.e. an event). Events, therefore, are not 
ʻsupernaturalʼ (however one is to take this metaphor). They are the ever-present 
expression of processes of becoming that can be articulated in actuality or virtuality.
" This means that events are ubiquitous. They do not come from outwith a 
world. They are not the unconditioned. They are instead better understood as the 
condition of possibility of any effect or shift or change in a world (or more precisely 
any existing field). This is because Deleuzeʼs plane of immanence is continuous, in a 
sense. This is not to say it is consistent, but rather to note that events initiate shifts 
from within an already existing paradigm of potency – think Paradoxico-Critical 
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orientation. The event is the shift in that univocal field of difference itself. For Badiou, 
this is precisely why Deleuzeʼs micro-revolutions are not sufficient to introduce 
novelty or change. An Event, for Badiou, must break with the relations of any 
phenomenological world if it is to have a real impact on material reality. This is also 
why Peter Hallward can remark that Deleuzeʼs philosophy is not able to theorize the 
introduction of the novel, but merely rests at the level of a type of mysticism “that 
leads forever out of our actual world.”306 These readings fault Deleuze on two fronts: 
1) for reproducing the transcendental coordinates of phenomenological reality and 2) 
escaping the actual material inexistences in favor of potential transformations at the 
local and non-subjective level. To sum up Badiouʼs position on the world-event 
structure:
We begin with the underlying ontological components: world and event, the 
second introduces a rupture in the presentational logic of the first. The 
subjective form is then assigned to a localisation in being that is ambiguous. 
On the one side, the subject is but a set of elements of the world, and 
therefore an object of the scene where the world presents its multiplicities; on 
the other side, the subject orientates that object, in terms of the effects it can 
produce, in a direction that comes from an event. The subject can therefore 
be called the unique known form of thinkable “compromise” between the 
phenomenal persistence of the world and its evenemental [événementiel] 
reshaping.307
"
There is, thus, a redoubling of sorts. As the subject emerges in fidelity to the Event, it 
must then bear witness to the truth of that event in the world by turning the truth back 
onto the world to reconstitute it anew. In a sense, the Event becomes the only source 
for new potential truths to be instituted in any given/all potential world(s) that would 
otherwise reproduce itself/themselves without change. 
" The Deleuzian position theorizes the complete opposite. That is, change is all 
there is. ʻWorldsʼ (or transcendental fields) are cut through with processes of 
transformation at every stage; and these transformations are to varying degrees of 
intensity and variation. A given state of affairs is the individuation of this expression 
of intensity. In Williamsʼ words, a given “state is undergoing events, introducing 
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novelty and stress into it at all times and in all parts where there is a change in 
intensity in the state.”308 Therefore, any change in actual relations or virtual potency 
are focal points of events. And these events cut through the interrelations between a 
given field and the various ʻworldsʼ that intersect with it. What this results in is a 
theory of pluridimensional interpenetrating conditions of relationality, much like how 
we have articulated life lived in Kaironic Seriality. 
" And this is where we can begin to see the Sartrean resonance in both Badiou 
and Deleuze:
Badiou Deleuze
Rupture and its effects Transcendental field that 
creates conditions for rupture
Theory of the subject related to 
the Event
Events create the conditions of 
subjectivity
Events are novel reorganizing 
and reordering moments of 
worlds
Events are expressions of 
creativity and experimentation 
in unfolding fields in the 
process of becoming
Badiou takes from Sartre the moment of rupture and the intensity of its measured 
effects; Deleuze expands on Sartreʼs notion of the transcendental field of possibility 
that creates the conditions for the rupture to take place. Badiou develops a theory of 
the subject that is necessarily related to the Event; Deleuzian events are pre-
subjective and create the conditions out of which subjectivity itself is individuated. 
Events for Badiou are novel reorganizing and reordering moments of worlds; Events 
for Deleuze are expressions of creativity and experimentation in unfolding fields in 
the process of becoming. 
" What this means for the present project is that both Badiou and Deleuze can 
help us construct the logic of apocalypse through their divergent theories of the 
Event/events. Shortly after Sartreʼs death, in a letter to his friend Jeannette 
Colombel, Deleuze wrote, 
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The ʻsituationʼ is not a concept among others for Sartre, but the pragmatic 
element that transforms everything, and without which concepts have neither 
meaning nor structure. A concept has no structure or meaning as long as it is 
not situated. The situation, is the functioning of the concept itself. And the 
richness and novelty of Sartrean concepts derives from this point, they are the 
expressions of situations, at the same time as situations are assemblages of 
concepts.309
These situations are Deleuzeʼs ʻpragmatic factorsʼ.310 They traverse the structures of 
language and philosophical concepts that condition a given milieu. Referring back to 
the brief mention of Émile Benveniste in the section on Kaironic Seriality, we can say 
that, for Deleuze, situations are akin to enunciation. They are what bridge the gap 
between the semiotic and semantic or between the synchronic and diachronic 
material conditions. The latter are analytical abstractions. But situations are real 
material transformations – they are the invocation of kairos. So perhaps we might 
say: the situation is what brings things to life. As Deleuze says, pragmatic factors 
(situations) are “internal variables, agents of enunciation with which languages or 
change occur. [The situation] traverses [language structures and philosophical 
concepts] through and through, it determines their new divisions and their original 
content.”311 And in this way we can understand the logic of the apocalypse: it is the 
irruption of hope from within the invocation of Kaironic Seriality whose conditions are 
ever-present as the shifting field of material relations tells the story of novel evental 
creation. This does not mean that every apocalypse is a revolutionary storming of 
the Bastille in actual material terms. Rather, the example of the Bastille has use-
value insofar as it illuminates the pragmatic factors that are enunciated in the 
imperative, “To the Bastille!” Thus, what we can extract from such an Event is that 
situations are fluid landscapes of becoming that contain internal variables whereby 
upsurgent flashes of creation and Life (i.e. freedom) can be actualized. 
" At this stage of the investigation, while we may not be able to say, 'this is the 
apocalypse', we can say that the time of the apocalypse is always now. This means 
that the logic of the apocalypse articulates humanity's potential to be actualized at 





Just because there is inertia does not negate the praxis embedded therein. It is 
dormant, as Flynn notes. It must be awakened if freedom is to become 
actualized. And this is why understanding the logic of the group is crucial. For, it 
articulates the formation of praxis-in-common under conditions of Kaironic Seriality 
that enact the enunciation of the situation. Understanding this logic is then crucial if 
we are going to develop an orientation that will allow for the potential of liberatory 
praxis to become better attuned to Kaironic Seriality so that prescriptive enunciations 
can palpate the surface of actual life to release the flows of virtual evental creation. 
5.3 The Group-in-Fusion! !
" The group-in-fusion is the activity of the differential becoming common. His 
action becomes my action; her subjectivity, my subjectivity. There is a telepathic and 
empathic connectivity that unites each through a common action. It is the 
unconscious affective reciprocity of the emergent translation of the differential 
between participants who have been united through the apocalypse. 
" The use of ʻtelepathyʼ is not meant to refer to some supernatural, 
extrasensory perception. Rather, it is the real, material contagion of emotion. Had 
Sartre understood mirror neurons, he may well have ventured to explain how the 
occurrence of group fusion has a biological substrate. For present purposes, that is 
inconsequential. What matters is that group fusion is a real, material, and common 
contagion. Similarly, the use of ʻempathyʼ here does not refer to the common notion 
of feeling compassion for another. It refers not to cognitive empathy but tends toward 
what psychologists refer to as affective empathy (with some minor points of 
divergence). The former refers to a role-taking approach where “an empathic person 
can imaginatively take the role of another and can understand and accurately predict 
that personʼs thoughts, feelings, and actions.”312 Affective empathy, by contrast, is a 
“vicarious emotional response to the perceived emotional experiences of others.”313 
Whereas the former is a conscious recognition of the otherʼs feelings that entails an 
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element of predictive accuracy, the latter includes the immediate sharing of feelings. 
The risk of affective empathy, according to neuroscientist Matthieu Ricard, is that 
without maintaining a separation between self and other in the role-taking distancing 
of cognitive empathy, one might risk ʻemotional contagionʼ. Emotional contagion is 
the automatic feeling of an “otherʼs emotion without knowing that he or she is the one 
who provoked it, and without being really aware of what is happening to me.”314 This 
is what he argues exists in animals and young children. It is characterized by a lack 
of control or conscious directedness per se. It is simply the contagious spread of an 
impulse. 
" While we are employing the use of both contagion and empathy to describe 
the effect of the differential writ large to articulate the logic of the group, this is not to 
suppose that the spread of subjectivity through shared praxis is the undirected 
spread of impulsive feelings. It would be better to speak of the affectivity of the group  
logic as being prior to feelings, so understood. 
" Cognitive scientist Antonio Damasio refers to feelings as the shadow of 
emotions.315 He corrects the commonly expressed interchangeability between 
feelings and emotions by drawing a distinction between awareness and unconscious 
stimuli: 
In everyday language we often use the terms interchangeably... but for 
neuroscience, emotions are more or less the complex reactions the body has 
to certain stimuli... This emotional reaction occurs automatically and 
unconsciously. Feelings occur after we become aware.”316
It is this definition of emotions that we are interested in. That is, affective empathy is 
less about feelings than about an automatic and unconscious stimuli. This skirts the 
problems of emotional contagion as defined by Ricard, as common praxis does not, 
in the first instance, pertain to feelings. Similarly, the orthodox psychological 
definition of affective empathy is also too closely related to what Damasio identifies 
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as feelings. Thus, the deployment of empathy here refers to a contagious, affective 
(i.e. unconscious and automatic) vicarious experience of a common goal. Granted, 
Sartre did not have the tools of neuroscience at his disposal. However, his 
investigation into the fusion of the group and the descriptions he uses fit nicely – 
analogously, if nothing else – within the definition of affective empathy and the 
structure of emotions derived from Damasio. 
" This does not mean the logic of the group is ʻirrationalʼ. No, as Sartre makes 
clear, the logic is intelligible.317 But this intelligibility is not based on a rational choice 
of calculating participants. It is not Game Theory. Rather, the fusion takes place at 
the affective level. Gavin Rae suggests that the group-in-fusion is a rational 
formation based on the idea that 
[Each] individual recognizes that the other: 1) has the same end as she does; 
and 2) is crucial to the attainment of their common end. This ensures that 
each individual recognizes that the activities of the other are crucial to the 
attainment of their shared common goal. 
While it is patently the case that each end is common and that a comprehension of 
this is crucial to the condition of the group fusing in the first place, it is not the case 
that this comprehension is a ʻrecognitionʼ. Such an idea is a derivative. That is, this 
idea of recognition is only valuable after first understanding the logic of the fused 
group in the establishment of ways to apply this logic. In the activity of the group-in-
fusion itself as analyzed by Sartre, there is no ʻrecognitionʼ. There is comprehension, 
but only as this comprehension is understood non-thetically. Therefore, it seems that 
Raeʼs mistake is that he is using phenomenological language to describe a formal 
materialist activity. Furthermore, Rae is neglecting the logic of the apocalypse and 
the group-in-fusion as a moment of subjective constitution through the dissolution of 
Infinite Seriality. This ensures that his reading of CDR remains at the 
phenomenological and ontological level, rather than the formal and hypo-logical. 
" But this idea of subjective constitution needs to be given substantive meaning. 
In the moment of the apocalypse, subjective constitution is limited to an abstract 
conception of the emergence of praxis in common. At the moment, the individual 
apocalyptic subject is merely a “disintegrated individual.”318 This means the grouping 
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of disintegrated individuals have no substantial being. What needs to be understood, 
therefore, is how subjectivity is common and how individual subjectivity is not lost in 
hyperorganicism or collective consciousness. According to Flynn, it is “the 
ontological primacy of praxis [which] saves Sartre from Hegelian ʻhyperorganismsʼ 
and even, he sometimes insists, from Durkheimian ʻcollective consciousness.ʼ”319 
What this seems to imply is that the ontological primacy of praxis is an atomization of 
free individual praxes that come together consubstantially in activity, united by the 
interstices of mediated reciprocity. The problem with this is that the group is not 
atomized. There is no ʻontological primacyʼ of free individual praxis. There is only a 
formal logic of praxis in CDR. And this logic makes intelligible the activity of human 
action in common antagonism to the impossibility of living in Kaironic Seriality. Free 
individual praxis is a logical formulation that gives us a formal framework for further 
investigation into common action, but it does not provide an ontological grounding or 
explanation for group commonality. In seeking to protect Sartre from 
hyperorganicism, Flynn makes the opposite mistake by atomizing the praxical logic. 
Instead, Sartre walks a fine line between the two, refusing to reduce group praxis to 
an atomistic theory of social formation while simultaneously resisting 
hyperorganicism and collective consciousness. The result is that the group-in-fusion 
is connected through the ʻfusingʼ of empathy and the differential. It is therefore an 
affective logic of differential common action – a disjunctive synthesis. As Mark Poster 
states, “Since it has no ontological status, the group can persist only through the 
commitments of its members.”320 And as has been shown, these commitments, as 
common, are impelled by a ʻcollective unconsciousʼ that has been instigated by the 
external pressure of Infinite Seriality and by the internal fury of those who 
comprehend it in its impossibility.  
" What needs to be explained now is the mechanism that enacts this common 
subjectivity under material conditions. As has been outlined above, in Kaironic 
Seriality, individuals are saturated in the practico-inert field. Therefore, inhuman 
relations of conflict and alterity abound. However, in the apocalyptic upsurge, there is 
a shift from negative mediation through the practico-inert to positive meditation 
through common praxis. Sartre puts its succinctly: “[the] mediator is not an object, 
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but a praxis.”321 What this means is that, in the apocalyptic constitution of 
subjectivity, by the common comprehension of the impossibility of living in Kaironic 
Seriality, individuals are united internally through an empathic connection. This 
empathic connection becomes the mediation of the group-in-fusion. Wilfrid Desan 
puts it nicely when he states that in the group we understand “the Other as a 
dimension of our own life.”322 No longer are inhumans mediated (and alienated) by 
the practico-inert field. Instead, human subjects are constituted and united through 
their shared praxis in opposition to the practico-inert field itself. In Sartreʼs words, the 
group “produces itself in and against the practico-inert field.”323 Here, again, there is 
a self-referentiality in praxis. The group ʻproduces itselfʼ. And as before, this self-
creation is an effect of totalization. The group totalizes itself in its common praxis and 
thereby shifts the ternary relations, from mediation through the practico-inert field to 
mediated praxis, and in the process creates a field of empathic subjects who are 
common insofar as each has the same unconscious fury as the next. This is the 
basis for building up subjectivity within the group. However, in the moment of the 
group-in-fusion, this subjectivity is still in its germinal stage. It will progress as the 
group accomplishes its goal, stratifies into established functions, and organizes. This 
will be covered in the coming sections. 
" For now, it is sufficient to understand the logic of the group-in-fusion. Quoting 
Sartre in a dense passage that sums up this logic:
[The] objective of the third party produces itself for him as a common 
objective, and the plurality of epicentres reveals itself to him as unified by a 
common exigency (or common praxis), because it decodes serial multiplicity 
in terms of a community which is already inscribed in things, in the manner of 
a passive idea or a totalising destiny.324
In this obscure passage, Sartre indicates how the logic of the group-in-fusion is able 
to 1) uphold a robust notion of free individual praxis; 2) explicate the reason 
individuals are united in common praxis; 3) describe how subjective constitution 
takes place in opposition to Kaironic Seriality; and 4) suggest how common praxis 
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resists hyperorganicism or collective consciousness. He upholds a robust notion of 
free individual praxis in that the third party is understood as self-producing a 
common objective among a field of other third parties – i.e. ʻepicentresʼ – who also 
self-produce this common objective. That is, each acts commonly on the group itself, 
creating the group itself, as each is mediated by the praxis of an other (or all others). 
There is no dissolving of praxes into one another. Rather, mediation is maintained as 
the unifier and preserver of individuated praxis. But mediation also explicates the 
reason individuals are united in common praxis: exigency. Material conditions either 
compel or impel action. In the milieu of scarcity, under practico-inert conditions, 
Infinite Seriality compels praxis through radical exigency. But under conditions of 
antagonism to seriality, destiny is transformed from pre-determination to common 
freedom in relation to a common exigency/praxis. This exigency ensures that the 
group is practically realist, for their response to the material situation that threatens 
them with impossibility is based on real material conditions, and transformed 
concrete material possibilities are therefore opened up. What is more, by opening up  
these possibilities, subjective constitution is sparked to life as serial multiplicity is 
decoded and the inert community ʻwhich is inscribed in thingsʼ is resuscitated 
through mediated reciprocity. This resuscitation is possible because of the return of 
stolen praxis that is inscribed in the mediating practico-inert field. This mineralized 
praxis has both counter-final and differential elements in it. As has been thoroughly 
discussed, the counter-final elements of the material ensemble are what lead to 
seriality. However, so as to not ignore the other force of totalization, it must be kept in 
mind that in the reproduction of the practico-inert field, so too is there a reproduction 
of previous flashes of humanity. It just so happens that the practico-inert field exerts 
far greater influence as its reserves grow exponentially greater than those of the 
differential. Nevertheless, the point in discussion here is that even under such 
conditions, Sartre elaborates the logic of how the group-in-fusion makes intelligible 
the upsurge of humanity in antagonism to the monstrosity of Kaironic Seriality. And 
the final point to reiterate about the logic of the group-in-fusion is that it is able to 
skirt the pitfalls of hyperorganicism or collective consciousness through common 
exigency insofar as this common exigency is affective and unconscious.  
" The remaining problem, for Sartre, is that the group is not a permanent social 
ensemble. It emerges in a situation that requires immediate activity, but once the 
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goal has been reached, once the common affective exigency settles, the life of the 
group-in-fusion ceases. When the group-in-fusion meets its objective, it will dissolve 
as such and the group that met its objective will be “united only by a past action” 
which is “engraved in their Being.” This can (but not necessarily will) lead to a “desire 
to exploit it for their own purposes or in support of a particular policy.”325 What is 
certain is that the group cannot go back to the previous state of affairs, and the 
members of the group seek to preserve the past experience of freedom. As he would 
continue on to say, “The fused group should therefore be characterised as an 
irreversible and limited process: the reshaping of human relations by man had 
temporalised itself in the practical context of a particular aim and as such would not 
survive its objectification.”326 That said, it must be understood that there is a sense in 
which the potency of the group-in-fusionʼs common praxis will be preserved in the 
remaining members. It is mineralized in the pledge and in the very goals and 
activities of the organization. It is important to remember that the practico-inert is the 
practico-inert. And this crystalized praxis is preserved in a minimal sense, as a 
common past that once was radical freedom-in-action. As such, there is a nostalgia 
that can come to characterize group action and organization after the group begins 
its fall back into seriality. But, the logic of the group still resonates, although at a low 
hum. In this way, the social milieu, even the serial milieu, is not a mere fall back into 
a previous situation of impossibility. It is not a repetition of the same. Rather, the 
group really has transformed the human relations, human subjectivity, and the social 
landscape in a concrete and definitive way. Plus, beyond this, there is a sense in 
which the pledged group and the organization are still impelled by free, common 
exigence. But understanding the extent of this residual freedom requires further 
exploration. 
5.4 The Pledged Group!
" After the irruption of the apocalypse and the emergence of the fused group, 




surviving group is the ensemble of individuals who were fused together in affective 
antagonism to the Impossible. Previously, under the monstrous dominance of 
Kaironic Seriality, they were inhuman actors, living in impossible situations of 
exigence. Through the experience of shared exigency in mediated praxis, and by the 
opening of the space for freedom and novelty to emerge through the differential, 
subjective constitution began to create human existence (le vécu). A new people are 
emerging. 
" However, the affective fury that fused the group in the first place is not a 
permanent condition. If the fused group accomplish their common aim (whatever it 
might be), there is a settling of the exigent field. That is, the compression that made 
the impossible conditions of life in Kaironic Seriality impossible to continue living has 
been loosed. The common spark of life that spread to each, as common to all, 
blazed hot and far, but its oxygen supply – its imminent violent foe – has become 
less potent. This is the crucial moment for every revolution. Once the enemy has 
been defeated, how can the crowd instill a permanence that refuses the past and 
that remains faithful to the common freedom of the individuals in the group? Enter 
the pledge.
" For Sartre, the pledge is the action of the group to preserve itself in its 
freedom. It does this by swearing an oath to ensure that the group will not dissolve in 
its commonality. Nina Power puts it thusly:
Sartre needs to show how the group, in order to maintain itself and persevere 
in action, must interiorise the passivity of the practico-inert in activity (and also 
interiorise a certain kind of inhumanity). It is not freedom that threatens the 
newly formed group but its collapsing back into seriality. This is the path that 
leads the group-in-fusion to form what Sartre calls a ʻpledged-groupʼ.327
What Power suggests is the way Sartre indicates how to preserve freedom in a 
material world that is constantly threatened by the dominance of seriality, under 
conditions of scarcity. While it is the case that Sartre does seek to explain the logic of 
the perseverance of the group under the constant pressures that come from without, 
it is not the case that the group interiorizes “the passivity of the practico-inert in 
activity.” Rather, the group seeks to interiorize pledged-praxis, which has 
characteristics of inertia, in that it is the introduction of permanence into mediatory 
139
327 Power, “The Terror of Collectivity,” 101.
group life, but also praxis in that it is a self-imposed mediation of positive reciprocal 
relations. This is another shift in exigency. “Exigency, in this context, has the same 
characteristics, but it is the [pledged] agents themselves that are inorganic inertia 
[rather than the practico-inert or the free praxis of the mediating third].” So, mediation 
has shifted from the practico-inert (under conditions of seriality), to praxis (in the 
group-in-fusion), to now mediation through pledged-praxis. 
" The difference between pledged-praxis and the practico-inert is that the 
former is the perpetuation of the logic of emergent human life, whereas the latter is 
the stored labor of inhuman life under serial conditions. In other words, pledged-
praxis is the effect of transformed subjects who have emerged under conditions of 
apocalyptic novelty. In this way, pledged-praxis, as the mediation of the pledged 
group, ensures that the group will not simply fall back into the previous state, but will 
continue its totalizing dialectical movement. This does not mean that there is no 
sense in which seriality is not present in any capacity. On the contrary, seriality is 
always present as the necessary compression against which the group forms itself 
(and sustains itself). Further, seriality is intensified by the intentional self-imposition 
of stasis in the pledge.328 But this isnʼt a complete reversion into a serial state. 
Rather, it is the groupʼs attempt to remain free perpetually. It does this in two ways: 
1) The group comes to see itself in its past victory and 2) The pledge is a guarantee 
against the future.329 In other words, the pledge is essentially nostalgic and 
imaginative.330 
" The immediate threat is no longer present, but is imagined as a threatening 
absence that still looms. Sartre puts it this way:
In absence, the new differentitations are, of course, determined in close 
relation to the totality of objective circumstances. Nevertheless, the group 
determines itself in accordance with a future unification (unification through 
the return of the enemy) and a past unity (its group-being as transcended 
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past, or, in other words, its practical reality in so far as it has been, and in so 
far, as it has objectified itself in materiality).331
It is this two-way movement that prevents the pledged group from being a pure 
passive activity. If they were characterized exclusively by nostalgia, they would be a 
passive community externally united by an inert image. Likewise, if they were purely 
imaginative, they would be united by a Utopian Ideal that is literally ʻnowhereʼ, which 
would make the ensemble idealist. But Sartre must maintain the realism of the 
group. Therefore, the pledge is nostalgic and imaginative, while all the while 
attempting to maintain its presence in real, concrete, material conditions of exigence. 
" However, if he can be faulted anywhere with regard to his investigation into 
the logic of the pledge, it is most strikingly with this latter notion. That is, he is 
insufficiently realist in his investigation and development of the logic of the pledge. 
The group-in-fusion is eminently realist. In fact, they are driven exclusively by the 
realism that breaks forth under the pressures of a system that seeks to hide the 
truths of the real exploitative conditions of life in Kaironic Seriality. The pledged 
group, however, by virtue of looking backward and forward, perpetuates an idealist 
tendency by creating itself through memory and imagination. Sartre states that the 
pledge brings “the future group [to the] present community as the limit to all possible 
transcendence [dépassement].”332 In this sense, the pledged group creates itself in 
the present by bringing this future image into the present, and as a result introduces 
new limits and exigencies that are conditioned by future praxis. This means that the 
pledged group is constituted by the mediatory functions of a future image and the 
exigencies contained therein. This does not mean that the logic of the pledged group 
is somehow deficient or useless. There is still value in understanding it, particularly in 
relation to the entire logical chain of the group. But it does need to be kept in mind, 
so that the gaps in his logical framework can be filled in to make any application of it 
more complete, and therefore more effective and applicable.333 
" Yet, the core of the pledge is still to be explored. And this is the true bedrock 
of the logic of the pledge. Because, yes, in one sense, the pledge is the desire to 
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maintain itself in freedom, but really, even this desire is itself a derivative founded 
upon fear – or as Sartre says terror. Terror comes to the pledged group, in the 
present, through the fabrication of the future image. This future image is of the foe 
returning. Although not an imminent threat, the fear of its return is felt by the group 
through the creation of the future image. They can never return to the previous state. 
Therefore, they are bound together in their shared anticipation of the next wave of 
violence. And knowing full well that they have already been successful once, they 
are confident that they can be successful again. This is the paradox of the pledged 
group: they are united by their past victory and by their future fear. 
" However the intelligibility of the pledge requires one more nuance. It can only 
be revealed in what Sartre calls ʻfraternity-terrorʼ. 
[This] is precisely what the pledge is: namely the common production, through 
mediated reciprocity, of a statute of violence... To swear is to say, as a 
common individual: you must kill me if I secede. And this demand has no 
other aim than to instill Terror within myself as a free defence against the fear 
of the enemy.334
Here what we see is that the pledged group becomes its own immediate objective by  
instilling terror upon itself. That is, the logic of the pledged group is understood as a 
logic of fraternity-terror. In reference to the past, the group is aware of its success 
and must declare to never go back to the pre-group state. Looking forward, the 
group anticipates the return of the foe, or the attack of another, and galvanizes 
around an anticipatory fear. And in the present, based on nostalgia and the future 
image, fear permeates the group; fear that one will secede, fear that I will secede. 
The exigency of the pledged group therefore ultimately becomes an exigency based 
on fraternity-terror.
" Badiou reads the pledge as “the point where the possibility that the group 
might disperse has been internalized.” This seems correct. However, he continues, 
“As everyone is the third party for everyone else, he fears the dispersed solitude that 
is both the others' doing and his own doing. It is not enough for reciprocity to be 
immediate. It requires a stable mediation. It is the oath that allows everyone to 
commit themselves to remaining the same [emphasis added].”335 Here we see 
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Badiouʼs phenomenological ontological reading of the in-itself/for-itself projected into 
the logic of the pledged group. It does not seem accurate to state that one fears ʻthe 
dispersed solitude that is both the othersʼ doing and his own doingʼ. Nor does it fit 
within the schema of the group logic to claim that reciprocity in the group is 
ʻimmediateʼ. The fear is first and foremost conditioned by the fear of the Impossible, 
the imminent foe that could return from outside the group. That interiorized future 
threat ensures a heightened state of awareness and anxiety within the relations of 
the group. But it does not threaten the members of the group with solitude. There is 
no isolated individual for the Sartre of CDR. Serial relations are not characterized by 
solitude, but rather, mimetic rivalry, alterity, and interchangeability; all of which are 
social phenomena. The ʻsolitude that is both the othersʼ doing and his own doingʼ 
rings much truer with the structure of inter-subjective conflict in BN. The same 
tendency can be seen in Badiouʼs assumption that in the group ʻreciprocity is 
immediateʼ. In the group, mediatory relations abound. They have shifted from the 
serial mediatory relations conditioned by the practico-inert field, but relations 
between members of a group are not ʻimmediateʼ. They revolve around the ubiquity 
of the mediating third. 
" Yes, Badiou is right that the oath must be sworn to clearly demarcate who 
would be a traitor and to impose a permanence onto the group to prevent such 
treason. But as Sartre makes clear, “Suspicion appears within the group not as a 
characteristic of human nature, but as the behaviour appropriate to this contradictory 
structure of survival: it is simply the interiorisation of the dangers of seriality 
[emphasis added].”336 Again, Sartre explains how the threat that constantly imposes 
itself is seriality. This is what leads to fear and suspicion. It is not the potential of the 
group to become atomized individuals. Suspicion enters the frame because of the 
pervasive presence of seriality as introduced through the practico-inert; in this case, 
the inertia introduced by nostalgia and the future image. Pietro Chiodi echoes this 
sentiment when he comments that the members of the pledged group swear that s/
he will never become other through self-imposed fraternity-terror – what he calls, 
“reflexive fear.”337 There is no imminent enemy that organically unites the group in 
commonality, so they must manufacture fear (i.e. create a fear-image). This is the 
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reason why Sartre says the pledge is a ʻcreative actʼ whereby the pledged group 
creates itself in common.338 But this creative act must not be understood as the pure 
expression of some type of artistic freedom, but rather as the self-imposition of 
nostalgia and fear, which in turn mediates the pledged group in relations of fraternity-
terror. 
" Perhaps the reason Badiou reads Sartre the way he does (besides the 
ontological differences) pertains to Badiouʼs notion of “institutional fidelity.”339 For 
Badiou, the Christian Church serves as a model of this. As he says, “the Church 
[was] the first institution in human history to aspire to universality” by clearly 
demarcating the line between orthodoxy and heresy.340 Through fidelity to the Christ-
Event, the Church was able to bring into existence that which was a previously 
inexistent by establishing itself in relative fraternal order. Of course, fidelity as such 
does not necessarily relate to the theological. Stripped down, fidelity pertains to the 
constitution of a political subject. “[To] become a political subject is to be constituted 
in relation to an event... as the bearer of a truth process who is called upon to 
maintain an enduring fidelity to the event and its commands.”341 We covered this 
idea above in the section on The Apocalypse.342 But in that section, our concern was 
on the status and efficacy of the Event itself in constituting subjects. Here, what 
matters is the notion of fidelity that preserves that which has been made existent. 
What matters is that the institution becomes the ʻhuskʼ which contains the enduring 
fidelity to the ʻevent and its commandsʼ.343 As such, the party or the Church for 
Badiou are subjective. As Power explains:
Badiou is very close to Sartre on this point (although for Sartre there is no 
question of ʻthe partyʼ preserving the initial moment of revolt)—the ossification 
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of force into institutions is not the framework that preserves the initial moment 
of novelty: here we see why Badiou must maintain the centrality of the 
ʻsubjectiveʼ—structures and organization are not enough if their participants 
are not gripped by the motive force that catalysed their initial movement.344 
It is the last sentence that is most illuminating to compare Badiouʼs fidelity to the 
pledge of Sartre. For both, the members of the group must be ʻgrippedʼ by the 
catalyst that fused the group/subtracted the subject. However, for Badiou, that which 
binds the political subject is not fraternity-terror but fidelity. Institutions themselves 
are not sufficient to constitute political subjects. This is why political parties, or 
anarchist collectives, or parachurch communities as such are not the bearers of 
political subjectivity. They can still be conditioned by the transcendental coordinates 
of a world (in the language of LoW). It is only those institutions that hold fast to the 
Event that are marked by subjectivity insofar as they preserve the ʻevent and its 
commandsʼ. This does not meant that political subjects will endure forever. No, 
Badiou shares Sartreʼs concern for the tendency of revolutionary fervor to dwindle.345 
However, the very constitution of the institutional subject for Badiou is quite stark in 
contrast to the pledge in that there is no necessary introduction of seriality into the 
very life of institutional fidelity itself. For Badiou, the relations of phenomenological 
worlds decrease or increase to varying degrees of intensity. As a political subject 
emerges, the world in which the subject acts has not been completely transformed. 
Therefore, new inexistences will always need to be brought to existence. Badiou 
does theorize the existence of a world where no future political action is required – 
the atonic world. However, this world is not common, and is not one transformed by 
the over-saturation of political subjectivity, but is wrought by the transcendentals 
which stifle any possibility for decision whatsoever;346 in the least, it is not a world 
with which we are concerned in the present investigation. With that, what must be 
stated is that, for Badiou, worlds will always introduce new sites, or points, that 
require further subtraction. However, there is a purity that characterizes the 
constitution of political subjectivity that is absent in Sartre. 
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" For Sartre, the pledged group is constituted precisely on the basis of the 
introduction of the fear-image. This means that seriality is part of the pledged groupʼs 
very existence. This is not to overstate the point. The pledged group is not merely a 
serial grouping. Remember, they are mediated by pledged-praxis. However, if we are 
to understand the logic of the pledged group, particularly in contradistinction to 
Badiouʼs ʻinstitutional fidelityʼ, the constitutive centrality of seriality must be 
emphasized. 
" As was mentioned above, in the pledged group, mediation is via pledged-
praxis. This pledged-praxis is now understood in relation to nostalgia, the future, and 
fraternity-terror. But Sartre also wants to make it clear that the pledge serves a 
practical function. That is, the pledge is a “practical device” and a “regulatory 
praxis.”347 It is rooted in the idea that trust is a delicate social modulator that requires 
some grounding for its legitimation. Thus, with the eradication of the previous forms 
of legitimacy and their promises of trustworthy reciprocity (which turned out to be 
negative reciprocity as conditioned by the practico-inert field), there must be a new 
fabrication of the grounds of legitimate reciprocity. 'Fabrication' is of course not 
meant to imply arbitrary construction. It is certainly necessary (in its contingency, of 
course). But this 'fabrication' must be created anew, by a new human logic, a human 
logic that has been constituted under different conditions than the inhuman logic that 
constituted the constellation of legitimacies of serial existence. 
" In this sense, Sartre is seeking to maintain his realism. The usefulness of the 
pledge is rooted in real fear in the present. The group really is under constant threat. 
Kaironic Seriality is the logic that ʻEarthʼ is Impossible. Therefore, the pledge is 
useful insofar as it practically regulates the group by instilling a permanence through 
the rousing of affects and the creation of new grounds of legitimacy. From affect to 
affect, the group creates itself through various phases and degrees of mediation. In 
the logic of the group-in-fusion, humans are resuscitated through the irruption of the 
apocalypse, which sparks subjective constitution; the spark spreads and subjects are 
made in common, through common exigence. They are empathic individuals working 
in common towards a common objective. The logic of the pledged group is rooted in 
fear; fear that the past might return; fear that alterity might return through dissidence; 
fear that another foe will come. Therefore, it is affect – affect as sparked and affect 
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as roused – that serves as the motor for group logic in the fused group and pledged 
group. In the organization, however, as stratification sets in, group members begin to 
take on particular roles. The next step in the logic of the group, therefore, is 
organized affect in the form of mediated capacity. 
5.5 The Organization!
" There is some debate in the secondary literature regarding the re-introduction 
of seriality in Sartreʼs investigation into the life of the group. It centers around 
deciphering at which point in the stratification of the group seriality comes to 
dominate, turning the group into a serial gathering. For some, the pledge 
reintroduces inertia and thereby, through the establishment of permanence, initiates 
a shift toward serial existence. For others, it is not until the organization that seriality 
sets in. And yet still, for a select few, who have become more prominent in recent 
years, the organization is the ideal social gathering, with the institution being the 
phase where the alienating power of seriality has returned. Kristian Klockars explains 
this nuanced debate this way:
But exactly where is the 'turning point'...? Does the main dividing line go 
between the group-of-fusion, which is defined purely in terms of praxis, and 
the pledged group, which introduces terror (sanctions) into the human 
relations? Or does it go between the organised group, which constitutes non-
hierarchically organised long-term projects, and the hierarchical institution, 
which introduces subjugating leadership? The answer to this difficult question 
depends on whether one chooses to emphasise purity of form and anarchism, 
on the one hand, or concreteness and the possibility of an ideal society, on 
the other, as the major ingredient of Sartre's ethical thinking. That is, in the 
first case, already social organisation would be seen as a first step towards 
alienation, whereas in the second case, one would imply that Sartre believed 
in the value of a common organisation (at least as a first step towards an ideal 
society).348
" Nina Power is a theorist of the first grouping. She states that in the pledge, the 
group interiorizes “the passivity of the practico-inert in activity.”349 Her reading is 
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based on the valorization of the moment of irruption in the apocalypse and the 
ordering of the group-in-fusion. For her, this mode of the ensemble best 
encapsulates freedom in the groupʼs immediate antagonism. As she states, “Group 
activity is simply the pure moment of revolt, for however brief a period.”350 Thomas 
Flynn represents a more modest position. For him, the pledge does not introduce 
passivity because the pledge is self-imposed. Therefore, “praxis remains primary.”351 
Elsewhere, Flynn would write, “The artificial (factice) inertia of the pledge forms the 
apex of [Sartreʼs] social dialectic in terms of freedom-necessity and yields the 
ʻcommon individualʼ (group member as such) as the effective positive agent of 
history.”352 For Flynn, the pledge only imposes an ʻartificial inertiaʼ upon the members 
of the group. As such, the pledged group maintains its freedom as each member 
becomes ʻthe effective positive agent of historyʼ. More recently, Gavin Rae has 
suggested that, in fact, for Sartre, the organization is the mode of group formation 
that best stimulates freedom. He argues that, “while the group formations called the 
series and the institution constrain the individualʼs practical freedom, the open, 
democratic group formations called the group-in-fusion and, in particular, the 
organized group, enhance the individualʼs practical freedom.”353 It is the ʻin particularʼ 
that is most interesting in his reading of CDR. For Rae, the organization is the group 
most apt to enhance practical freedom. In fact, he even suggests that individuals 
ought to seek out joining groups that are ordered in the vein of Sartreʼs organization 
in order to best experience practical and political freedom.354
" The confusion surrounding the ʻturning pointʼ (as Klockars called it) can be 
understood in light of two general causes; the first of which is endemic to the text 
itself; the second stemming from the common method of reception of CDR. Sartre 
was somewhat ambivalent regarding the point at which seriality would come to exert 
a dominating influence over the life of the group. At times, he does speak of inertia 
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entering the group through the pledge.355 And he appears to suggest that there is a 
negative effect of the pledge imposing a ʻbeingʼ onto the spontaneous freedom of the 
surviving group.356 However, as was covered in the previous section, he also insists 
that freedom is made common and that the mediatory relationship of the pledged 
group is a pledged-praxis, not the practico-inert. Further, Sartre seems to divide his 
four modes of the group into two divisions: the “fused and pledged, organisational 
and institutional.”357 This division places the fused group and pledged group in the 
same simple category, and places the organization and institution in the other. 
However, does this two-part division mean that the first grouping are the bastions of 
freedom, whereas the second are ensembles of alienation? Rae has argued quite 
convincingly that such is not the case. 
" This leads us to the second cause for confusion surrounding the ʻturning 
pointʼ. If CDR is read as a text of social ontology, or similarly, if CDR is read as 
espousing a normative vision for the ways social groupings ought to be arranged, 
then the debate ought to framed as it has been historically. However, this is not what 
Sartre is doing. As has been argued throughout the present thesis, CDR is an 
investigation into the formal conditions of structural and historical anthropology. That 
is, CDR is investigating, first, the logical underpinnings of abstract social groupings, 
only to subsequently compound these logical abstractions in deeper levels of 
pluridimensionality in light of real, concrete, material conditions. The result is that 
Sartre develops a logic for making the conditions of history intelligible. He is not 
engaged in normative ascription. Nor is he seeking to develop a theory of how 
groups are actually ordered (at least not necessarily so). Therefore, the debate over 
the ʻturning pointʼ is taking place at the wrong level of discourse. It ought rather be 
centered around the reasons seriality enters at certain points; and to what degree; 
under what conditions; resulting in what effects. Likewise, the investigation of the 
various modes of group life ought to reveal the logic of these various stages insofar 
as each phase presents different specific ways in which individuals are united in 
relation to Kaironic Seriality. This helps explain Sartreʼs ambivalence when 
investigating each mode of the group. For, each mode of the group is itself an 
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unfolding moment of totalization that is rife with complex relations of varying degrees 
of seriality and freedom. 
" With this in mind, the logic of the organization will be more clearly understood. 
As Sartre makes it clear, his purpose in exploring the dialectical rationality of the 
organization is to investigate the way(s) in which organized action is praxis. That is, 
is it common? To what extent? How does it differ from mediated praxis and mediated 
pledged-praxis? In what way(s) is affect organized?358 These questions are summed 
up in the following quip: “Organization is a distribution of tasks.”359 This is the basic 
intelligibility of the organized group. In the organization, stratifications become more 
clearly defined and roles settle. In the group-in-fusion, the individual roles arenʼt pre-
established. One member acts in an immediate sense, in light of his or her position 
under conditions of imminent threat. In the organization, by contrast, tasks are 
distributed in three ways: 1) based on the capacities of the individual members of the 
group, 2) based on the requirements of the individual tasks, and 3) based on the 
groupʼs overall objective. Sartre uses the example of a soccer team to illustrate this. 
" With a soccer team, each player has a particular task. This task is assigned 
based on the skill set of the player; in relation to the other players on the team; in 
relation to the players on other teams; in relation to the rules of the game; in relation 
to the expectations that each position demands; and in relation to the historical 
development of the totality of soccer as a sport – all for the purpose of winning.360 
Each position creates exigencies that individual praxis must act in accordance with 
by interiorizing this exigency and then enacting exigencies (ex. training, diet, 
practice, etc) that best accord with the function of that role within the common goal of 
the team.361 In this sense, there is both demand and praxis. And the organization 
(i.e. the soccer team) functions best (i.e. wins) when the players are fulfilling their 
roles to the best of their abilities. 
" There is another dimension to the logic of the organization that needs to be 
highlighted. This is the way in which the group acts upon itself. As has been 
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discussed throughout this chapter, the apocalypse begins the process of subjective 
constitution. Once inhumanity has been dissolved and the spark of life has become 
contagious, the logic of the construction of humanity itself takes various forms. In the 
organization, this logic is understood as “The group defines, directs, controls and 
constantly corrects the common praxis; it may even, in some cases, produce the 
common individuals who will realise it (through technical education, for example, 
etc.).”362 This is the further explication of the ways in which subjectivity is autopoetic 
in common praxis. For Sartre, the differentiation of the organized group is of little 
importance because its appearance is ʻimmediately intelligibleʼ. What is important is 
precisely “the relation between the action of the group on itself and the action of its 
members on the object.”363 In other words, what becomes central for Sartre is the 
relationship between two modes of common exigency: one internally directed and 
the other externally directed. As the organization acts on itself, it perpetually 
recreates itself in its desire to achieve a common goal. This is crucial to understand: 
the internal exigency is the shared freedom of the dispersed functions as the 
organization transcends one moment of common praxis in its perpetual totalization 
towards future common exigencies. In this way, the organization preserves its 
freedom. It is not driven by inertia coming from without, but impelled by a deepening 
of self-generated exigencies. Therefore, as the organization works on itself, it 
constitutes new arrangements of subjectivity. And at the same time, the shared 
capacities of the ensemble of perpetually created subjects work together to 
accomplish shared objectives.364"
" In this way, Gavin Raeʼs positive reading of the organization is most close to 
the logical analysis that is presented here. While his suggestion that one ought to 
seek membership in social and/or political organizations falls prey to the ontological 
and normative interpretive problems highlighted above, the emphasis he places on 
the organizationʼs capacities to perpetuate freedom charts a useful trajectory. 
Similarly, Klockars suggests that Sartre “has in fact given us... an example of an 
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ideal social formation: the (organised) group.”365 Instead of this type of normative 
conclusion, it is better to state that Sartre has developed a logic of the organization 
that demonstrates the ways in which social stratification can maintain freedom by 
mediating capacities through the organization of affects in relation to a common 
objective. 
" With that, there is still one mode of group life that needs to be explored: the 
institution. For Sartre, the institution is logically posterior to the organization because 
of the proliferation of alterity due to ʻsystems of composite reciprocitiesʼ. Sartre refers 
to the organization as a ʻregulated heterogeneityʼ.366 This is based on the 
enrichments and determinations of exigent limitations. For example, an organization 
may have become united by the pledge, and hence from the perspective of the self-
imposition of the pledge each member was granted an equal status before the 
constitutive image. But not all the members of that organization will ultimately have 
all the same capacities, desires, functions, skills, concerns; nor will they belong to 
the same age group, social class, political organization, etc. The result is that 
heterogeneity comes into the organization – in fact, defines the organization. And 
this heterogeneity is the basis for the reintroduction of alterity. As the “task becomes 
more complicated and the volume of the group increases, systems of simple 
reciprocities are replaced by systems of composite reciprocities.” 367 The result is 
that hierarchy is introduced, and institutionality serializes group life. 
5.6 The Institution!
" The logical chain of group life proceeds from mediated praxis, to mediated 
pledged-praxis, to mediated capacity, to, finally, mediated function. In the institution, 
what Sartre identifies is the logic of “the systematic self-domestication of man by 
man.”368 Affect becomes impotent as the individuals in the institution are declared 
inessential in relation to the essentiality of the institution. In fact, the individuals 
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become the means to perpetuating the essentiality of the institution.369 This is, of 
course, the radical inverse of the logic of the group-in-fusion. The logical cycle has 
come about-face, and the individuality that characterized the mediated capacity of 
the organization is discarded for pure, repetitive function. Sartre states that, in the 
institution, “[Freedom], conceived as a common transcendent subject, denies 
individual freedom and expels the individual from function; function, positing itself for 
itself, and producing individuals who will perpetuate it, becomes an institution.”370 
There is still a sense in which Sartre discusses freedom in relation to the institution. 
However, this freedom is no longer the shared spark of life of human subjects in 
mediated reciprocity. Rather, freedom belongs exclusively to what Sartre calls ʻthe 
sovereignʼ. The sovereign need not be understood as an individual per se. Rather, 
the sovereign is better understood as the dominant logic that withholds the freedom 
of the institution from the inessential component parts.371 It can be an individual, a 
gathering of individuals, or a set of abstract ideas. Thus, ʻfreedomʼ is an ironic turn of 
phrase to denote the source of potency in the institution. For Sartre, the cause of the 
institution is “greater than all of [the members]” and “there is only one freedom for all 
the members of the [institutionalized] group: that of the sovereign.”372
" Clearly, what has been re-introduced at this stage is the dominance of 
seriality. In the institution, individuals are ʻunitedʼ through shared alterity. Each 
functions as a cog in the institutional wheel, serving the purposes of the institution. 
However, the logic of the institution is not identical to the logic of the collective. In the 
collective, individuals are mediated by the practico-inert. But in the institution, 
individuals are mediated by a shared commitment to the logic of the institution itself. 
In other words, they are mediated by the self-domestication of their pure functionality 
in service of the sovereign. The difference lies in the logical causal chain. That is, 
under the conditions of abstract seriality in the collective, as mediated by the 
practico-inert field, the individuals ʻunitedʼ are inhuman through and through. In the 
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institution, the individuals are the remnant of those who have been transformed 
through the various stages of the group. The result is that, formally, the individuals in 
the institution bear a level of humanity within (regardless of how suppressed by 
institutional dominance) that was absent in the formal abstract investigation of life 
lived under conditions of Infinite Seriality. So although the institution is the mode of 
group life that falls back into seriality, for Sartre, there is a crucial difference between 
the institutional logic and the logic of the series. 
" That said, by reintroducing seriality, Sartre has led the investigation to the end 
of its logical spiral. His foray into the formal conditions of structural and historical 
anthropology have revealed a set of logical constructs that make the conditions of 
social life under historical conditions of scarcity intelligible. They are not absolute 
facts. Nor are they universal logical principles. Rather, they are practical devices that 
themselves are part of the totalizing flow of history. But they are still abstractions. In 
order to better understand concrete material existence, it needs to be re-iterated that 
at each given moment, at every given moment, dispersed everywhere around 
ʻEarthʼ, these varying modes of social life intermix in a massive cross-contamination 
of complexity. Any group that emerges, therefore, will never fully eradicate the 
entirety of the influence of Kaironic Seriality that impinges upon its various members. 
There may be a sense in which the antagonism is directed to a particular intense 
expression of this seriality, and that the group successfully eliminates that particular 
threat. However, each body in the group, each individual, will still retain varying 
degrees of serial alienation within. This is why Sartre refers to the monstrosity of 
seriality as ʻInfinite Serialityʼ.373 The persons in the group-in-fusion, while ʻfreeʼ in 
relation to the immediate threat that fused them in the apocalyptic moment, are still 
part of various institutional systems that persistently impinge upon them throughout 
the duration of the apocalyptic Event. Likewise, in the organization, there will be 
varying levels of seriality that will define an individual member outside the scope of 
the task of the organization. So in reference to the task of the organization, the 
individual might still be living according to a de-alienated logic, but with respect to the 
entirety of her life, she will still be influenced by Kaironic Seriality (to varying degrees 
of intensity and actuality). 
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" Sartre was keenly aware that Infinite Seriality was persistent. He knew that 
group irruption was not sufficient in itself, in its particular uprisings (even its multiple 
uprisings) to create a socialist revolution around the globe. However, this was his 
ultimate hope: that a socialist revolution would take hold. And this is how we must 
understand his investigation into the conditions of History: in light of the persistence 
of seriality, even through the many group uprisings, how can there be a global effort 
to effect a transformation of life in such a way as to make global socialism possible? 
In other words, his ultimate desire to discover and found the one meaning of History 
was to serve as a tool in the hands of humans (however they come to be created) to 
create society as a work of art. This prepares us for Part Two, wherein the 
investigation will examine the power of the imagination to effect this Sartrean vision. 
Eschewing the normative and ontological readings of CDR, Part Two will proceed by 
developing an imaginative logic of action based on the investigation into the formal, 
logical conditions of history as outlined above. 
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Part Two: 
Toward an Imaginative Logic of Action
" Having investigated the logical constructions developed in CDR, Part Two will 
proceed in two ways. First, Sartreʼs early phenomenological inquiry into the 
imagination will be briefly outlined. The purpose of this is to reveal the ways in which 
the imagination functioned for the early Sartreʼs general theoretical disposition. That 
is to say, the imagination will come to be seen as central to his understanding of 
consciousness and thus his phenomenological ontology. We will see the limits of his 
theory of the imagination for political praxis and will then make connections with 
other thinkers, and even the later Sartre himself, in order to suggest ways in which 
the imagination might be made politically relevant, even necessary. The goal of this 
first step is to prepare for the development of what is being termed here the 
ʻimaginative logic of actionʼ. The latter weds together Sartreʼs theory of the 
imagination in his early writings with the ʻliving logic of actionʼ in CDR as explored in 
Part One. A key claim guiding this section will be that Sartre unwittingly develops a 
theory of praxis in CDR that supplements his earlier work on the imagination by 
infusing the latter into the logical constructs that were explored in Chapters Three, 
Four, and Five as a necessary constituent part. The imaginative logic of action will, 
therefore, come to be seen as the affective, active, and imaginative logical 
disposition that both constitutes human subjects and enables them to combat 
Kaironic Seriality. Then, finally, once this logic is established, we will muse on the 
ways this logic can contribute to the project of creating new humanisms and the 
perpetual creation and re-creation of de-alienated society. It must be granted that 
this is a creative reading of Sartre but one that is thoroughly rooted in exegesis. 
Therefore, fidelity and creativity will guide the rest of this project. 
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VI. The Logic of Poetic Imagination
“By and by, we learn to prefer the closure of constraint to the openness of context. We are 
progressively trained to refuse the gift of imagination, to stay in touch with reality, as we are wont to 
say. We learn to mistrust and resist the lure of the merely imaginary in favor of the really real.”374
6.1 The Usefulness and Limits of Sartreʼs Imaging Consciousness!
" In The Imaginary (hereafter PI), Sartre outlines a phenomenological theory of 
the imagination. Viewed in terms of intentionality, the imagination is not a supplement 
to consciousness, the image is not in consciousness, but rather imagination is a type 
of consciousness – an “imaging consciousness.”375 As such, it is always directed 
toward an object. Thus, the object of the image is not the image itself, but that ‘real 
thing’ the image presents. In the case of non-fictive objects, there is an actual 
material object that is sought by the imaging consciousness. Being both present (as 
an object of the image) and absent (as not physically present), the object of the 
image is ‘intended’ by the spontaneous emergence of the imaging consciousness. In 
fact, both the image and the imaging consciousness arise together – they are 
understood as co-constituting;376 the former being the relation between the latter and 
the object intended. But it must be remembered that the image is not an existent for 
its own sake – it is only an analogue of the real object sought. As such, it is deemed 
irreal. “Without doubt it is present but, at the same time, it is out of reach. I cannot 
touch it, change its place: or rather I can indeed do so, but on the condition that I do 
it in an irreal way... to act on these irreal objects, I must duplicate myself, irrealize 
myself.”377 Thus, the real desire, the ultimate desire, is to realize the material object 
(the real) in perception. Of course, the latter is impossible. Therefore, there is a 
deferral of desire/intentionality from the real towards the irreal.
" This process is both satisfactory and frustrating: satisfactory because the 
object is partially presented in its absence as a phantom which gives minimally that 
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which the real could give infinitely; and frustrating because the image is an already 
constituted irreal existent that will only play at satisfying desire378 – because it has no 
autonomous capacity, it teaches nothing, and it is finite insofar as it is a product of 
the intending imaging consciousness. The result is that consciousness is constantly 
surrounded by phantom objects, which provide us with a “perpetual evasion... [from] 
our current condition, our concerns, our boredoms; they offer us an escape from all 
the constraints of the world, they seem to be presented as a negation of the 
condition of being in the world, as an anti-world.”379 In other words, they provide an 
escape from that which is. However, this ‘anti-world’ is a world constituted by inert, 
irreal objects that can do nothing by themselves; therefore, any attempt to base 
praxis off such a world will only provide episodic expressions of positive affect. The 
extreme of such an effort is what Sartre labels schizophrenia. 
To prefer the imaginary is not only to prefer a richness, a beauty, a luxury as 
imaged to the present mediocrity despite their irreal character. It is also to 
adopt ʻimaginaryʼ feelings and conduct because of their imaginary character. 
One does not only choose this or that image, one chooses the imaginary state 
with all that it brings with it... This factitious, solidified, slowed down, scholastic 
life, which for most people is but makeshift, is precisely what a schizophrenic 
desires.380
This does not deny the importance or the power of the imagination in toto, but merely 
demonstrates how living in an ‘imaginary state’ is a flight from reality, and thus hardly 
a mode that would provide the sort of real life liberation that so concerned Sartre.
" In contrast to the image stands the real. The real for Sartre (in PI) is that 
which is given in perception. In PI (and as later developed in BN) it is the ‘in-itself’. 
The in-itself has an infinite depth of being in relation to perception, as the latter is 
incapable of exhausting all being-in-itself has to give.381 Therefore, the real has 
infinite possibilities that both confront the subject as the site of viscous absurdity and 
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" In CDR, the real is still understood as materiality. However, the material world 
is refracted through the logic of the practico-inert field that captures labor, thereby 
alienating praxis from the finality of its project(s), and that limits the field of possibles 
through mediated exigencies – the return of stolen praxis. As the group seeks ‘to 
snatch from worked-upon material its inhuman power of mediation’ it constitutes 
subjects according to mediated reciprocity in which each subject remains individual 
but also an individual-for-others; and each other (i.e. third) does the same. 
Therefore, the human, as constituted in the group, is freed from the negative 
reciprocity that necessarily arises from the dialectical relationship between the 
project and the situation under conditions of serial alienation. As mentioned earlier, it 
is this process of de-alienation that most concerns Sartre.
" If it is the case that life lived in Kaironic Seriality is a necessary result of 
scarcity and the dialectical relation between praxis and the situation, and if the image 
(i.e. the relation between consciousness and the intended object) only offers finite, 
momentary satisfaction and/or glimpses into that which might be, then in what way 
can the imagination aid us in constructing a broad social theory? Let me suggest that 
what needs to be explored is the way in which the imagination functions as a 
moment of praxis, as the transcendental condition of the project, and as the site of 
the perpetual creation of novelty.382 Returning for a moment to PI, Sartre notes that 
there are two ways in which we can conceive of the future: (1) the living future and 
(2) the imagined future. The former is the “temporal ground on which my present 
perception develops, the [latter] is posited for itself but as that which is not yet.”383 
The living future is part of real existence, which occurs with “present, past and future 
structures, therefore the past and the future as essential structures of the real are 
equally real, which is to say correlates of a realizing thesis.”384 But the imagined 
future is posited by oneself, for oneself, as an absence (a nothing, an unreality) that 
is desired. In the case of the group, the pledge pertains to the imagined future in that 
it 1) recollects a past moment of reality and seeks to recreate the exigence of that 
moment by the positing of an image (nostalgia) and 2) posits a future foe that is not 
imminent (imagination). The problem is that while nostalgia and imagination can 
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indeed actualize a small degree of the affective impetus of the past and can 
stimulate genuine feeling toward the future foe, it is not able to reach the real of 
those situations by virtue of the inert and irreal nature of the image. Thus, by 
nostalgia and imagination alone (i.e. the pledge) the group will never be able to 
sustain itself and prevent dissolution into seriality or alienating institutions.385 
" Referring to the time after the fusion of the group and at the beginning of the 
pledge process Sartre remarks,
We may speak here of reflection, in the strictly practical sense: the group, 
waiting for the attack, looks for positions to occupy, divides itself so as to man 
all of them, distributes weapons, assigns patrol duties to some, and scouting 
or guard duties to others, establishes communication... and in this way, in the 
free exploitation of places and resources, it constitutes itself for itself as a 
group.
He would continue on to say,
It is impossible to deny that [the group] posits itself for itself once it has 
survived its victory. Or, to put it another way, there is a new structure to be 
explained: group consciousness... Furthermore, the problem of the surviving 
group... suddenly becomes connected for us with the problem of being, that is 
to say, of permanence.386
Seeking permanence, the group imposes an inert mode of mediated reciprocity from 
within. However, the pledge, as a reflective act of group consciousness, locks the 
group into a statut of permanence that does not allow the group to reshape itself 
freely. Thus, freedom is negated and necessity reigns. This is the logic of the pledge 
from the perspective of the imagined future. We can see now why the pledge is 
locked in a tendential idealism; and we are also given insight into how the logic of the 
future image can be modified to escape this idealism. 
" The only section in “Volume One” of CDR where Sartre mentions the 
imagination is in the section “Totality and Totalisation.” As was discussed in Chapter 
One, the former is a creation which is present in its entirety, whereas the latter is a 
developing activity. It should come as no surprise that Sartre classifies totality as “the 
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correlative of an act of imagination.”387 This means that any totality is merely an 
analogon. Totalization on the other hand is the correlative of praxis; it is a perpetual 
dialectical ordering. Favoring totalization, Sartre devises a theory of individual and 
group praxis that, at moments, is able to embody freedom. But this freedom is only 
momentary because once the group’s objective has been achieved there is no 
longer an immediate and exigent situation that requires common praxis. The result is 
that the group must pledge itself for itself and to itself by imposing inertia upon itself 
in the form of a reflective act (i.e. an analogon). This analogon is set to remind the 
group of the possibility of the violent foe’s imminent return. Structuring itself by an 
image of fraternity-terror, the group therefore negates its own free praxis in favor of a 
totality (‘we are x’). Seeking to recreate the affective purity that arose initially at the 
moment of apocalypse, the pledged group views itself in its past victory by creating 
an image that will stir up the affective impression from that previous event. 
Successful in part, this effort is doomed to fail as the group permanently settles into 
this new order by institutionalizing itself. 
" Therefore, what needs to occur in order to prevent this ossification is that the 
group needs to take a progressive approach and turn its gaze forward to the field of 
possibles. That is, the group must resist the urge to rest assured within the fraternity-
of-terror and instead conceive of ways in which new events can be produced. That 
way, the non-reflective experience of the apocalypse might be perpetuated by the 
will of the group. Such productive mythologizing would arise in situation and seek to 
surpass such conditions as it imagines and seeks to produce possibilities that are as 
yet impossible. The question arises: will such imagined futures produce the desired 
result? No, they won’t. It is not the imagination that produces the apocalypse. Such 
is a spontaneous upsurge of non-reflexive praxis in situation. Nor does it produce a 
final result at all. The imagination’s role is merely to create an image of that which is 
not yet in order to motivate group action through affective possibilities that arise 
therefrom. As stated in PI, at times, an image is created “for no other purpose than to 
arouse the feeling.”388 Regarding the dialectic, the imagination is the essential first 
moment of praxis by which the constituted group envisions its next step in 
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overcoming the conditions of scarcity and negative reciprocity. Then, through praxis, 
the situation is modified thereby creating new conditions that must be overcome. 
" The reason this forward-looking approach has validity is that the pledged 
group’s primary error is that it is seeking to preserve that which once was, through 
representation and reproduction of a past moment of pure freedom into a permanent 
state; whereas the desired approach would be one in which individuals and/or the 
group arise out of a given set of exceptional conditions but that continually create 
and produce new images. Therefore, creative imagining never settles and thus never 
ossifies into seriality and/or institutionalization. Of course, there will be moments 
when the group’s particular task is accomplished, or when the apocalyptic moment 
ceases. But if scarcity is universal and undeniable (as Sartre claims) then there will 
never be a shortage of situations of exigence that need to be identified and 
transcended. This means that the group from one situation of exigence to the next is 
not the same as it was by virtue of the previous apocalyptic moment. The group must 
continually recreate itself in light of each given situation of exigence in order to resist 
ever settling into being x. There is an openness that must come to characterize the 
social order, one that connects both the real world and the imaginary state. That is, 
human praxis must tether that balance between that which is and that which might 
be, with the hope that by preferring the former but simultaneously tending toward the 
latter a constant creation of affectivity will actually force the creation of the novel in 
new unforeseeable directions. In this way, we might call for a derealization of the 
political, or positively, we ought to revel in the imaginary with the hope that by the 
powers of the imagination we will be able to press the process of totalization into 
presently unforeseen situations that will allow us to appropriately respond as we 
seek universal liberation.
" But precisely at this point we have reached the limits of Sartreʼs imaging 
consciousness. The future image, as conceived from the perspective of PI, is not a 
sufficient concept for the realization of such a project. It must be opened up to the 
real in order to have the efficacy that is required to fit a truly historical materialist 
logic of action, one that incorporates the unifying and affective power of the image 
but that also remains grounded in material reality. And then, in line with the theme of 
this thesis, there must be an investigation into the logic that underpins such an 
imaginative project.
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6.2 A New Logic of Imagination!
" Above it was stated that the imagination functions 1) as a moment of praxis, 
2) as the transcendental condition of the project, and 3) as the site of the perpetual 
creation of novelty. It is these three functions of the imagination that must first be 
investigated in order grasp the imaginative logic of action as developed in the 
forthcoming pages. The reason is that although Sartreʼs investigation into the 
imagination yields fruitful concepts that signal the way forward in a general sense, 
his development of the terms themselves must be supplemented in order to allow for 
a more robust conception of the imagination to attach to the logic of action as 
developed in CDR. Particularly, this section will focus on the ways in which the 
imagination is conceived in terms of its role as a mediatory material exigency within 
the larger social milieu.
" Kristian Klockars falls into the normative and ontological trap by reading 
Sartre as a thinker of Utopia. He states that,
Today Marxism can no longer be claimed to represent the mood of the times, 
nor does the kind of Utopian perspective Sartre seems to identify with have 
much to give. Quite the contrary, I consider the kind of political Utopianism 
that bases itself on images of ideal societies that appears to be wholly 
different in kind than our own a first step towards a dangerous 'the end 
justifies the means' thinking. Today, perhaps more than ever, critical social 
theory needs to focus more on critical-normative issues, rather than Utopian 
ones.389
The two biggest problems with this reading of CDR is that Sartre is not basing his 
thinking 1) ʻon images of ideal societiesʼ or 2) on images of ideal societies that are 
ʻwholly different in kind than our ownʼ. The first point falls into the ontological and 
normative criticism that was outlined previously. Briefly stated, CDR is not concerned 
with developing normative ideals or social ontologies of possible social ensembles. 
His investigation into the various groupings is a hypo-logical investigation into the 
formal conditions that make such groupings intelligible. The second point is more 
pressing for this chapter. That is, Sartre is not proffering images of ideal societies 
that are ʻwholly different in kind than our ownʼ. Even if we grant that Sartre is in fact 
developing images of ideal societies (rather than developing a logic that will aid in 
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the construction of images to motivate action), the images that he investigates are in 
no way ʻwholly differentʼ than our present state of affairs. In fact, it is the rigorous 
analysis of the formal conditions of society under Kaironic Seriality that is the 
earmark of his investigation. Klockarsʼ error is that he neglects the enfolding, 
dialectical nature and trajectory of the totality of CDR, which progresses from the 
simple and abstract to the complex and concrete. What is more, he fails to give 
proper attention to the status of CDR as a ʻprolegomena to any future anthropologyʼ. 
The point being this: CDR investigates particular social ensembles, historical 
conditions, and anthropological formalities in order to understand the logic that 
underpins praxis under serial and common conditions. The result being that his 
investigation is not ʻwholly different in kind than our ownʼ social life, for the 
investigation itself is precisely an examination of this social life in order to 
comprehend it further. Of course, Klockarsʼ claim that Utopianism is dangerous must 
be heeded. As he notes, “The search for objective and normative moral principles 
and the positing of Utopian models of the ideal society share the dangers of 
becoming authoritarian.”390 In this much, we are all in agreement.391 However, this is 
why it is crucial to understand the imagination as a mediatory material exigency. And 
further, this is why it is crucial to open Sartreʼs understanding of the imaginary to a 
robust materialist conception of the imagination. 
" It must be made clear at this point that the present project is not in any way 
seeking to think Utopia (with a capital ʻUʼ). Utopic visions are trapped in the idealist 
tendency of the imagined future mentioned above. They are inert monoliths that 
stand above reality as transcendent Ideas. However, this is not to suggest that utopic 
thinking (with a small ʻuʼ) tout court is necessarily subject to the same criticism. On 
the contrary, it might be said that the very thing this project proposes is utopic 
thinking. The difference, for our purposes, between thinking Utopia and utopic 
thinking is that the former is musing simply on the fantasy of that which is not, 
whereas the latter is a logical disposition that surpasses the present state of affairs 
by aiming towards the not-yet. Utopic thinking is an optimistic comportment to the 
world. We might say that it is grounded by remaining true to the earth. Therefore, 
utopic thinking is not the mere construction of fanciful ideas that seem pleasant or 
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equitable for their own sake, or even merely for the sake of those projecting them. 
Rather, utopic thinking is rooted in the struggles of real, concrete, material life. It 
derives its impetus from reality while refusing to accept the present statut, and then 
aims towards that which is not yet in order to realize it. This is the type of thinking 
Sartre presents in CDR. His logic of action is not a vision for Utopia; it is a framework 
for utopic thinking. 
" Ironically, in CDR, Sartre develops a theory of praxis that supplements his 
earlier work on the imagination, albeit unwittingly. In PI, there are three ways that the 
real (i.e. situation) can be surpassed: affectivity, action, and imagination. These three 
cannot be separated in actual fact, but only in abstraction. Therefore, in lived 
experience, the productive activity of consciousness is simultaneously affective, 
active, and imaginative. In CDR, no longer viewing the human in phenomenological 
terms, these three abstractions still inhere in the (in)human project. Praxis, as the 
logic of (in)human action, includes all three elements in its totalizing activity. As 
Sartre would come to say, there is a “strict equivalence between praxis with its 
particular articulations and the dialectic as the logic of creative action.”392 There are 
two things of note in this quotation. First, the particular articulations of praxis is 
referring to the differential, subjectivity. This is the spark of subjective constitution 
that was discussed in Chapter Five. Second, praxis is equated with the dialectic as 
the logic of creative action. This means that praxis is understood as the logic of (in)
humanity insofar as the (in)human project is essentially creative. As Thomas Flynn 
suggests, this unique activity – the particular articulation of subjectivity in praxis – is 
an act of the imagination.393 Therefore, what Sartre develops in CDR is a materialist 
version of his earlier notion of the way the (in)human project surpasses any given 
situation. ʻManʼ, for Sartre, both transcends and invents his situation. Whereas in PI 
the imagination served as the solipsistic negating activity of individual consciousness 
in ontological freedom towards projects unique to a particular individual contra other 
competing projects, in CDR, praxis becomes a mediated activity of common 
imaginative negation in a milieu of scarcity. Thus, understood abstractly, praxis is 
affective, active, and imaginative. 
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" The question remains, however, in what way is this understanding of the 
imagination understood as mediatory? This must be answered in two ways. First of 
all, it is mediated in its serial form. Second, it is mediated, as common, in the group. 
Serially, if praxis is stored in the practico-inert, and if praxis is affective, active, and 
imaginative, then the return of stolen praxis must contain the entirety of the logical 
structure of praxis in its alienating capacity. Therefore, inhuman life under Kaironic 
Seriality is mediated by the practico-inert in its pluridimensionality insofar as the 
practico-inert is the stasis of previous affective, active, and imaginative praxis. 
Therefore, in one sense, the imagination (as a moment of praxis), in Kaironic 
Seriality, is beholden to the exigencies of the practico-inert field. In another sense, 
the imagination is precisely the predestined inhuman praxis that is previously charted 
by the exigencies of the practico-inert field. And finally, the demands that are placed 
on inhuman praxis in Kaironic Seriality are partly characterized by their previous 
serial imaginative qualities that have been stored in the practico-inert through the 
past anti-dialectical relation between anti-praxis and the material condition. This 
means that the imagination, understood from the logic of Kaironic Seriality, is 
mediated through the practico-inert as part of the anti-dialectical activity of inhuman 
praxis. 
" This understanding of the imagination has resonance with Charles Taylorʼs 
development of the ʻsocial imaginaryʼ in his monumental Modern Social Imaginaries. 
Comparing Sartre with Taylor on this point is useful in that the ʻsocial imaginaryʼ also 
conditions and mediates social life. However, Taylorʼs concept is far too simplistic to 
offer the type of analysis that is required to grasp the depths of pluridimensional 
seriality. By bringing Taylor into dialogue with Sartre, it becomes clear just how 
valuable Sartreʼs heuristic is for understanding mediated social life in Kaironic 
Seriality.
" Although not associated with alienation per se, the social imaginary, upon 
inspection, actually maps quite well onto the idea of serial imagination that was 
elucidated just above. For Taylor, “The social imaginary is not a set of ideas; rather, it 
is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society.”394 Elsewhere, 
he would write that the social imaginary is part of the “very formative horizon of my 
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identity.”395 In other words, the social imaginary is the transcendental condition for 
social life. It is what makes intelligible the ʻpractices of societyʼ. We could say that the 
social imaginary is the logic of Taylorʼs social theory. However, unlike Sartreʼs 
investigation in CDR, Taylorʼs development of the social imaginary does not explore 
the various modes of pluridimensional reality. Rather, Taylorʼs conception of the 
social imaginary is an innocuous reading of the conditions that we have identified as 
Kaironic Seriality. This is not to claim that Taylor does not identify variations within his 
understanding of the social imaginary. As is the case, social imaginaries vary in 
many different ways. But what he neglects is an investigation into the varying logics 
that undergird these different expressions of the social imaginary. As Matthew Ally 
has pointed out, “The social imaginary possesses a certain recalcitrance to change – 
Sartre might call it quasi-being or inertia, Taylor might call it stability or integrity.”396 
This is the crux of the difference between Taylor and Sartre. For Taylor, the social 
imaginary, as a logical construct, is a neutral hegemonic conception of the 
ideological life of persons in communities. Sartre, by contrast, would identify the 
social imaginary as objective spirit, the Big Other that mediates life in Kaironic 
Seriality, and thus necessarily includes alienation as a result of life lived under such 
conditions. That is, Taylorʼs social imaginary is driven by a serial logic, one that he 
ignores in his examination of how social relations are mediated, identities are 
constructed, and how relational bonds are formed. 
" More positively, John Sallis presents a conception of the transcendentality of 
the imagination that fits well with the development of an imaginative logic of action. 
For Sallis, the imagination is the poetic activity that wonders excessively beyond 
nature as it is beckoned forth by the power of the elemental, namely the Earth and 
the sky. Imagination is not a power of the subject. Rather it is in “excess of the 
self.”397 Like Sartre, Sallis understands the power of the exigency of material 
conditions. One is drawn forth toward the possible through the image, which is not a 
representation of the thing, but is rather the presence, occurrence, and locus of the 
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thing.398 However, Sallis, following Aristotle and Heidegger, presents a conception of 
the imagination that is wedded to a conception of the elemental that is absent in 
Sartre. For Sallis, the imagination wonders excessively beyond nature.399 Absent a 
critical theory of worked matter, it is the power of the elemental in its infinite depth 
that draws the imagination forward. This is the force of imagination. “Force of 
imagination names, not some capacity belonging to imagination, but rather the self-
deployment of imagination itself at some site, indeed, as tractive, at some locus of 
presence.”400 That said, the idea of wondering beyond nature is not entirely outside 
the purview of the logic of imagination that we are developing. Rather than speaking 
of nature, however, it is better to speak of the situation, or Kaironic Seriality, or 
ʻEarthʼ. In this sense, a Sartrean inversion of Sallisʼ idea would be to speak of the 
force of imagination being drawn from the exigence of the material situation that 
mediates social relations. In Kaironic Seriality, this mediation would lead to alienation 
and inhumanity, but would nevertheless still be characterized by the force of 
imagination that draws inhumanity toward the practico-inert field. Therefore, along 
with Sallis, we can claim, “rather than imagination belonging to the subject, the 
subject would belong to imagination.”401 
" At this point, the logic of serial imagination is showing itself. But what of 
common mediated imaginative praxis? Sallis again provides a useful foray:
Imagination can be otherwise deployed. Or rather, a certain impoverishment 
of imagination can come about, and the result can even be mistaken for 
imagination itself in its highest possibilities. When poetic imagination ceases 
to be poetic, it becomes mere imagining. This occurs, specifically, when the 
drawing is withdrawn from every matrix, when it ceases to bring about a draft 
in stone, on the shadable surface of a canvas, or in the sound of a voice. It 
becomes what one might call, in a very restricted sense of the word, a free 
drawing: lacking a matrix in which figuration could bring to manifestness some 
moment of the expanse of manifestation, imagination loses all connection with 
self-showing as such. In contrast to the disclosive artwork, it can only 
summon up mere phantoms.402
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The final pages of Force of Imagination discuss the distinction between an effective 
poetic imagination and an impotent phantasmic imagination. The former is open to 
the elemental, the field of possibles, to exigency, whereas the latter is purely self-
referential and self-derived. The phantasm is the image that merely perpetuates 
itself. It refuses to be sensitive to the beckoning of the exigent needs that saturate 
the field of possibles. As such, it can only create images that are static and closed off 
from the future, thereby recapitulating the past endlessly. This is the earmark of 
conservatism. The poetic imagination, by contrast, is necessarily embedded in the 
milieu of exigency. It derives its potency from the demands of the elemental. Poetic 
imagination is therefore replete with capacity and potency. It is essentially impelled 
by the interiorization of these exigencies and then exteriorized into the field of 
perpetually reformed exigencies in a movement of dialectical totalization. Therefore, 
the logic of the poetic imagination must be contrasted with the logic of serial 
imagination, with the former according to the logic of the group and the latter 
according with the logic of seriality. The differences, of course, between Sallisʼ 
understanding of the poetic imagination and a Sartrean imaginative logic of action 
are many. But where Sallisʼ logic of the poetic imagination is useful is precisely in its 
appeal to the creative activity of the imagination as it is impelled by the field of 
materiality that conditions subjective life and that forces imagination forward. In this 
sense, imagination is both the condition and the execution of action. In Sartrean 
terms, it can be said that a poetic imagination is the condition and enactment of 
dialectical totalization. Likewise, the distinction Sallis makes between poetic 
imagination and phantasmic imagining maps loosely onto the Sartrean distinction 
between freedom and seriality. The phantasmic imagining ʻceases to be poeticʼ, and 
as such it has no potency; it is impotent, in the Sartrean sense. 
" However, under conditions of commonality, according to the logic of the 
group, the mediatory activity of the imagination has specific characteristics that 
Sallisʼ account are unable to explicate. It can only be understood in its incorporation 
into the logical schema already sketched in Chapter Five. Most importantly, what 
needs to be understood is the way in which the transformation of subjectivity in the 
irruption of the apocalyptic moment affects the imagination. As noted above, praxis is 
affective, active, and imaginative. Conditioned by the logic of seriality, praxis is anti-
praxis; as such, there is an impotence that characterizes the affectivity, activity, and 
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imagination of inhumans. When the apocalypse breaks open the fabric of reality and 
initiates the subjective constitution of those whose praxis is mediated in common in 
the group-in-fusion, not only is there an affective and empathic connectivity that 
binds them in their common action, but their effort is shared in its creative expression 
as well. That is, their affective, empathic common praxis is imaginative at the same 
time. Of course, making such distinctions is an abstraction for the purpose of 
understanding the logic that guides the action. In real, concrete, material life the 
mediation of affect, action, and imagination occurs simultaneously. Therefore, the 
differential of subjectivity that is sparked is ignited partly by the imagination, both 
from without, as the mediatory locus shifts from the practico-inert to the shared 
imaginative praxis of the members of the group, and from within, as the differential 
(i.e. subjective constitution) is transformed and given a new orientation toward the 
imaginative field itself. 
" Because of this transformation of subjectivity, utopic thinking becomes 
possible. That is, utopic thinking as conditioned by a serial logic is a non sequitur. 
Impotence reigns, and as such, thinking under such conditions will necessarily be 
(logically) impotent. The only logical conditions that prepare the way for utopic 
thinking are those that emerge under conditions of common praxis. As the group 
initiates the rebirth of human life, the imagination is resuscitated and reorientated so 
that the group will, by necessity, create imaginatively in its shared affective praxis. In 
this way, it can be said that group praxis is necessarily driven by a utopic logic. But 
this utopic logic is not the mere creation of alternative ideals, as was Klockarsʼ 
criticism of Utopia. Rather, this utopic logic is meted in real, concrete, material 
conditions. As the group-in-fusion exists in direct antagonism to an imminent foe, the 
actions of the members, as shared, exhibit a utopic impetus in their violence. Once 
the foe is defeated and the pledge is sworn, the pledge-image is created as a self-
imposed inertia that is both inert and dynamic. This pledge-image, as nostalgic and 
imaginative, mediates the members of the pledged group in commonality. As was 
noted in Chapter Five, the pledge is not purely inert, but rather is the creation of 
human subjects, now understood as those whose upsurgent imaginative capacities 
have constructed a shared image to unite them in their desire for permanence. And 
in the logic of the organization, the imagination takes on an even larger role as social 
stratification sets in. Mediated by capacity, the freedom of the members of the 
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organization is driven by the organization of affect in their perpetual recreation of 
themselves and in their common objective.
" What this means for the foregoing pages of this project is that the logical 
constructs that were explored in Chapters Three, Four, and Five are now infused 
with the imagination as a necessary element. Distinguishing between its impotent or 
poetic expression is crucial in elaborating how the imagination is central in 
constructing what is being termed here the 'imaginative logic of action', and 
understanding how this logical disposition is useful for emancipatory political 
concerns in Kaironic Seriality. While Sartre did not explicitly develop an 'imaginative 
logic of action', his project in CDR bears the latent information that this study 
palpates in order to release the potential benefits for developing social and political 
theories in the future. Moving forward, this investigation will now demonstrate how 
both seriality and freedom condition life in pluridimensionality. We will call that logic 
that is predestined by conditions of seriality the serial logic of inaction, and that logic 
that is conditioned by the freedom initiated by the apocalypse the imaginative logic of 
action. 
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VII. A Tale of Two Logics
“[How] can he satisfy his needs without hurting himself, without reproducing, through his aspirations 
and satisfactions, his dependence on an exploitative apparatus which, in satisfying his needs, 
perpetuates his servitude?”403
"
" There are two modes of logic that will be explored in this chapter: the first, the 
serial logic of inaction, describes the conditionality of lived experience in Kaironic 
Seriality, whereas the second, the imaginative logic of action, explicates the logical 
framework under conditions of freedom. Neither of these designations are used in 
CDR. Rather, they are conceptual amalgamations derived from the findings of the 
present investigation. Their value is contained in their accuracy and deployment. 
Insofar as these terms remain faithful to a fresh explication of the logical constructs 
developed in CDR, as reconstructed in this project, they will come to be understood 
as accurate depictions of the logical underpinning of lived experience. Likewise, their 
deployment as logical concepts will prove valuable for social theory and future 
philosophical anthropological thinking as they each provide a robust framework for 
intelligibility, as well as equipping a forward-looking approach toward the field of 
possibles. 
7.1 The Serial Logic of Inaction
" As was explored in Chapter Four, the dominance of Infinite Seriality is replete. 
Inhuman life is the primary mode of life in Kaironic Seriality. The depths of its 
infringement paint a bleak picture of the possibility of living freely, either individually 
or in community. Therefore, Kaironic Seriality must only be understood as a logical 
concept that makes intelligible this dire statut. It is a way of making intelligible the 
impossibility of living inhumanly by the invocation of the call that it is always the 
opportune moment. But it also does something else: namely, it reveals the depths of 
alienation to such an extent that the very logic that governs inhuman life, and that is 
expressed in this very impotent existence, is seen as the dominant mode of feeling, 
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thought, and action. As Sartre states, “[It] is in the serial milieu and through serial 
behavior that the individual achieves practical and theoretical participation in 
common being.”404 In other words, social life in Kaironic Seriality takes place in the 
serial milieu and expresses itself as serial behavior. What is more, serial social life 
and serial behavior are governed by a logic that predestines life under such 
conditions. As Sartre makes clear, “there is a logic of the practico-inert layer” and as 
such there are “structures proper to the thought which is produced at this social level 
of activity; in other words, there is a rationality of the theoretical and practical 
behaviour of an agent as a member of a series.”405 This is what is meant by there 
being a logic that governs life under serial conditions. Members within any given 
series are complicit with the formal logic that predestines the exigencies of that 
situation. Broadening this out in line with the ubiquity of Kaironic Seriality, the logic 
that predestines lived experience can only be understood in relation to the polyvalent 
material exigencies that mediate social life in its pluridimensionality. Not to sound too 
dire, but there is no escape from this logic. It is the dominant power that makes life in 
Kaironic Seriality intelligible. All thought, behavior, social gatherings, political 
movements, etc, that are so conditioned, are serial; and as such, are predestined by 
the practico-inert field in all its various layers of complexity. 
" One example that Sartre uses to give an idea of this formal conditioning is 
with regard to bourgeois respectability in the late nineteenth century.406 For Sartre, 
respectability is a particular instantiation of what is being termed here the serial logic 
of inaction. Respectability was a “lay-puritan attitude to life.”407 It was the domination 
of culture over nature; the mortification of natural needs in favor of prizing sobriety, 
frigidity, constraint – in other words, ʻrespectabilityʼ. The bourgeois were 
distinguished by this particular identity marker. It is what separated them from the 
masses, the workers. But this artificiality was a serial construct that was imposed 
onto those who were born into the system, who then in turn interiorized this mode of 
objective spirit, and perpetually re-exteriorized respectability in new forms through 
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the process of totalization. It was a “serial reason.”408 As such, respectability was the 
practico-inert that mediated social life in particular class arrangements. The result 
was that the individual actions undertaken by particular bourgeois were subject to 
the “inert limitation and the guiding schema” of oneʼs comprehension of objective 
spirit. Again, as above, this comprehension is not necessarily conscious. In fact, 
more often than not, it functions as the unconscious lived reality of persons 
embedded within a particular mode of objective spirit.409 The point being this: 
respectability in the late nineteenth century functioned as a serial logic that affected 
oneʼs way of seeing and living in the world. The result of this was that there could 
never be any real notion of ʻcommunicationʼ under such conditioning. “There is 
nothing to communicate, since the same comprehension is present in everyone.”410 
This is one way that Infinite Seriality limits the possibility for freedom. Under such 
conditions, there is not even communication. All thoughts, body language, words, 
inventions, social events – in short, all signification – are homogenous with the 
dominant ideology that predestines social life. Thus, communication is deemed 
mute. Like shouting into a mirror, it is the repetition of static ideas bouncing back and 
forth between individuals who are, in effect, miming one another. Of course, this 
examination is merely one minor investigation into the broader issue of Kaironic 
Seriality. But it does serve as a useful foray into the idea of how life is conditioned by 
a serial logic of inaction. For, with regard to bourgeois respectability, thoughts, 
words, and all action are impotent. One is unable to communicate in any real sense. 
Therefore, what occurs is a serial existence of the perpetuation of the same. Nothing 
really changes. Nothing really happens. Life is just a self-referential, self-
perpetuating repetition of seriality. 
" Jonathan Crary discusses a similar phenomenon with respect to the 
contemporary info-tech landscape of late capitalist society. In a discussion about 
Bernard Stieglerʼs theory of the “homogenization of perceptual experience within 
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contemporary culture,”411 Crary suggests that there has been a large-scale “systemic 
colonization of individual experience... [by] the remaking of attention into repetitive 
operations and responses that always overlap with acts of looking or listening.”412 
The result of this “entails a loss of subjective identity and singularity; it also leads to 
the disastrous disappearance of individual participation and creativity in the making 
of the symbols we all exchange and share.”413 While Crary agrees with much of 
Stieglerʼs analysis, he differs by claiming that Stiegler focuses too much on the 
passive sphere of spectator receptivity. Instead, Crary notes that the current state of 
media requires participants to engage with the content by sharing, following, 
exchanging, and reviewing. The result is that he develops a dialectical logic that is 
very similar to Sartreʼs. It is worth quoting him in length:
[Against Stieglerʼs] idea of the industrial homogenization of consciousness 
and its flows, one can counterpose the parcellization and fragmentation of 
shared zones of experience into fabricated microworlds of affects and 
symbols. The unfathomable amount of accessible information can be 
deployed and arranged in the service of anything, personal or political, 
however aberrant or conventional. Through the unlimited possibilities of 
filtering and customization, individuals in close physical proximity can inhabit 
incommensurable and non-communicating universes. However, the vast 
majority of these microworlds, despite their patently different content, have a 
monotonous sameness in their temporal patterns and segmentations 
[emphasis added].414
What we see here is an explication of the dominance of Kaironic Seriality. The 
ʻparcellization and fragmentationʼ of the ʻfractured microworlds of affects and 
symbolsʼ and the ʻmonotonous sameness in their temporal patterns and 
segmentationsʼ states nicely the way the serial logic of inaction functions. It is not a 
monolithic Idea without internal difference. Rather, it is a heterogeneous network of 
rationalities that have various sites of variegating intensity that express themselves 
and that are enacted in different ways; all the while serving the dominant exigencies 
established by the practico-inert field. 
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" For Sartre, there is both a commonality and a difference in seriality. That is, in 
reference to the collective object in diachronic serial relations, recurrence ensures a 
commonality of serial logic. Whereas in the structural network of synchronic seriality, 
there are layers enfolding upon layers so that each individual has various and thus 
unique institutional serial complexes impinging upon her. Some might be shared in a 
simple sense. But the particular complex, because of the uniqueness of each 
individual totalization, is specific to each body upon which it compresses and 
contracts. This field is the transcendental condition of social life as mediated by the 
practico-inert. It is what establishes how life is to be lived, what is to be believed, 
where individuals fit within a given society, and the entire plethora of social concerns 
in real, concrete, material existence. But it is not merely an objective power. No, it 
must be kept in mind that every objectivity is the necessary condition for an 
interiorization. In this sense, Sartre speaks of the way “one makes oneself a 
bourgeois.” Through interiorization, one appropriates the network of serial conditions, 
and every action, “every moment of activity is embourgeoisment.”415 And each 
individual in Kaironic Seriality does the same. In Thomas Flynnʼs words, it is 
“collective bad faith,”416 and it is lived through the perpetual process of interiorization-
exteriorization. That is, the serial logic of inaction is what governs the process of 
totalization in Kaironic Seriality. What we can learn from this is the way in which 
inaction is self-defeating as it produces its own alienation (ʻembourgeoisementʼ). As 
such, serial inaction is necessarily the reproduction of seriality within oneself and in 
the exterior field of objectification that serial inaction enacts. Flynn calls it a 
“deformation of praxis because of practico-inert mediation.”417 Serial logic prevents 
anyone under such conditions from doing anything other than reinforcing the 
monstrous powers of serial logic itself, and, therefore, unless there is direct 
antagonism to it, then there is a contagion that perpetually refabricates the serial 
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logic. Thus, for Sartre, there is a sense in which we are all responsible for our 
participation in the perpetuation of serial logic.418 
" Crary states that “seriality is the numbing and ceaseless production of the 
same. It is the weight of all the counterfinalities that inexorably act against our own 
intentions, our loves and hopes.”419 And this indomitable ʻweightʼ is what ensures that 
life lived in Kaironic Seriality is ultimately impossible. With reference to the previous 
chapter, there is a sense in which the serial collective is still engaged in an act of 
imaginative logic but one that is limited by its acceptance and interiorization of the 
serial conditions in which it finds itself; this is the phantasmic imagining that Sallis 
speaks of. It is an imaginative logic that is not sensitive to the exigencies of praxis, 
but that is rather beholden to the static inertias of Infinite Seriality. It does not yet 
recognize the opportunity of the kairos. The group, on the contrary, uses a creative 
imagination, one that transforms the conditions in which it finds itself in order to 
intentionally recreate the world and aim toward future possibles of de-alienation. 
Apocalypse, then, creates the new in that it introduces possibles that weren't latent – 
but virtual – in the collective serial condition. What takes place is the introduction of a 
reality that wasn't merely potentially present in a latent state, but a new free creation 
of life and sociality that is not defined by alienation but by free communized praxis. 
Because of the irruption of the apocalypse, the imagination is freed (as is the rest of 
the human-in-creation). And as the individuals in the group become molten and 
share their mediated reciprocity, so the imagination is wrested away from the 
constraints of serial logic and a space is opened for a new logic to emerge. 
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7.2 The Imaginative Logic of Action
" In MR, Sartre was interested in the development of a coherent philosophy that 
would free dialectical materialists “from the myth which crushes them and which 
hides them from themselves.” In place of this ʻmythʼ, Sartre wanted to develop a 
philosophy that would be “superior to materialism in being a true description of 
nature and of human relationships.”420 Although it took him another decade to 
develop such a philosophy, the ideas of CDR are present, in germinal phase, in the 
mid to late nineteen-forties. The two most important aspects of this philosophy that 
he begins to explore in MR are 1) a commitment to the present situation and 2) a 
future-oriented praxis. As he states, “What is needed is, in a word, a philosophical 
theory which shows that human reality is action and that action upon the universe is 
identical with the understanding of that universe as it is, or, in other words, that 
action is the unmasking of reality, and, at the same time, a modification of that 
reality.”421 What he outlines here in bare bones is what would later become his notion 
of totalization in CDR: a dialectical philosophy of action that moves through the 
interiorization and exteriorization of the conditions in which one finds oneself thrown 
at each moment. But this philosophy must not be merely pragmatic in its activity. This 
is what he sees as the failure of the dialectical materialists. They do not have an 
accurate philosophy of the world as it is, and as such, are engaging in myth creation 
for the purpose of motivating action. But, this “pragmatic conception of truth will not 
do, for it is subjective idealism, pure and simple.”422 Therefore, what he was seeking 
to explore, and what he would later develop in CDR, is a philosophical theory that is 
essentially realist. That is, it must be committed to the real world. It must not engage 
in thinking Utopia. He would say, “[The] revolutionary demands a philosophy which 
considers his situation, and, as his action has meaning only if it brings manʼs fate 
into question, this philosophy must be total, that is, it must produce a total 
explanation of the human condition.”423 This is why the relation of man to matter in 
CDR would become so crucial as the ground of his argument. In order to describe 
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the revolutionary capacity in each individual, he had to construct a philosophy of the 
human as one that is essentially capable of revolution in its very existence. And this 
revolutionary capacity would be intelligible only by first understanding the conditions 
that mediate human (and inhuman) life. Then, and only based on such a realism, 
could one make the future orientation of praxis intelligible as it goes “beyond the 
situation in which [one] is placed... [as it aims] towards a radically new situation.”424
" The imaginative logic of action that is being developed here is the culmination 
of this philosophy. It is a way of comporting oneself to the world as it really is, in 
order to analyze it, engage with it, connect with it, and ultimately surpass it. Ally 
states it perfectly when he notes that the task of Sartreʼs dialectical logic is to,
show how everything is everywhere always at stake (a descriptive moment), 
in order to understand just what is at stake (an eductive moment) and how it 
came to be so (a regressive moment) and how it comes to be (a progressive 
moment), and all of this so that we might get a better grip on a way forward (a 
normative moment).425
The first four ʻmomentsʼ that Ally describes are crucial prior to the ʻnormative 
momentʼ. They must be understood in order to avoid misunderstanding Sartreʼs 
method. Neglecting the robustness and nuance of Sartreʼs approach by jumping 
straight to normativity misses the comprehensive purpose of CDR, which is the 
development of the grounding for any future normative anthropologies. But once this 
grounding has been established, then there is a solid foundation upon which 
projections toward the future can begin to build. However, such construction must be 
aware of the logic that is guiding the project. Under Kaironic Serial conditions – 
insofar as the serial logic of inaction is guiding anti-praxis – there is an impotence of 
inaction that governs theory construction and the action that accompanies it, 
ensuring that the ideas coming therefrom will be frail and ultimately subject to the 
weaknesses of the system that undergirds it. By contrast, an imaginative logic of 
action is the guiding logical form that enables genuine theory construction and 
political and social engagement to flourish in a creative freedom of common praxis. 
" Kristian Klockars voices a concern when he claims that Sartreʼs search for “a 
comprehensive understanding of concrete reality, and totalisation as a central notion 
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of this ideal” is subject to the poststructuralist and postmodern skepticism provided 
by Foucault, Said, and Lyotard.426 Klockars states that the contribution of these 
thinkers was to replace any notion of a total description orbiting a single center with 
that of a set of discourses and practices that focus on “discontinuities, 
transformations, thresholds and differences, and which rather ʻwould deploy the 
space of dispersionʼ than totalise.”427 Waging “war against the idea of totalisation,” 
these thinkers are claimed by Klockars to have presented a criticism of all totalizing 
philosophies, of which Sartre was a signal figurehead. The problem with this reading 
is that Klockars seems to be conflating ʻtotalizationʼ with ʻtotalityʼ. Totality, of which 
Sartre himself is critical as being practico-inert, is the target of poststructuralism and 
postmodern skepticism. Although the word ʻtotalizationʼ might be used at times by 
poststructuralists and/or postmodernists, the confusion is chalked up to the strange 
proliferation of the term in CDR. Totalization is a perpetual activity, aligned with 
praxis and processual flow. Totality is the static conception of being that is negatively 
aligned with the practico-inert mediator. Therefore, Klockarsʼ conflation of totality with 
totalization and subsequent alignment of the poststructural and postmodern 
criticisms with this conflation ultimately ends up being a straw man which neglects 
the nuance of Sartreʼs development of his dialectical logic as Paradoxico-Critical. 
Although it is the case that Sartre wanted to come to a point where there could be 
one meaning of history, this isn't a metanarrative or a dominant 'world-view'. Rather, 
it is one meaning that is itself discontinuous. Or even better, it is the development of 
a logic that will enable history writ large to be intelligible in all its pluridimensionality. 
This might still be an overly ambitious project that itself is lent to the skepticism of 
postmodern criticism,428 but it must be kept in mind exactly what Sartre was doing in 
CDR. He was seeking to understand the heterogeneity and pluridimensionality of 
real, concrete, material life by investigating the formal, logical constructions that 
make said life intelligible. 
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" Engagement in the world, therefore, begins with a sensitivity to reality, to the 
situation. Embedded in the Impossible of Kaironic Seriality, the imaginative logic of 
action emerges in antagonism as the spark of life is initiated in the apocalypse. This 
logic is affective, active, and imaginative in all of its instantiations. That is, there is a 
commonality that is shared through mediated reciprocity as affectivity is dispersed 
and shared by a group logic. Likewise, it is enacted in the activity of the group itself, 
as the group logic is a living logic of action. And of course, it is imaginative – creative 
– as it freely surpasses the present statut in its perpetual transcending toward the 
future. And here we come full circle. The two general requirements of the imaginative 
logic of action are 1) a sensitivity to the present situation and 2) a forward-looking 
gaze. 
" William Connolly speaks of the “seer” as one who “reads natural and cultural 
signs during fateful moments in modern life” and one who has “exquisite sensitivity to 
the world.”429 In this sense, those who are governed by an imaginative logic of action 
are seers. They are sensitive to the world as they are embedded in it, feeling the 
pressures of Kaironic Seriality that press them to extremes that can no longer be 
endured. Reality has been unveiled, the opportune moment perceived, an internal 
fury ignited, and the apocalypse brings to light a novelty that makes possible another 
reality. This means that seers are ones who sense the opportunity of the opportune 
moment of Kaironic Seriality.
" But the seer must also be driven by a forward-looking gaze. Contra Klockarsʼ 
criticism that Sartre was a thinker of Utopia, the imaginative logic of action inspired 
by Sartre must, without hesitation, utilize utopic thinking. Alongside Herbert Marcuse, 
it must not shy away from employing the imagination in the construction of 
alternative futures. This does not in any way suggest the elimination of the scientific 
character of critical theory. Rather, it means that 
[t]echnique would then tend to become art, and art would tend to form reality: 
the opposition between imagination and reason, higher and lower faculties, 
poetic and scientific thought, would be invalidated. Emergence of a new 
Reality Principle: under which a new sensibility and a desublimated scientific 
intelligence would combine in the creation of an aesthetic ethos.430
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This is the logic that governs revolutionary praxis. The imaginative logic of action is 
deployed by seers who are sensitive to the real world, who refuse it, and who are 
motivated by an aesthetic ethos. As Ally states, it is “an orientation to the real 
refracted through the lens of the possible.”431 And because such persons have 
begun the process of becoming human through subjective constitution and the 
varying organizations of affect, praxis, and the common mediation of the two, they 
are driven by a logic that is creative and free. Only under such circumstances, only 
through the appropriation of such a logic, and only by the deployment of this logic 
can the cycle of serial logic be broken. This is the only hope for genuine action 
irrupting through ʻEarthʼ. It is in the construction and deployment of an imaginative 
logic of action as it emerges in opposition to, and within the opportunity provided by, 
Kaironic Seriality under the threat of the Impossible. 
" At this point, however, it must be made clear that we are still working at the 
level of abstraction. In reality, there is no way that the serial logic of inaction and the 
imaginative logic of action can be fully separated. What this means is that both 
inhere to varying degrees of intensity and in competing levels of effectiveness within 
various (in)human bodies. Both logics exist simultaneously, and in many ways feed 
off one another. Sartre himself states that “in every non-serial praxis, a serial praxis 
will be found, as the practico-inert structure of the praxis in so far as it is social.”432 
This is not to claim that they exist in the same way, at the same time, thereby 
negating the essential differences between them. Rather, this is to state that the 
complexity of pluridimensional life ensures that the two logics can, and do, insist 
within the same contexts at the same time, competing for dominance. If the scope of 
Kaironic Seriality is as replete as has been suggested above, then even under 
moments of freedom in the apocalypse, there still remain levels of seriality that 
impinge upon the individuals who are antagonistic to it. Likewise, the group dissolves 
seriality in relation to the immediate threat, but not in relation to the totality of 
Kaironic Seriality. And in the wake of the apocalypse, since there has been an 
initiation of subjective constitution, even under new forms of seriality dominated by 
an institutional logic, there is still a remnant (at least) of the transformation that was 
sparked by the irruption of freedom. Therefore, it must be admitted that in real, 
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concrete, material life, both the serial logic of inaction and the imaginative logic of 
action are present simultaneously in all contexts. The goal becomes, therefore, not 
the wholesale replacement of one logic for another, but rather, the perpetual 
dissolution of serial logic in the expansion of the imaginative logic of action. Sartre 
admits as much in this lengthy quote:
[We] have supposed for convenience that the individuals who compose [the 
group] are homogeneous... In fact, each comes to the group with a passive 
character (that is to say, with a complex conditioning which individualises him 
in his materiality); and this passivity – in which we should include biological as 
well as social determinations – contributes to the creation, even apart from 
seriality, of a hysteresis which is capable of occasioning a new series. For 
these and other reasons, the theoretical schema which I have sketched does 
not apply in reality: there are procrastinators, oppositionists, orders and 
counter-orders, conflicts, temporary leaders who are quickly re-absorbed and 
replaced by other leaders. But the essential point remains, through this life of 
the fused group (which is in fact only its struggle against death through 
passivisation): namely, if the group is really to constitute itself by an effective 
praxis, it will liquidate alterities within it, and it will eliminate procrastinators 
and oppositionists.433
Here Sartre declares the real, concrete, material logic of the life of the group: it is the 
liquidation of alterity that is contained within it. In other words, Sartre was keenly 
aware that his previous investigation into the life of the group and the power of 
seriality were convenient abstractions that served the purpose of giving insight into 
the logics of freedom and alienation. This is what is meant when he says 'the 
theoretical schema which I have sketched does not apply in reality'. In the end, 
however, his investigation reveals that the two logics that explain and drive history 
exist side-by-side in a complex agonistic relation. This does not mean that Sartre 
was content to leave the discussion there. No, he was still the ever-optimist. And his 
concern, as it was in MR, was to construct a philosophy in order to equip 
revolutionary thought and action. But he needed to emphasize that this philosophy 
would only be understood as a logic that experiences itself “in and through the praxis 
of struggle, that is to say, antagonistic reciprocity... in our world (governed by 
scarcity). [... Dialectical logic] appears at the moment in which the group emerges 
from the oppressed series as a dictatorship of freedom. [... It] is the praxis of the 
oppressed in so far as they are common individuals rooted in a seriality of 
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impotence.”434 Therefore, as the serial logic of inaction and the imaginative logic of 
action battle for supremacy in a multitude of sites dispersed throughout the social 
milieu, there must be a war waged against seriality – from within. The imaginative 
logic of action is not exogenous. Rather, it is the epigenetic emergence of novelty 
within the interstices of dissonance contained within the network of power relations 
on ʻEarthʼ. The revolutionary goal, therefore, is the maximization of freedom through 
the proliferation of an imaginative logic of action that erodes the stranglehold of 
Kaironic Seriality. 
" The question then remains: how does this happen? The final pages of this 
project will suggest two ways in which this erosion of Kaironic Seriality might occur. 
The ideas contained therein are not normative absolutes. Rather, they are 
speculative proposals that work within the imaginative logic of action that has been 
constructed thus far. In the end, this logic will itself become more clearly defined as it 
attaches itself to specific ideas that suggest ways in which revolutionary praxis will 
be foundationally supported. The task will be to “find ways to strengthen the 
connection between the fundamental terms of late-modern existence and positive 
attachments to life as such.”435 This will be done through an overarching motif that is 
being called the development of the imaginative political subject. This subject is one 
that is constructed through a totalizing relation to the imaginative logic of action, both 
being conditioned by it and by employing it.
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VIII. Creating Society as a Work of Art
“[As] you know, for me there is no a priori essence; and so what a human being is has not yet been 
established. We are not complete human beings. We are beings who are struggling to establish 
human relations and arrive at a definition of what is human ... we are seeking to live together like 
human beings, and to be human being. So it's by means of searching for this definition... that we will 
be able to consider our effort and our end. In other words, our goal is to arrive at a genuine 
constituted body in which each person will be a human being and in which collectivities will be not 
less human.”436
" The above quote is the motor that will impel the rest of this investigation. “We 
are not complete human beings... we are seeking to live together like human beings 
and to be human being [emphasis added].” Therefore, an investigation into the 
imaginative logic of action in relation to the construction of new humanisms and the 
perpetual creation of society will illuminate conditions under which the above 
Sartrean quest is refracted through contemporary concerns. 
" The imaginative logic of action is what makes both the transcendental 
condition of freedom intelligible and what guides the effectiveness of said freedom. It 
mediates common praxis, through totalization. In this task, there are two general 
dialectically related processes that pertain to subjectivity that will be explored in this 
final chapter. First, it will be crucial to understand that subjectivity is constituted in 
freedom. Second, we must examine how this process of subjectivization occurs. For 
present purposes, it is important to keep in mind that subjectivity refers to the 
condition and enactment of agency under conditions of group freedom (i.e. mediated 
group praxis), initiated by the affective spark of the apocalypse, in antagonism to 
Kaironic Seriality (recall the discussion on subjectivity and ʻthe differentialʼ from 
Chapter Five). Since life in Kaironic Seriality is marked by inhumanity, there must be 
an investigation into the ways that human life might emerge through the process of 
subjectivization. The result will be that Sartreʼs call for a perpetual apocalypse will be 
dressed in new garb as it is refracted through the lens of this overall project. 
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8.1 Constructing New Humanisms
" If there is no transformation of subjectivity alongside a transformation of the 
conditions of life, then revolutionary activity will be incomplete. To aim towards one 
pole, to the neglect of the other, ensures that the transformation will be partial and 
that it will be predestined by the serial logic of inaction. There must be a total effort, 
one that confronts all aspects of the diverse field of life, in order to allow the flows of 
a revolutionary logic to flourish. The first aspect of this total transformation that will 
be discussed here is with regard to the construction of new humanisms. In this 
respect, we heed the advice of Frantz Fanon: “For Europe, for ourselves and for 
humanity, comrades, we must make a new start, develop a new way of thinking, and 
endeavor to create a new man.”437 The creation of this ʻnew manʼ, however, must not 
be seen as the supplanting of a pre-existent eidos in favor of a new one. Instead, the 
creation of new humanisms must be essentially pluralist and open. This is the reason 
for using humanisms as opposed to humanism. The latter term is encased within a 
limiting and limited paradigm. It cuts short the polyvalence that makes up material life 
in real history, and instead offers a static vision of what could be. It also derives its 
theoretical strength from a limited vision, one that is not sensitive to the real world. 
The plural, humanisms, by contrast, is a concept that is more useful for our present 
concerns. It is an “empty placeholder that is impossible to fill definitively.”438 It 
contains within itself an openness that eschews philosophical, theological, political, 
and other historical logics that limit what might emerge through the creative interplay 
of various social forces, and instead leaves room for the upsurge of novelty through 
the proliferation of freedom in common praxis. In the preface to Wretched of the 
Earth, Sartre refers to the violence of the colonized and the emergence of 
subjectivity in this way:
[Fanon] shows perfectly clearly that this irrepressible violence is neither a 
storm in a teacup nor the reemergence of savage instincts nor even a 
consequence of resentment: it is man reconstructing himself... Once their 
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rage explodes, they recover their lost coherence, they experience self-
knowledge through reconstruction of themselves.439
" It has been argued by Power and Flynn (among others) that CDR is 
unconcerned with subjectivity as such. Counterposing Badiou and Sartre, Power 
writes, “Sartre in effect primarily describes the moment of rupture, whereas Badiouʼs 
emphasis is on the way in which the collective subject holds true to a political event, 
and indeed, is actually constructed by it.”440 Likewise, Flynn is willing to concede only 
an inch with respect to subjective constitution in CDR: “The true ʻsubjectʼ of history is 
the closely knit group, in the sense that only in the group does one overcome the 
passiveness and exteriority of the practico-inert and achieve a degree of mutual 
recognition among freedoms that Sartre visualizes as the ʻreign of man.ʼ”441 Ken 
Anderson argues to the contrary that CDR does in fact emphasize the way in which 
political and historical subjectivity is constructed: “The reintegrated organism 
projected through this disintegrated materiality would obviously not resemble the one 
appearing through serial isolation. But effecting this liquidation will require... not only 
change in the circumstances that constitute the practico-inert field, but also a 
subjective transformation.” He would continue, “The revolutionary act is an 
expression of the dissolution of serial isolation in what Sartre terms a group-in-fusion 
[both emphases added].”442 
" While Power is clearly right that Badiouʼs project is explicitly focused on 
subjectivity constructed through fidelity to the Event, it is not the case that Sartre 
primarily ʻdescribes the moment of ruptureʼ. In her view, “Sartre does possess a 
notion of a political subject.” However, like Flynn, she equates Sartreʼs political 
subject with the historical group – in her case, specifically the group-in-fusion.443 
What is more, she would later modify her position and claim that Sartre does not in 
fact possess a theory of a political subject, but merely an historical subject.444 This is 
187
439 Sartre, Wretched of the Earth, lv.
440 Power, “From Theoretical Antihumanism to Practical Humanism,” 185
441 Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason Volume 1, 126. 
442 Anderson, 274 
443 Power, “From Theoretical Antihumanism to Practical Humanism,” 114.
444 Power, “The Terror of Collectivity,” 103. 
because she follows Badiouʼs lead in criticizing Sartreʼs subject for being 
insufficiently structurally organized.445 Recall Chapter Five where we engaged with 
Badiou and Smithʼs claim that Sartreʼs theory of the group is founded upon his 
phenomenological ontological commitments to the in-itself/for-itself binary held over 
from BN. Power comes to a similar conclusion. For her, Sartreʼs historical subject is 
the result of the aleatory historical circumstances out of which it emerges. But this 
subject is not a political subject in that 1) it is not properly collective and 2) there is 
no political program or concerns motivating its formation. In fact, she would muse 
that Sartreʼs focus on novelty and discontinuity perhaps entail that “we should no 
longer refer to him as a Marxist.”446 Similarly, Badiou claims that Sartreʼs theory of 
the group is essentially rooted in 
the framework of bourgeois revolutions, and especially that of 1789. He 
refers, that is, to days of rioting in which there is no dialectic with institutional 
political forces, and in which no peopleʼs party is present in the masses. From 
that point of view, fusion is a historico-revolutionary concept, and not a 
political concept.447
As such, for Power and Badiou, Sartreʼs ʻsubjectʼ is both politically benign and 
substantially vacuous. 
" However, to speak of it as being vacuous might not necessarily be a criticism. 
For as was suggested above, the idea of the human-in-becoming is better viewed as 
an empty placeholder to be perpetually filled-in based on the particular 
circumstances out of which it emerges and towards which it is aimed in its praxis. In 
fact, Power criticizes Badiou for similarly theorizing a subject that is “strangely 
insubstantial.”448 She contends, “Badiouʼs desire to retain a notion of the political 
subject comes at the price of a certain emptying out of the concept.”449 Much like her 
reading of Sartre, Power notes that Badiouʼs relation to Marxism is tenuous. 
Communist, yes. But Marxist, perhaps not. “[In] terms of historical materialismʼs 
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economic dimensions, it has also been argued that Badiouʼs analysis of politics does 
not commence or really engage with any fleshed-out description of capital; indeed, 
the category of the economic as an analytic lens is largely absent from his work.”450 
Again we see the resonance between Badiou and Sartre right at the same point 
where there is dissonance. Both Badiou and Sartre present a theory of the subject 
that is ʻinsubstantialʼ and tenuously Marxian. This is because for Marx the subject is 
not a perpetually indefinable placeholder subtracted from historical conditions, 
whereas for both Sartre and Badiou, subjectivity is always related to the novel and to 
discontinuity. 
" However, whereas Badiouʼs subject is perpetually “beyond history,” as Antonio 
Negri has remarked,451 Sartreʼs subject is precisely historical. As such, Sartreʼs 
subject is not politically benign. It is always directed towards particular tasks, rooted 
in situations of exigence, and regressively made intelligible because of this. Thus, 
the bifurcation between political and historical subject that Power articulates makes a 
division that ought not to be traced. Further to this, as was explored in Chapter Five, 
the moment of rupture, the apocalypse, is a crucial instigation of the spark of 
subjectivity, but the logic of the group extends through its various iterations to reveal 
the organization and mediation of affect and praxis in the process of subjectivization. 
Thus, while it is surely the case that the logic of the group includes a notion of 
common subjectivity, Power and Flynn end up far too reductive. For, in line with 
Anderson, it is also the case that individual subjects themselves are structurally 
constituted as humans-in-common through the various logical formulae of the 
different group iterations. What this means is that there is both a sense in which 
subjectivity is grouped and individuated, political and historicized, with neither term 
predominant or exclusionary in relation to the other. 
" The other issue with Powerʼs and Flynnʼs reading is that they are camping 
within the ontological and normative reading of CDR that we have already discussed 
above. When CDR is approached as a logic, as does Anderson, subjectivity 
becomes a paradigm that makes intelligible the effects of the group. This means that 
rather than speaking of a ʻtrue subject of historyʼ, it is better to speak of the process 
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of subjectivization that is driven by the imaginative logic of action. For, remember, 
subjectivity is ʻthe differentialʼ, the gap between interiorization and exteriorization. As 
such, subjectivity, for Sartre, is a process. It is the gap in the activity of creative 
freedom that is enacted in totalization. This means that subjectivity is not a static 
term that defines what a human-in-construction might become. It does not define 
how ʻhumanityʼ is understood in se. It is the logic that guides the creation of what 
humanisms might perpetually become, through the revolutionary act; the latter being 
both the expression of the new spark of life and the vehicle of subjective constitution. 
As Sartre himself states:
[The] group statute is indeed a metamorphosis of the individual. And the 
practical moment of the actualisation of the powers constitutes him, in himself, 
as fundamentally different from what he was on his own: adopted inertia, 
function, power, rights and duties, structure, violence and fraternity – he 
actualises all these reciprocal relations as his new being, his sociality.452
" In a very loose way, it can be claimed that the Sartrean project of CDR has 
resonance with that of Martin Heidegger. Both men problematized certain received 
notions of humanity and subsequently sought to explore the conditions under which 
new conceptions of ʻthe humanʼ might emerge. While this is not the place to explore 
this in detail, a few cursory remarks to set the landscape will be beneficial. Even 
though Heideggerʼs “Letter on Humanism” was written partially as a rebuttal to the 
Sartrean existentialism of “Existentialism is a Humanism,” Sartreʼs project in CDR fits 
quite well into the Heideggerian framework. For Heidegger, “humanism is opposed 
because it does not set the humanitas of man high enough.” A few pages later, he 
would write, “So the point is that in the determination of the humanity of man as ek-
sistence what is essential is not man but Being – as the dimension of the ecstasies 
of ek-sistence.” 453 In these two passages, a central thrust of Heideggerʼs project is 
revealed. He wanted there to be an opening of Being to allow a more original and 
more 'essential' idea of man to be revealed. The early Sartre was unable to deal with 
this level of essentiality by remaining at the level of beings (as opposed to Being). 
Therefore, the for-itself, in-itself, for-others, and ʻmanʼ (more broadly construed) in 
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Sartreʼs early existentialist writings were second-order notions that had no grounding 
in Being that ultimately made them intelligible. 
" Power summarizes Heideggerʼs project in this way: “Heidegger undermines 
the term ʻhumanismʼ only to propose on a ʻdeeperʼ level its reclamation, posing the 
question of Man in a lateral way that evacuates the question of any primary or 
ontological political content.”454 In other words, Heideggerʼs concern was a ʻlateralʼ 
investigation into the Being of ʻManʼ that would open a space in which a conception 
of the human could emerge that would be unsullied by political formulations. This is 
precisely where Sartre differs, however. In the opening pages of CDR, Sartre is 
describing the task of the forthcoming tome. In the section titled “Scientific and 
Dialectical Reason,” Sartre writes that, as a Marxist ideologist, his project is the 
“unveiling of being” and that this project presents itself as “an unanswered question 
as to the validity of this unveiling.”455 The overlap with Heideggerʼs project is clear 
and startling. What Sartre was setting out to do in CDR was investigate the unveiling 
of being and the meaning of being – the two poles of the Heideggerian project that 
was initiated in Being and Time. However, the difference lies precisely in that 
Heideggerʼs project, as shown by Power, sought to ʻ[evacuate] the question of any 
primary or ontological political contentʼ, whereas Sartreʼs sought to pose the question 
of ʻManʼ as primarily historico-political. He states the question this way: “[Is] there a 
region of being where totalisation is the very form of existence?”456 And of course 
this ʻregion of beingʼ is concrete praxis-as-totalization (which will include both the 
absolute of praxis and the absolute of objective possibility in their dialectical spiraling 
chaissé-croise). Therefore, Sartre sets up the terms of his investigation in a 
Heideggerian-Marxian framework. He takes the intent of Heidegger and infuses it 
with historical materialism; the result being an investigation into the question of ʻManʼ 
that is explicitly historical and political. 
" It is this political aspect that signals the increased distancing of Sartreʼs 
project from Heideggerʼs. As Elizabeth Butterfield notes, “[The] deconstruction of the 
human now requires a reconstructive moment.”457 What she develops throughout 
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Sartre and Poshumanist Humanism is a reading of CDR that enables the concepts 
contained therein to reconstruct a posthumanist project that will appropriately 
respond to the socio-political demands of today. She uses CDR as a logic to equip 
posthumanist theorizing in the construction of potential humanisms after humanismʼs 
deconstruction in the post-Heideggerian and post-Nietzschean philosophical 
landscape. If the Heideggerian project challenged the notion of the human on the 
grounds that all conceptions heretofore (since Aristotle) had merely been the 
second-order investigation of beings, and if Nietzsche waged an all out war on 
transcendence, then emerging from the rubble of the philosophical agora must be 
projects that eschew both transcendent conceptions of humanity and those that fail 
to allow for a space in Being to be opened and then revealed. While Sartreʼs early 
work fits well within the Nietzchean paradigm, it is insufficiently Heideggerian. In 
CDR, he corrects this, but in an historical materialist framework. Butterfieldʼs project 
rightly takes the logic of CDR, in both its Heideggerian-Marxian and Nietzschean 
modes, and presents a theory of posthumanism that is faithful to Sartreʼs philosophy 
but that also creatively carries the mantle of the established logic further. What she 
writes is that,
What we need today is a way to take into account the helpful insights of 
perspectivalism and the recognition of social construction, without abandoning 
the possibility of describing a common human condition altogether. We need a 
new understanding of social identities, as both socially constructed and yet 
real elements of experience, and this will require a new understanding of the 
relationship of the individual to the social, and of the experiences of freedom 
and necessity.458
And so she turns to CDR in order to develop a “new understanding of the social” that 
will aid in the construction of social relations thematized around “mutual recognition, 
cooperative group praxis, and even authentic love.”459
" Towards this end, Kevin Boileau claims that CDR does not sufficiently ground 
a space for the primordial ʻweʼ to emerge. In other words, Sartre does not properly 
pose the question of ʻManʼ in a way that allows for the pre-subjective transcendental 
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field to perpetually create humanisms that would resist the atomization of his early 
work in BN. Following Foucault, he remarks,
[The] pre-personal, temporal dispersion (at the pre-reflective level) is not a 
substantial self, i.e., the self of knowledge that can be known. Rather, it is a 
self-in-process, an unfinished, pre-self. This unfinished “self” is not the 
atomized, isolated self that Sartre describes in BN. Its boundaries are not so 
distinct and therefore “its” relation to the world is not so dualistic (recall the 
subject-object ontology of BN). This is the ontological domain from which a 
primordial “we” can emerge. This is the ontological grounding Sartre does not 
develop in his practical discussion of groups in CDR.460
Ignoring his obvious ontological and normative hermeneutic, Boileauʼs claim seems 
to be that Sartreʼs thought would be strengthened if it were supplemented by an 
appeal to the pre-subjective transcendental field from which it emerged, which he 
finds in the work of Michel Foucault. He claims that Foucaultʼs project brings to light 
“the relations and interests of power that result in the historically contingent ways 
that thought itself controls its own range.”461 Through ʻrevoltʼ it is possible to 
reconstruct the self. “We can invent new concepts to structure the world and our 
relationship to it.”462 And by developing ʻnew technologies of the selfʼ, we can “enter 
into dialogue with others about identifiable power relations within which we live. We 
must try to understand what this dialogue about power entails and whether or not it 
offers us the possibility of exposing underlying relations of power in a way that 
promotes genuine reciprocity and group authenticity.”463 But is this not precisely what 
CDR allows? Thus far, through the development of the imaginative logic of action, a 
path has been charted within the Sartrean paradigm whereby ʻthe relations and 
interests of powerʼ of Kaironic Seriality are made intelligible so that ʻwe can invent 
new concepts to structure the world and our relationships to itʼ. Likewise, the 
dialectical logic of CDR exposes the ʻunderlying relations of power in a way that 
promotes genuine reciprocity and group authenticityʼ. Further, it is not small point to 
note that Deleuze was perceptive to the presence of a tendency toward the pre-
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subjective transcendental in Sartre's earliest of writings. In his final essay, 
“Immanence: a Life,” buried in a footnote, he writes: “Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, who 
posits a transcendental field without a subject that refers to a consciousness that is 
impersonal, absolute, immanent; with respect to it, the subject and the object are 
ʻtranscendentsʼ (La transcendance de lʼEgo).” This of course does not indicate that 
TE is sufficient to answer Boileau's criticism. But it does indicate that the very thing 
he criticizes Sartre for and praises Foucault for might not be as stringent a criticism 
as he supposes. When we chart this germinal tendency that Deleuze notes in TE 
through BN and into CDR, his criticism becomes further deflated. 
" This is not to claim that Sartreʼs project cannot be strengthened in dialogue 
with Foucaultʼs. Rather, it is to note that two are not so far apart as is generally 
supposed, as represented in Boileauʼs criticism. In fact, in 1984, Foucault remarked 
that 
[Relations] of power are not something bad in themselves, from which one 
must free oneself. [... The] problem is not of trying to dissolve them in the 
utopia of a perfectly transparent communication [as it is for Habermas], but to 
give one's self the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the 
ethics, the ethos, the practice of self, which would allow these games of 
power to be played with a minimum of domination.464
The giving of oneʼs self the ethos ʻwhich would allow these games of power to be 
played with a minimum of dominationʼ is precisely what the construction of the 
imaginative logic of action seeks. And it must be repeated that this logic is explicitly 
derived from the work of Sartre himself. It is a creative reading in some ways, but it is 
thoroughly rooted in exegesis. As such, the project of Sartre in CDR can be seen to 
have crossing paths of resonance with the post-structuralist project of Foucault. This 
is where Butterfieldʼs work also begins. She does not take the presumptive 
interpretations of Sartre that are stuck within ʻmethodological individualismʼ, or the 
typical normative and ontological readings of CDR as her starting point. Rather, she 
approaches CDR as a formal, logical investigation into the conditions of lived 
experience, and then derives useful concepts that can aid in the construction of 
socio-political theory. 
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" The big difference between Sartre and the post-structuralists (Foucault in 
particular) is that Sartre still retains the notion of subjective constitution in a 
dialectical relational field with objectivity. That is, the subject and the object 
(structures, systems, institutions, etc.) are co-constituting. So there is a sense in 
which the subject is a constituted site of pre-subjective forces, but this doesn't 
negate the freedom and effectiveness of praxis, as it seems to in many post-
structuralist endeavors, which hesitate to give much credence to the individual 
forcing of a particular person. Of course, for them, 'bodies' or ʻselvesʼ as collections 
of forces do have the power to act, but this action isn't given the same positive power 
as it is in Sartre. Likewise, the objective is also constituted by a swirling network of 
forces. But rather than speak of the indeterminate production of desiring machines or 
relations of power,465 Sartre wants to locate the causal power in the mediatory 
relation of praxis and matter. So while a person is thrown into a situation that is not of 
her own choosing, that person has the ability to act (totalization) and transcend the 
situation toward future possibles. Ultimately the differences don't seem so stark. 
Perhaps the great difference is that Sartre still had a supreme place for the acting 
praxis, whereas Foucault et al were more interested in the pre-subjective flows of 
desire or practices that constitute a subject and that work through her. But where 
they agree is in the development and proliferation of the underlying logics that 
condition life. And both Sartre and Foucault believed that through the transformation 
of the objective there would be a transformation of subjectivity – and vice versa. 
" Although he famously declared the ʻdeath of manʼ, Foucault was not a nihilist 
when it came to thinking the ʻhumanʼ. Rather, he was an inventive critic of modernist 
conceptions of humanism. Like Sartre in CDR – who declares that “man does not 
exist”466 – Foucault explored the conditions of history that gave rise to subjectivity 
and the broader structures of power that condition the former. As was mentioned 
above, the later Foucault wanted to develop an ethos that would enable 
ʻtechnologies of the selfʼ to revolt against exploitative powers in the perpetual 
diminishing of their efficacy. One way he spoke of this perpetual undertaking was by 
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suggesting that we “create ourselves as a work of art.”467 Called the ʻaestheticization 
of selfʼ by subsequent theorists, this undertaking is a perpetual project whereby 
would-be humans create themselves to refuse “the type of individuality that has been 
imposed on us for several centuries.”468 While Sartre does not use this terminology, 
the imaginative logic of action that is being developed here operates by a very 
similar logic. Nik Farrell Fox claims as much when he states that, “Since Sartre and 
postmodernists both envisage the subject as something which must be created, they 
tend as a result to aestheticize the subject and the project of authentic self-
determination.”469 And this project of aesthetic creation can only be driven by the 
imaginative logic of action. 
" As was stated above, the deployment of the imaginative logic of action is 
directed both externally and internally. It is directed externally insofar as it transforms 
the objective condition in which praxis is embedded. And it is directed internally 
insofar as it undertakes the perpetual process of subjectivization. This dual relation is 
yet another example of Sartreʼs dialectical logic, for neither the external nor the 
internal can be separated in actual fact. They are co-constituting aspects of 
totalization in the social milieu that is conditioned and enacted by the imaginative 
logic of action. Only the latter is sensitive to the Real in such a way that it can 
respond to the opening in Being that will allow for novelty to emerge – i.e. the 
apocalyptic moment – and transform inhumans into humans, equipping them to 
confront the dominant monstrosity of Kaironic Seriality. Understanding this gives us 
greater insight into how subjectivity is constituted in situ. As Robert Bernasconi 
points out, it is the antagonism of the group that shows “how violence not only 
creates the group but transforms reality.” And through the transformation of reality 
what this violence achieves is “solidarity.”470 This is the dual nature – the external 
and internal activity – of the imaginative logic of action in its enactment: it transforms 
reality and the group in common praxis. 
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" It must be kept in mind that this activity emerges in context, in antagonism to 
Karionic Seriality. The latter is the condition that makes intelligible the particularities 
of life lived under its dominance. Characterized by the serial logic of inaction, life 
lived in Kaironic Seriality is predestined to perpetuate inhumanity. The imaginative 
logic of action, by contrast, is the emergence of human life in opposition to this 
dominance. This means that the logic that dictates life in Kaironic Seriality is 
eschewed when the imaginative logic of action irrupts from within the interstices of 
the social milieu. The emergence of this counter-logic must be understood 
dialectically. That is, it is the result of the apocalyptic moment that is both initiated 
from without and from within. In other words, it is a dialectical emergent that is both 
attributable to objective material conditions and subjective praxis. What this means is 
that the imaginative logic of action necessarily operates through the transformation 
of reality and of subjectivity. It is, in one sense, the result of the spark of this dual 
transformation, and, in another sense, it is the further expression of this 
transformation. These two modes must be tethered together in a dialectical tension 
in order to understand the concrete complexity of this counter-logic. 
" Now, it must be reiterated that the recreation of subjectivity is not merely the 
creation of bodies that are tabula rasas. Rather, the depths of Infinite Serialityʼs 
impingement upon inhuman bodies is so vast that prior to the emergence of human 
life, in a particular context, inhumans have been so constituted that their very serial 
existence must be unraveled. As Sartre was wont to say,
[t]he worker will be saved from his destiny only if the human multiplicity as a 
whole is permanently changed into a group praxis. [... There must be a] joint 
negation of two reciprocal aspects of the practical field: a negation of the 
common object as destiny and a connected negation of multiplicity as 
seriality... seriality itself [is] a link of impotence; this seriality is the being-to-be-
transcended towards an action tending to socialise the common object.471
Setting aside the appeal to the permanent salvation of the worker (a point we will 
return to below), the crucial point for present purposes is to note that Sartre avowed 
that only through a dual ʻnegationʼ of ʻcommon objectʼ and of ʻmultiplicity as serialityʼ 
would the worker be ʻsaved from his destinyʼ. In fact, Sartre seems to emphasize that 
seriality, as the impotence of the multiplicity, is the key term to be transcended in 
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praxis towards freedom. It is the ʻbeing-to-be-transcendedʼ in praxisʼ seeking 
commonality. The point of emphasizing this now is not to backtrack on the dialectical 
tension mentioned above. Rather, it is note how crucial subjective transformation is 
for the dialectical logic of CDR. Most interpreters focus on the grand events noted 
throughout the text: the storming of the Bastille or the gold coins of Spain. But they 
neglect the role of subjectivity within such objective conditions. The present 
contention is that this oversight drastically diminishes the efficacy of the logic that is 
presented in CDR. In its place, it is of vital importance to understand Sartreʼs text as 
providing a logic for the emergence of subjectivity itself, one that is ever-embedded 
within and mediated by material conditions. For, the aim of the development of his 
philosophy was the creation of “Another man: a man of higher quality.”472 And the 
latter would only be done through the perpetual transformation of the objective, 
through the transformation of subjectivity. In his words:
[The] praxis of the group is constantly to reorganise itself, that is to say, to 
interiorise its objective totalisation through the things produced and the results 
attained, to make of it its new differentiations and its new structures, and 
thereby to transcend this rearrangement towards new objectives – or rather, 
to make this internal rearrangement, as structures which have to be 
transcended (because attained) the transcendence of old objectives and of 
interiorised instrumentality.473
Interestingly enough, though, Sartre would claim that this reorganization “is not 
fundamentally different according to whether it depends on centralisation from above 
or on a spontaneous liquidation of seriality within the series itself and on the common 
organisation which follows.” The only thing that matters is that it is understood as a 
“practical recognition within action.”474 What could this mean? Does this contradict 
what has been established thus far, that freedom emerges within the interstices of 
Kaironic Seriality? Not at all. Rather, what Sartre is suggesting is that the perpetual 
reorganization of reality and subjectivity takes place according to a fundamental logic 
that is not dependent upon a micropolitical, horizontal outburst of action. Rather, the 
fundamental logic only has purchase insofar as it is ʻpractical recognition within 
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actionʼ. In other words, the fundament of group praxis is the imaginative logic of 
action. 
" In an excellent, thought-provoking essay by Betty Cannon, what we are 
calling the imaginative logic of action is filtered through the lens of group therapy. 
Cannonʼs contention is that group therapy provides “the possibility for radical change 
in a personʼs orientation toward the world, which groups tend to provoke and 
reinforce in a way that is more difficult in other forms of therapy.”475 For her, the goal 
of the group “is not to develop the efficiency of the machine, but rather to aid its 
members in deconstructing and reconstructing in a more healthy fashion life choices 
made in other groups.”476 The therapy group, therefore, is a manifestation of the 
reorganization driven by the imaginative logic of action that refuses to ossify. Its 
primary goal is the continual transformation of the members so that they can live 
healthier lives in the other groups or collectives or institutions to which they belong. 
In this way, the therapy group is a useful tool, so to speak, in that one of its primary 
functions is the transformation of the inhuman person into a genuine free subject. 
This person can then move through various group settings throughout his or her life, 
having been transformed by the logic of freedom. 
" While group therapy is not the typical mode of engroupment that is considered 
in relation to CDR, Cannon argues that it is in fact “a powerful antidote to 
oppression.”477 Operating according to the imaginative logic of action, the therapy 
group is one expression of antagonism to Kaironic Seriality; that is, its very form. By 
exposing the serial constraints and seeking to identify freedom, enacting it, and then, 
through the transformation of the person(s), releasing such persons into the world 
again, it operates as a sort of fused-pledged-organized group by confronting the 
serial logic of inaction through piecemeal transformation. Therefore, what Cannonʼs 
investigation provides is an application of the imaginative logic of action that is 
faithful to the fundamental logic of group praxis in CDR, but that also applies it in a 
creative way. For, what the logic does not suggest is the radical overturning of 
seriality tout court. Rather, it is the perpetual withering away of its dominance in favor 
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of free praxis, with the goal eventually being that the human race will be “fully 
matured [and] will not define itself as the sum of the inhabitants of the globe, but as 
the infinite unity of their reciprocities.”478 But this goal will require serious 
understanding and effort. As Nik Farrell Fox notes, “Transgressive and aesthetic 
practice is vital for the creation of new forms of subjectivity.” But this practice of 
creating ourselves as works of art must be continually made and unmade by 
“constant activists for whom it is necessary to prevent enabling limits from 
congealing into constraining limitation, and to generate new limits and new forms of 
subjectivity which constitute selves.”479 And this can only happen through a 
philosophical outlook that is both analytical and creative. But identifying subjects who 
are properly equipped for such an undertaking requires a bit more investigation. 
Namely, if it is the case that the transformation of reality and of subjectivity is a 
dialectical activity that takes place in piecemeal fashion, how are we to understand 
the mechanism(s) that drive(s) this transformation? While this question is far too 
large to delve into here in any sufficient sense, the next section provides an example 
of one way in which this transformation takes place – through micro-psychobiological 
shifts. Such shifts make intelligible the process of subjectivization as driven by the 
imaginative logic of action. 
8.2 Micro-Psychobiological Shifts
" The voices that will guide this discussion are Herbert Marcuse, Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, Catherine Malabou, and William Connolly. 480 Each of them 
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develops, in his or her own way, a logic of subjective transformation that parallels the 
imaginative logic of action, supplementing the discussion thus far by making new 
connections that bring more color to the discussion of this dialectical logic. Bringing 
these disparate thinkers into dialogue with Sartre is a large-scale project that can 
only be cursorily undertaken at present. But this brief creative investigation will yield 
great benefits in four ways: 1) by creating an historical narrative into which CDR fits 
that has up until now been absent, 2) by demonstrating ways in which the 
imaginative logic of action can be utilized in philosophical discourse, 3) by providing 
further explication into the efficacy of this logic, and 4) by demonstrating how a fresh 
reading of CDR brings Sartre up to date with recent trends in Continental Philosophy. 
" In Spinozaʼs Theological-Political Treatise, he sets out to confront the religious 
presuppositions of his day to expose them as mistaken notions. Of primary import is 
the traditional dogma of prophecy. For Spinoza, the ancient prophets were not 
individuals with divine minds, superior knowledge, or unique access to God. Rather, 
they were persons with “vivid imagination.”481 Thus, they really did ʻencounterʼ God. 
However, this encounter was mediated by their historical, contextual, and personal 
intellectual frameworks, which in turn influenced the interpretation of said 
encounter.482 The result was that the prophets spoke forth and proclaimed highly 
imaginative messages that both reflected and confronted their particular situations. 
" For Spinoza, the ʻprophetic imaginationʼ is not something to be characterized 
as ʻgoodʼ or ʻbad.ʼ However, he does make it clear that prophetic imagination is not 
akin to natural knowledge – which he does see as superior.483 The latter is superior 
in that it has no need of a theological or supernatural interpretation of Nature. It 
provides certainty by its very nature without the need of signs.484 Prophetic 
imagination on the other hand is deemed inferior to natural knowledge as a 
ʻcapriciousʼ exception that only arose during certain historical epochs in order to 
substantiate and shore the foundation of the preexistent moral law.485 However, his 
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aim was not solely directed at the ʻpropheticʼ imagination, but toward imagination tout 
court:
Those who are most powerful in imagination are less good at merely 
understanding things; those who have trained and powerful intellects have a 
more modest power of imagination and have it under better control, reining it 
in, so to speak, and not confusing it with understanding.486
" The stakes for Spinoza are veritably high: namely, to place theology in its 
proper, subordinate place to philosophy (i.e. ʻnatural knowledgeʼ) is essential if one is 
to understand the power of God and the effects such power enacts. 
For everything is done by the power of God. Indeed, because the power of 
nature is nothing other than the power of God itself, it is certain that we fail to 
understand the power of God to the extent that we are ignorant of natural 
causes. Therefore it is foolish to have recourse to this same power of God 
when we are ignorant of the natural cause of some thing, which is, precisely, 
the power of God [emphasis added].487
" Although Spinoza affords a certain measure of philosophical capital to 
prophets, by denigrating the status of the prophetic imagination to a moral 
forthtelling, he verges towards a reductive rationalism. This reductionistic perspective 
limits the robustness of the prophetic tradition which was concerned with a 
productive mythologizing that has much in common with the political concerns of this 
present project.488 What is more, it does not seem clear that the imagination and 
knowledge, in Spinozaʼs sense, are necessarily at odds. As this project has been 
attempting to argue, in fact, both the imagination and knowledge are moments of 
praxis that themselves refract through one another in dialectical totalization. This 
indicates a slight resonance with Spinozaʼs desire to have a full accounting of the 
causes of Nature, as the intent of the latter maps well onto the desire to develop the 
imaginative logic of action that is well-attuned to the material conditions in which it 
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the field of possibles. Deep analysis and a utopic thought are needed to the neglect 
of neither. 
" However, there is a conservative imaginative logic that would be ʻfoolishʼ (to 
borrow Spinozaʼs term) according to the dictates of the present project. This would 
be a logic conditioned by the serial logic of inaction. Corey Robin describes this 
conservative imaginative logic as being conditioned by a sense of nostalgia that is 
refracted through a counter-revolutionary spirit.489 Essentially, conservatism is an 
ideology of reaction that bears a logic not so dissimilar to the mark from which it 
seeks to separate itself. Of course, things must be understood in their unique 
expression, but the point is that conservatism has a malleability to it that enables 
conservative thinkers to perpetually reinvent themselves (albeit within serialized 
parameters). For Edmund Burke, in particular, part of this is because of the power of 
the sublime. The sublime is that ʻterribleʼ beyond that shatters our comfort and 
rearranges how we comport ourselves with the world. Most notably, God is sublime. 
God serves as this fearful ʻlightnessʼ and ʻdarknessʼ that presents both ʻfear and painʼ 
in his awesomeness (awfulness?). God is the transcendent beyond that stirs up 
opposition within the soul and constitutes the self in the process. The result is that 
the constituted self before the transcendent God-sublime is one that is made through 
tension, fear, pain, anxiety."                                                                                              
" This is a creative process for Burke. The self is forged before the sublime. And 
Robin rightly notes that this Burkean tendency resides to varying degrees within the 
conservative logic as such. However, this tendency is precisely not creative. It is the 
literal antithesis to creation. Reproduction? Sure. Repackaging? Undoubtedly. 
Transformation? Possibly. But creation? No. The God that Burke claims disrupts and 
makes the self is a transcendent practico-inert externality. It is the transcendent 
inverted inflation of those qualities of men (literally men) that are deemed valuable. 
Projecting this image before the self, to only have that constructed image 
deconstruct said self, is to circularly flagellate oneself into submission. This may 
have similarities with the fear-image of the pledge that we discussed in Chapter Five, 
but the key difference is that the logic of the pledge is not entirely cut through with 
seriality, but retains genuine elements of praxis within it. As such, the ʻsublimeʼ that 
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Burke touts, and that undergirds much of conservatism's imaginative logic, is 
essentially stale and suppressive. It is the interiorization of a practico-inert image that 
reproduces and intensifies serial existence. A truly creative Sublime would be 
apocalyptic (in the sense of CDR) in its potency, not merely reproductive (exclusively  
at least, for reproduction itself is not necessarily contrary to creation).                           
" Thus, if this is accurate, there is a sense in which the conservative imaginative 
logic – as an expression of the serial logic of inaction – must be understood as 
having an affective and constitutive capacity, as does the imaginative logic of action. 
The difference, however, is that, where the serial logic of inaction reproduces 
seriality, the imaginative logic of action emerges from events with novel potency that 
is able to perpetually transform the ʻpsychosomatic unitʼ.490
" Contra Spinozaʼs pessimistic take on imagination, Herbert Marcuse, in his 
manifesto and polemic An Essay on Liberation, argues that imagination qua 
liberatory faculty is the mediator between sensation and reason.491 As such, he sees 
imagination not as something to be immediately denigrated. In fact, for Marcuse, the 
imagination is not something that is necessarily inferior, capricious, and uncommon, 
but rather is a ubiquitous productive human capacity insofar as it mediates the 
rational and the sensual in “the reconstruction of society.”492 A few pages earlier we 
read that “human sensibility which rebels against the dictates of repressive reason... 
invokes the sensuous power of the imagination.” He would continue on to remark 
that rather than liberatory political action “being shaped and permeated by the 
rationality of domination, the sensibility would be guided by the imagination.”493
" At this point it is important to interject two notes. The first: a preliminary 
distinction must be drawn between the myriad of various incarnations of imagination: 
the artistic imagination, the scientific imagination, the political imagination, the 
religious imagination, etc. Within these various forms of imagination there seem to 
be two generalizable similarities. The first is that they all arise in a given context. For 
the artist, her imagination is conditioned by her given situation (her psychological 
makeup, her desires, her financial pressures, etc). Likewise, the seer is one who is 
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immersed in a given situation that presses upon her. Much like producing a diamond 
out of coal, the pressure of a given situation condenses and particularizes the 
plurality of imaginative possibilities and produces a style of thought that imagines in 
accord with a given set of conditions. The second similarity between the sundry 
imaginative impulses is that they exceed the given situation and aim towards futures 
not yet realized. For the physicist, this might resemble the development of an as-yet 
undeveloped field of experimentation on wave-particle duality that will aid her in 
better comprehending the movement of light. For the seer, this might be where she 
proclaims a utopic vision of a future possible existence in which radical egalitarian 
principles will govern the social order. 
" The second note is that although imaginative traditions have particular and 
often times discordant content, they are all equal before the Real. Not one of them – 
in se – has absolute primacy over any other. Each arises in a localized context for a 
specific purpose. Be that as it may, as Marcuse intimates, imagination is not so 
neatly divided topologically. Art, specifically, is an interpenetrative imaginative 
impulse that can aid political action. Whatʼs more, he would claim that an aesthetic 
imagination is needed to imagine future possible political and/or social organizations: 
Released from the bondage to exploitation, the imagination, sustained by the 
achievements of science, could turn its productive power to the radical 
reconstruction of experience and the universe of experience. In this 
reconstruction, the historical topos of the aesthetic would change: it would find 
expression in the transformation of the Lebenswelt – society as a work of 
art.494
" It is apparent that Marcuse places high value on the social efficacy of science 
– to an extent; at which time an artistic imagination is required to redraw the outlines 
of societal possibilities. The reason science can only go so far is that by definition 
science is a discourse that is constructed within limits – limits that abet and 
perpetuate the knowledge of the status quo and of ʻLaw and Orderʼ. It might be said 
that science, as understood in the present context, is susceptible to capture within 
the general framework of Kaironic Seriality. That is, it is a limited and limiting 
discourse that necessarily progresses within strict parameters. Not denigrating 
scienceʼs historically proven usefulness, such endeavors inevitably fail to achieve the 
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goals toward which critical theorists strive; namely, the “transition to a higher stage of 
development: ʻhigherʼ in the sense of a more rational and equitable use of resources, 
minimization of destructive conflicts, and enlargement of the realm of freedom.”495 
What is more, Marcuse believed that even critical theory was unable and unwilling to 
think beyond such goals for fear of “losing its scientific character.”496 Thus, there is 
an element to critical theory that itself has been too wedded to a self-limiting 
paradigm of knowledge. To break the confines of the compressed discourse of the 
status quo therefore Marcuse wants to reintroduce the idea of ʻutopiaʼ:
I believe that this restrictive conception [the ʻscientific characterʼ of critical 
theory] must be revised, and that the revision is suggested, and even 
necessitated, by the actual evolution of contemporary societies. The dynamic 
of their productivity deprives "utopia" of its traditional unreal content: what is 
denounced as "utopian" is no longer that which has "no place" and cannot 
have any place in the historical universe, but rather that which is blocked from 
coming about by the power of the established societies.497
" In a word: the Masterʼs tools will never dismantle the Masterʼs house. It is only 
by envisioning the novel that the ʻrefusal of the Establishmentʼ and human freedom 
will come to fruition. Addressing the bio-productive impetus of advanced capitalism, 
Marcuse insists that there is a sense in which capital offers a Utopian vision of the 
future that constructs human nature and modifies organic behavior.498 As Philip 
Goodchild has shown, capitalism is creative.499 This descent into the ʻbiological 
dimensionʼ is at once both a threat and a possible ally to liberation. The threat seems 
fairly obvious: society, any given aggregate of human desire and behavior, is 
determined by the logic and insatiable appetite of the market. Thus, “the gadgets 
which, produced in accordance with the requirements of profitable exchange, have 
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Sartrean language, the constitutive serial conditions of the market have serialized 
inhumanity living in Kaironic Seriality to such an extent that the affective forces of the 
market themselves (which include the gadgets produced) have constructed 
biological beings made in the image of the market. This is why it must be said that 
capitalism does not merely ex-sist – it in-sists. Marcuse notes, “The power of 
corporate capitalism has stifled the emergence of [utopic] consciousness and 
imagination; its mass media have adjusted the rational and emotional faculties to its 
market and its policies and steered them to defense of its dominion.”501 In 
Foucauldian and Deleuzian parlance respectively, capitalism is a ʻtechnology of 
desireʼ and the ʻrelative limit of desiring-production.ʼ
" But this threat to human freedom is precisely the signal of Kaironic Serialityʼs 
own dissolution, even at the biological level. Nietzscheʼs ʻman of the futureʼ lays the 
tracks for twentieth and twenty-first century theories about biological production: “he 
awakens on his behalf the interest, excitement, hope, almost the confidence, of his 
being the harbinger and forerunner of something, of man being no end, but only a 
stage, an interlude, a bridge, a great promise.”502 By considering how to turn the 
tools of the Master against himself, proper conditions can arise that will recreate 
society at the biological dimension, which will allow truly innovative, imaginative 
political projects to be fabulated. This happens through a two-pronged approach: (1) 
the recreation of the bio-social order and (2) by releasing the powers of imagination 
from the stifling grip of serial reproduction. The latter cannot obtain anterior to the 
former. In fact, the release of the powers of imagination presupposes a new bio-
order. However, biological production alone cannot dismantle the Masterʼs house, for 
it uses the tools of the Master (the system as it currently exists is its starting point). 
Therefore, prior to the emergence of a revolutionary ʻaesthetic ethosʼ that would 
create ʻsociety as a work of art,ʼ the reconstruction of a new body-politic must be 
effected.  
" Although Marcuse does not discuss a ʻprophetic visionʼ per se, his work on 
the positive mediatory role of imagination (as that fabulating faculty between 
sensation and reason) settles well in the prophetic tradition and is useful for present 
purposes in that it presupposes Spinozaʻs criticism of supernaturalism but also 
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utilizes the creative impetus of utopic fabulation in the recreation of society. 
Therefore, the choice to examine his work in relation to Spinoza as we develop ways 
to deploy the imaginative logic of action is not arbitrary. 
" The most basic and striking feature about this understanding of Marcuseʼs 
utopic imagination is that it is way of thinking. However, contra Spinoza, it is best to 
understand this way of thinking as something common and ubiquitous. It is the very 
imaginative capacity that impels homo cultura. It merely needs to be released from 
the stifling constraints of serial reproduction. À la Deleuze, utopic thinking is the 
unbounded flow of desiring-production that scrambles the codes of social production, 
creating new forms of organization as it breaks the frozen confines of molarity. Said 
otherwise, utopic thinking arises in situ to meet a need and then exceeds that 
situation as it imagines a novel future in which such needs are met. In order that new 
futures might be imagined, there must be a shift in the biological dimension of human 
existence. Such a shift is not necessarily (or exclusively) one in which wholesale 
biological functions or physiological construction as such change. Rather, it is better 
understood as a shift in the micro-psychobiological order. As noted above, Marcuse 
insists that capitalism has such a power. By controlling the marketplace of desire, 
capitalism is able to reorder basic human functionality according to a particular logic. 
The resultant effect is that participants in the capitalist logic are constructed to 
function accordingly. Like the development of the opposable thumb alongside tools in 
the protohuman species, there is a biological change – a structural coupling – that 
occurs in the psychosomatic unitʼs relation and interaction with its environment. 
" The most basic psychobiological element that is captured and ordered by the 
capitalist system is desire. Defined not as lack but as creation, Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari view desire as an unbounded flow of production. It is the pre-individual 
flow of energy that in-sists in pure lines of flight, dispersing not from a singular point 
but rhizomatically.503 Not pure chaos, but metastable chaos within order (or perhaps 
more appropriately a constant state of order-ing), desire is indeterminate activity. As 
such, it is the pure creative impulse on which capitalism feeds. Like a bloodletting 
leech, capitalism arises only in relation to desire – and is ultimately dependent on 
desire. However, rather than pure suppression of the flow of desiring-production (as 
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in despotism), capitalism is a type of creation. As Goodchild states, “What this entire 
debacle known as the history of capitalism may teach us… is that there is such a 
possibility of creation.”504 This is because capitalism is a system of both decoding 
and recoding desire. This dyadic process occurs wherever desire is detected – 
“nothing must escape coding.”505 But unlike the despotic systemʼs need to code, 
capitalism functions as a type of immanence – one in which the flow of desire is 
decoded and recoded endlessly. The problem for Deleuze and Guattari is that this 
dyadic process is determinate – capitalism is a creation with a relative limit.506 The 
only solution therefore is to devise a way of thinking without limit – one in which the 
flows of desiring-production escape capture in toto. Deleuze and Guattari use the 
model of the schizophrenic to signify a figure of unbounded productive desire. While 
this model does offer theoretical merit, envisioning a society of schizophrenics hardly 
solves the practical needs of the oppressed. That said, the way schizophrenia is 
useful is that it carves a path toward alternative models of creation that resist 
capitalismʼs reallocation of desire.
" One such path is through the regressive element of the imaginative logic of 
action and its relation to the virtual. 
Philosophy is the theory of multiplicities, each of which is composed of actual 
and virtual elements. Purely actual objects do not exist. Every actual 
surrounds itself with a cloud of virtual images. This cloud is composed of a 
series of more or less extensive coexisting circuits, along which the virtual 
images are distributed, and around which they run. These virtuals vary in kind 
as well as in their degree of proximity from the actual particles by which they 
are both emitted and absorbed.507
" Described as mutually inextricable, virtual images and actual objects are 
veritably inseparable. In fact, according to John Mullarkey, the virtual as such is not. 
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The ʻvirtualʼ exists only virtually within a virtual ontology, and by that I mean 
that it is a performative concept, it is produced from our point of view or frame 
of reference as an ‘image’. [... One] can virtualise without anything existing 
other than what we call and see as ‘the virtual’. It is a frame or system of 
reference for ‘seeing as’, for taking up the actual world.508
" This means that the virtual is a transcendental coordinate (or field) within which 
human beings think the world. Akin to Deleuze and Guattariʼs schizophrenic, the 
thinker of the virtual is not bound to the actual, is not bound to that which is, but is 
rather in a constant state of encountering the indeterminate. That is, the virtual, as 
the persistence of the past and the reference by which human thinkers take up the 
world, is a concept that enables one to think beyond the relative limits of social 
production. Therefore, the virtual serves as a sort of depository into which actuality 
steadily flows. In turn, the virtual surrounds the actual (like an electron cloud to a 
nucleus) and acts as the 'situation' out of which actuality emerges (the 'actualization 
of the virtual'). We might call the virtual the 'material' with which actual desire 
creates. Therefore, schizophrenics are not needed in order to create, but seers. For 
the imaginative logic of action, the virtual corresponds to the 'regressive' element in 
that the virtual is the condition (as the totality of the past) that gives rise to any 
present state of affairs. The imaginative logic of action therefore 'uses' the 'material' 
of the virtual in its supersession of the past and the present-past in fabulating future 
possible worlds. In other words, the virtual is the basic situation in which human 
thought thinks. The imaginative logic of action is the creative logical disposition that 
uses the sensible and the rational for endless production of future possibles. This 
occurrence is not rare, but is the ubiquitous capacity of human imagination as that 
which mediates the sensible and the rational. However, creating a world in which 
human beings will recognize this capacity is no easy task – for it must arise through 
a shift in social relations; it must arise through the reconstruction of social life as 
such. 
" Following the heels of the May ʼ68 student protests in France, and squarely 
embedded within the counter-culture movement in the United States, Marcuse 
sought to make intelligible the revolutionary fervor that seemed to be taking hold. At 
the same time, he wanted to articulate the reasons that this spirit would either fail or 
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succeed. Of course, ʻfailureʼ and ʻsuccessʼ are loaded terms. But suffice it to say that, 
for Marcuse, success would come in the form of rebellion to the dominant ideological 
power structures of the day. And more than anything, he wanted to theorize about 
the biological root of this rebellion that would change manʼs nature.509 
" Like Sartre, Marcuse believed that social life was predestined. Unable to be 
truly free, contemporary society was bound by its entanglements with the established 
value systems and power structures of the day. This entanglement predestined who 
people were, how they were to live, and defined what it meant to be ʻhumanʼ. The 
result is that life under such conditions is nothing more than ʻvoluntaryʼ servitude. But 
Marcuse did see a way out. Through the reconstruction of humanity at the biological 
level, this voluntary servitude could be broken “through a political practice which 
reaches the roots of containment and contentment in the infrastructure of man.”510 
This ʻpracticeʼ is precisely what he set out to ground in the essay. He does this by 
opposing two logics. On the one hand is the dominant ideology of the day. And on 
the other hand, is a new practice that would “break with the familiar, the routine ways 
of seeing, hearing, feeling, understanding things so that the organism may become 
receptive to the potential forms of a nonaggressive, nonexploitative world.”511
" He identifies the dominant ideology of the day with capitalist society. As he 
states:
The so-called consumer economy and the politics of corporate capitalism 
have created a second nature of man which ties him libidinally and 
aggressively to the commodity form. The need for possessing, consuming, 
handling, and constantly renewing the gadgets, devices, instruments, 
engines, offered to and imposed upon the people, for using these wares even 
at the danger of one's own destruction, has become a "biological" need.512
This ʻsecond nature of manʼ is the constituted inhumanity of those living under 
capitalist dominance. They are constituted by a logic that, in turn, introjects a 
capitalist logic into their very nature, determining the scope, outlook, and trajectory of 
their lives. In line with the present investigation, it can be claimed that this logic is 
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akin to the serial logic of inaction. And like the latter, this logic is incapable of 
releasing the flows of humanity in freedom. Perpetually, those dominated by the 
capitalist logic, will appropriate the dictates of the serial system and live lives of 
predestined inhumanity. What is more, their very organic structures are reconstituted 
in line with this alienating logic. This ʻsecond natureʼ sinks down to the “biological 
dimension and [modifies] organic behavior.”513 Once this occurs, “The organism 
receives and reacts to certain stimuli and ʻignoresʼ and repels others in accord with 
the introjected morality. [... In] this way, a society constantly re-creates this side of 
consciousness and ideology, patterns of behavior and aspiration as part of the 
ʻnatureʼ of its people.”514 This affective a priori becomes the new statut by which such 
persons take up the world. They become the self-generators of their own dominance 
by their complicity with the system as they have been literally constructed by the 
logic, and according to the logic, of this serial system. 
" In order for there to be a transformation of nature, therefore, there must be a 
“rupture with the self-propelling conservative continuum.”515 This rupture must take 
place prior to revolution. However, in dialectical fashion, it can also only be 
understood in the revolution. And again, harkening back to Sartreʼs group logic from 
Chapter Five, this revolution must “be driven by the vital need to be freed from the 
administered comforts and the destructive productivity of the exploitative society.”516 
It is the threat of the Impossible that stirs vitality in the differential, at the affective 
level, and which is sparked to life in opposition to the ʻdestructive productivity of the 
exploitative societyʼ. Only on such condition can the new biological organism be 
constructed. And only the new organism can create a new society. However, 
although Marcuse claimed that “[t]he imagination of such men and women would 
fashion their reason and tend to make the process of production a process of 
creation,”517 he was ill-equipped to suggest precisely how this socio-biological 
transformation would take place. He did suggest that drug use among the hippie 
generation enabled them to “see, hear, feel new things in a new way.” But this 
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deregulation of the senses only contained “an artificial and short-lived” reprise from 
the “ego shaped by the established society.”518 This is because the narcotic ʻtripʼ can 
release one from the confines of the established system, but it can also release one 
from the exigencies of the liberatory order – the withdrawl creates its artificial 
paradises within the society from which it withdrew, without transforming the society 
as such, and it pacifies the revolutionary spirit by providing an escape into a Utopia. 
Therefore, what is required is a more holistic rebellion, one that will dissolve the 
established ego but that will not diminish the revolutionary spirit.519
" In What Should We Do with Our Brain, Catherine Malabou develops a logic of 
neuronal plasticity that maps well onto the imaginative logic of action as developed in 
this project. Although without stating so, Malabou furthers Marcuseʼs project of 
grounding the revolutionary transformation of subjectivity in the biological dimension. 
Her project is the flower to Marcuseʼs bud. Her stated effort is to take Marxʼs dictum 
that, “Humans make their own history, but they do not know that they make it” and 
modify it to, “Humans make their own brain, but they do not know it.”520 It is of no 
small consequence that Sartre, too, takes this Marxian dictum as his starting point in 
CDR. For, it demonstrates the shared dialectical logic that inspires both Sartre and 
Malabou. Although Malabou does not refer to Sartre in What Should We Do with Our 
Brain, the resonances with CDR are immediately apparent. In a way, she is providing 
a cutting edge perspective of the same process of subjectivization, albeit rooted in 
contemporary findings in neuroscience that were entirely absent in Sartreʼs day. 
Therefore, she becomes the perfect interlocutor to supplement the investigation at 
the present time. 
" Malabou employs the term ʻplasticityʼ, borrowed from neuroscience, because 
it has a dual sense. She remarks that,
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[w]e should not forget that plastique, from which we get the words plastiquage 
and plastiquer, is an explosive substance made of nitroglycerine and 
nitrocellulose, capable of causing violent explosions. We thus note that 
plasticity is situated between two extremes: on the one side the sensible 
image of taking form... and on the other side that of the annihilation of all 
form.521
These two extremes must be conceived together in dialectical tension. They form the 
basis of the mechanism that drives the transformation of neuronal ideology. Plastic, 
like rubber, is malleable. It bends and can be shaped and re-shaped. However, 
unlike rubber, plastic has a limit. It is not endlessly pliable. There is a point at which it 
will break, thereby taking on a new form. But plastic is also explosive. Immediately 
what comes to mind are the plastic explosives of demolitions. C-4 is stacked 
together, moulded by hand and detonated to great effect. For Malabou, such 
physical metaphor describe the logic of subjective transformation in the brain. The 
brain has circuits that are pliable to a limit but that eventually break. This rupture 
opens a space for new connections. And from the ash of exploded neurons emerge 
new formations of neuronal circuitry, thereby initiating new biological substrata. 
" If the brain werenʼt plastic, then it would not be feasible to suggest that novelty 
would ever truly emerge. For the biological system would merely be a self-
perpetuating site of homeostasis. Quoting Damasio, homeostasis “refers to the 
coordinated and largely automated physiological reactions required to maintain 
steady internal states in a living organism.”522 However, Malabouʼs effort is to 
develop a critique that will enable self-generation by 1) critiquing the logic of 
ʻflexibilityʼ that she claims fits within the existing global capitalist system and 2) by 
developing a new logic based on brain plasticity. She asks the following questions: 
“Can the description of brain plasticity escape the insidious command of the New 
World Order? Can it introduce something like a resistance within this very order? 
Can plastic brains measure the limits of their flexibility?”523 We might reword this as: 
Can the description of brain plasticity escape the insidious command of Kaironic 
Seriality? Can it introduce something like a resistance to the serial logic of inaction? 
Can plastic brains measure the limits of their flexibility?
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" She argues that brain plasticity in the sciences has done nothing more than 
perpetuate the dominant logic of the New World Order. It has “revolutionized nothing 
for us, if it is true that our new brains serve only to displace ourselves better, work 
better, feel better, or obey better.”524 By operating according to a serial logic, the 
sciences have turned brain plasticity into a term that is complicit with the endless 
flexibility of the capitalist system. By proclaiming a narrative that our brains can 
adapt to the rate of demand set by market forces, this dominant logic has proved to 
be nothing more than a handmaiden for the exploitative capitalist system. But, she 
argues, this is partly because of a misunderstanding of the application of plasticity. 
The serial explanation of plasticity forgets the explosive nature of plastique. It views 
plasticity as malleability, and in the process creates a serial neuronal ideology. 
Against this ideology, Malabou wants to theorize resistance to this logic by 
developing an “intermediate plasticity” defined as “a plasticity-link that is never 
thought of or recognized as such, allowing us to elaborate a true dialectic of the 
auto-constitution of the self... If we do not think through this transformation or this 
plasticity, we dodge the most important question, which is that of freedom.”525 In 
other words, she wants to develop a theory of subjective constitution that would 
transform the biological dimension in the creation of free praxis. And this 
transformation at the biological level would be “the transformation of one motor 
regime into another, of one device into another, a transformation necessitating a 
rupture, the violence of a gap that interrupts all continuity.”526 A point of note: 
Malabouʼs text functions much like CDR. It acts as an image that is meant to rouse 
the affections. In other words, it is not only theorizing about what can be done with 
our brains, but the text itself is an instantiation of the thesis of the text, which is to aid 
political subjects, in the creation of such subjects, in their struggle against the 
dominating ʻNew World Orderʼ – it is a Paradoxico-Critical project. And in the final 
lines of her book, she invites the reader to “do what they undoubtedly have never 
done: construct and entertain a relation with their brain as the image of a world to 
come.”527 This transformation at the neuronal level will lead to new a mentality, which 
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means (in one sense) that the transformation at the neuronal level enables reflective 
thought to create images that arenʼt determined by serial logic, but that can be 
created anew, according to a new logic.
" At this point, a brief appeal to William Connolly will signal the way forward to 
the final section of this project. Bringing together Marcuse, Deleuze-Guattari, and 
Malabou, a sketch for the transformation of subjectivity at the biological level has 
been drawn. Both Marcuse and Malabou develop theories that demonstrate the need 
for alternative counter logics. And they both suggest ways in which these counter 
logics are different from the systems in which they emerge and against which they 
are directed. Malabou goes further than Marcuse in detailing a general theory of how 
a shift in nature could occur within the brain – i.e. through the logic of brain plasticity. 
But now we need to suggest a way in which this logic might materially affect 
subjectivity. That is, Malabouʼs final charge to her readers must be undertaken. And 
this is precisely what Deleuze-Guattari tend toward and what Connolly presents in A 
World of Becoming, to which we now turn. If Malabou was the flower to Marcuseʼs 
bud, Connolly is the floating pollen that is carried by the wind.
" A sprawling, frenetic, somewhat scattered text, A World of Becoming is a 
barrage of micropolitical thought that presents a view of the world that is at one 
moment chaotic and another creative. Through the dispersal of affective forces 
(physical, social, spiritual, political, artistic), Connolly provides a pragmatic set of 
practices that can be employed in the transformation of subjectivity. Starting with the 
basic idea of affect, he states that “in its most elementary human mode, [affect] is an 
electrical-chemical charge that jolts or nudges you towards positive or negative 
action before it reaches the threshold of feeling or awareness.”528 Affect takes place 
prior to awareness at the very basic level of causal relation within bodies. Affect is 
the term to describe the initial shift in subjectivity. In Kaironic Seriality, affect would 
be the charge that initially introjects the serial logic of inaction into an embodied 
hexis. Similarly, affect is also what makes intelligible the first moment of subjective 
constitution in the apocalyptic upsurge. Affect is the spark of human life, the 
differential, the logic of subjectivization. What concerns us now, however, is how to 
utilize this spark of affectivity, how to initiate it in ways that can proactively confront 
exploitative logics. This is the final task of this project. Stated directly: how can the 
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imaginative logic of action – as affective, active, and imaginative – transform society 
through the transformation of subjectivity? The answer is through micro-
psychobiological shifts. These are micro shifts in the network of relations within any 
given body. They take place at the biological and psychological level and encompass 
the entirety of embodied life. That is, micro-psychobiological shifts are any shift in the 
network of functions that takes place within the body. This includes the processes 
from the lowest of complexity to the highest, from the most immediately material to 
the most abstract, from pure biological instinct to self-consciousness. They vary in 
scope. They vary in duration. They vary in intensity. They vary in complexity. And 
they donʼt follow a linear causal path from body to mental, or from mental to body. 
But they necessarily always have an effect. In fact, by nature, micro-psychobiological 
shifts are effects. Connolly says it this way:
You do so in part by pursuing tactics of the self in which individuals draw upon 
tools and small assemblages to affect themselves; you do so more robustly 
through strategic action on larger networks of desire, and most importantly 
through resonances back and forth between these levels. Microtactics of the 
self might involve priming your dream life before you fall asleep, meditation, 
prayer, neurotherapy, selecting particular films for viewing with others, reading 
provocative texts, and allowing each of these experiences to engage the 
others... To alter the networks in which you participate is eventually to alter the 
relational mode of desire coursing through you, in a model or notable way: 
you now participate in a modified assemblage of desire that includes and 
exceeds you. When the next round of action by you or your assemblage 
expresses that altered quality either or both may be poised to take a more 
adventurous political stance or accept a new level of ethical responsibility than 
before. You may be ready to listen to a new mode of inspiration to which you 
were previously tone-deaf. This is how, on the positive side, spirals of inter-
involvement between desire, action, ethics and politics work.529
And this is precisely what Sartre suggests when he speaks of the risks of the group 
logic when he states that “at each new stage of the undertaking, the revolutionary 
consciousness deepens.”530 The interiorized unity of the group transforms the 
objective and the group bit-by-bit, deepening the revolutionary logic, strengthening 
the vitality of the imaginative logic of action within Kaironic Seriality. As the 
imaginative logic of action increases in potency, so the serial logic of inaction 
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decreases in intensity. The result is that the revolutionary consciousness expands 
and alternative models of social and political life can be properly theorized and 
enacted. Created by a free logic, new images of historical life can be projected; 
images that are eminently analytical and yet thoroughly creative. Because the 
subjects themselves have come to life, the images they proffer will be imbued with 
vitality. They will not be perfect. They are not images of perfect societies or perfect 
social solutions. Rather, they are proper: they are fitting for the task to which they 
correspond. They are proper in their origin and in their capacity to continue the 
transformation of reality and subjectivity, for they are products of the very same 
transformation, carrying forward the mantle of this process in perpetuity. But this is 
precisely why the process must be perpetual. Because the images are imperfect, 
because of the scope of Kaironic Serialityʼs influence, there must be a perpetual 
effort of antagonism. Equipped with the imaginative logic of action, individuals and 
groups must work in common to realize what Sartre called ʻthe perpetual 
apocalypseʼ.531 
8.3 The Perpetual Apocalypse
" It is crucial to note that this project is not about creating or theorizing the 
revolution as such. Rather, it is about grounding the perpetual maintenance of the 
group logic; the purpose of which is not necessarily a wholesale takeover of one 
system in favor of a socialist revolution, but rather, a way of developing a logic that 
transforms ʻhuman beingsʼ in their individual and social lives so that they can better 
overcome exigent sites of scarcity in the present and near future, while 
simultaneously developing new humanisms that will be better positioned to deal with 
future social and political struggles. It is about founding the creation of better 
organizations, those that can be perpetually oriented towards the maintenance of 
contestation against the State, objective spirit, institutional alienation, and all forms of 
diachronic and synchronic seriality – in short, perpetual resistance to Kaironic 
Seriality. Following Sartre, this project is seeking to ground a notion of the perpetual 
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apocalypse, which Sartre found to be a “very attractive” notion.532 Desiring the 
perpetual apocalypse is not a clamoring for a perpetual state of chaos. Sartre is not 
espousing a caricatured anarchist outlook. Rather, the perpetual apocalypse is 
something that would be better akin to a marriage between theoretical anarchism 
and practical socialism. And in this sense, any Sartrean political project must be both 
micro- and macro-political. 
" Referring to the Cultural Revolution in China, Sartre notes there “must have 
been determinate contradictions at the base of the Chinese socialist economy which 
produced the movement for a return to something like a perpetual fused group.”533 In 
other words, it was the exigencies of the ʻdeterminate contradictionsʼ that potentially 
sustained ʻsomething like a perpetual fused groupʼ. Now, Sartre does later admit that 
he doesnʼt think that this is exactly what took place in China, opting instead to 
suggest that there must be ʻinfrastructural reasons for the Cultural Revolutionʼ, but 
nevertheless we get insight into what a project of perpetual apocalypse would 
require. Thus, perhaps by the deepening of such ʻcontradictionsʼ in society, by 
recognizing situations of exigence, and by the creation of affective images we can 
perpetually force the hand of antagonistic praxis to unravel and transcend Kaironic 
Seriality in the creation of new humanisms and better worlds. 
" This means that contestation must be maintained. Antagonism to Kaironic 
Seriality must become a bedrock of social and political logic. This happens as the 
imaginative logic of action actually deepens the ʻfeelingʼ of the Impossible, which 
then heightens the immediacy of the need for rebellion. Like the unconscious rage of 
the colonized from Wretched of the Earth, imaginative political subjects are 
perpetually enraged by Kaironic Seriality. This is one of the defining features of the 
imaginative logic of action (as affective). It is essentially a logic at a distance from 
seriality, and as such, in opposition to alienation. Therefore, the perpetual 
apocalypse derives its impetus from the perpetual feeling of rage towards the 
monstrosity of Kaironic Seriality. This again is why the term Kaironic Seriality is so 
useful. Not only does it demarcate the times as being thoroughly alienating, but it 
also heralds that the moment is always opportune – the time for transformation is 
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always now, the site of transformation is always here, and the fuel for this 
transformation is always at hand.
" But this antagonism is not merely a negative notion. Certainly, the imaginative 
logic of action is initiated partly through the violent oppositional upsurge of the 
apocalyptic spark. But there is also a profoundly positive notion of liberty contained 
in this opposition. For, the threat of continuing to live the Impossible becomes itself 
impossible only through a relational contradiction between that which is (the 
impossible situation of seriality) and that which must become (freedom). This is 
another way in which dialectical tension must be maintained. For, the very notion of 
negative freedom contains within it a positive notion of freedom as well. And the 
same is true in the other direction. Although Sartre does, at times, seem to valorize 
negative notions of freedom,534 Thomas Flynn rightly suggests that the future of 
objective possibility in Sartreʼs later oeuvre demonstrates a “major shift in Sartreʼs 
concept of freedom (towards so-called positive freedom) and constitutes a prime 
factor in his tilt toward a Marxist theory of history.”535 Therefore, the imaginative logic 
of action, as wielded by imaginative political subjects, must perpetually contest 
seriality while simultaneously seeking to realize alternative futures.
" Because our history is the history of scarcity, this ensures that there will be no 
shortage of situations of contestation.536 Thomas Flynn explains it this way:
Besides being the ʻlackʼ which illumines present reality, the possible serves as 
the limit in that it counterpoises the impossible. Thus, Sartre speaks of “the 
real and permanent future which the collectivity forever maintains and 
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transforms,” for example, the need for more doctors that industrialized society 
creates (SM 94).537
Thus, the praxis-project, as it aims towards its possibles, overcomes (i.e. negates/
transcends) the present condition (through interiorization and subsequent 
exteriorization), and then simultaneously introduces new possibles that can 
subsequently be overcome. In the process, one lack is overcome and new lacks are 
revealed (in the milieu of scarcity). This means that the more we create, the more 
need we also create. The future is that 'yet-to-be-achieved totality toward which 
praxis transcends the present' and it is the limit that counterpoises the Impossible – 
that is, 'the real and permanent future which the collectivity forever maintains and 
transforms'. So, the future opens the present to endless need, as the possible (i.e. 
the future possible that is subsequently transcended) also maintains and transforms 
the real and permanent future by continually recreating needs in the continual 
overcoming/negating of the present. This complex process is echoed by William 
Connolly in a different though consonant manner:
Sensory inter-involvement, disciplinary processes, detailed modes of 
surveillance, media infiltration, congealed attractors, affective disposition, self-
regulation in response to future susceptibility – these elements participate in 
perpetual circuits of exchange, feedback, and re-entry, with each loop folding 
another variation and degree into its predecessor. The imbrications are so 
close that it is near to impossible to sort out each element from the other as 
they merge into a larger complex... Even as they are ubiquitous, however, 
there are numerous points of dissonance, variation, hesitation, and 
disturbance in them. These interruptions provide potential triggers to the 
pursuit of other spiritual possibilities, where the term spirit means a refined 
state of the body in individual and existential dispositions embedded in 
institutional practices.538
These ʻdissonancesʼ are cracks in Kaironic Seriality, spaces where the hegemonic 
whole isnʼt in complete control. This is where there is a site for potential micro-
political action.
" It is generally argued across ideological lines that there are irreconcilable 
differences between micro- and macro-political theory. For instance, Todd May 
argues that
221
537 Flynn, Sartre, Foucault and Historical Reason Volume 1, 129. 
538 Connolly, 55-56. 
Poststructuralist political thought has offered, though not precisely in these 
terms, an alternative vision of political intervention that articulates the tension 
between the world as it is and the world as it could be, particularly since the 
collapse of the Marxist project. That the framework it provides has not been 
much discussed as such is in part owing to its nature: it avoids global 
discourse in favor of concrete, limited analyses. In poststructuralism, 
macropolitics gives way to micropolitics.539
What immediately jumps out from this quote is the claim that poststructuralism favors 
ʻconcrete, limited analysesʼ. Isnʼt this precisely what the imaginative logic of action 
allows, while also providing impetus for ʻglobal discourseʼ? May continues his 
argument by drawing a distinction between what he calls ʻstrategicʼ and ʻtacticalʼ 
political philosophies. Strategic political philosophies involve a “unitary analysis that 
aims toward a single goal.”540 Tactical thought, however, “performs its analyses 
within a milieu characterized not only by the tension between what is and what ought 
to be, but also between irreducible but mutually intersecting practices of power.”541 
As far as this argument is concerned, Mayʼs error seems to be in making such a 
stark distinction between micro- and macro-politics. While it may certainly be the 
case that the ʻMarxist projectʼ has historically focused on a transformation of 
economic modes of production, it is not necessarily the case that all Marxian-inspired 
thought, and therefore all macro-political, ʻstrategicʼ thinking is necessarily unable to 
simultaneously have a micro-political, ʻtacticalʼ thrust as well.542 
" Sartre's political philosophy was not concerned with a unitary analysis that 
aimed toward a single goal. May broad-brushes Sartre when he places CDR into the 
strategic camp. He claims that it merely has the same ʻcommon strategic baseʼ as 
structuralist Marxism and so doesnʼt pay specific attention to the details and 
uniqueness of Sartreʼs efforts. Instead he focuses his criticism on Althusser and in 
the process mischaracterizes CDR and ignores a unique contribution to the micro-/
macro-political debate. In CDR, the implications are that there is no center of power. 
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This is the genius of seriality as developed in CDR: it is dispersed diachronically and 
synchronically in such a way that there is no concentricity where power can be 
singularly analyzed. Quoting the great ʻmicro-political thinkerʼ, Michel Foucault: 
[The] mechanisms of power in the Soviet Union – systems of control, of 
surveillance, punishment – are versions of those used on a smaller scale and 
with less consistency by the bourgeoisie as it struggled to consolidate its 
power... One can say to many socialisms, real or dreamt: Between the 
analysis of power in the bourgeois state and the idea of its future withering 
away, there is a missing term – the analysis, criticism, destruction, and 
overthrow of the power mechanism itself [emphasis added].543
It is this last line that is precisely what CDR allows for and what the development of 
the imaginative logic of action equips. 
" Mayʼs hope for the revolution is one where there “is not a change from one 
fundamental form of society to another; rather, it is a change or set of changes 
whose effects sweep across the society, causing changes in many other parts of the 
social domain.”544 Sartre would agree. Clarifying some of his ideas from CDR, he 
once stated that, “The idea of an instant and total liberation is a utopia.”545 This is 
because Sartreʼs philosophy is one that tethers the balance between horizontal 
political action at the local and micro level, but that also seeks incremental 
transformations in the pursuit of large-scale socialist images. The fear of thinkers like 
May and those of his ilk are that global discourses and large-scale projects tend 
toward the centralization of power and authoritarianism. Such projects are also 
supposed to ignore the increased minoritization of the world. And this fear must be 
granted. There can surely be a tendency to dismiss the ever-increasing dispersal of 
needs, desires, demands, etc if grand visions are established as one-size-fits-all. 
This is Sartreʼs criticism of Lukács. But this is why the investigation of CDR is so 
important to continue to undertake and read with fresh eyes. For, it is both concerned 
with the radical concrete individual and the aggregate concerns of the social. It is 
both Kierkegaardian and Marxist. And while certain theorists have seen this 
ideological marriage as a fools errand, once the text is understood as a formal, 
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logical investigation into the conditions of history, all the logical notions developed 
therein resist orthogonal reciprocity and eschew ontological and normative readings 
that encrust the text into an either/or historical camp. In an interview, Sartre once 
claimed that while socialism “may not be able to eliminate all forms of scarcity, 
alienation, necessity, and suffering, we definitely can eliminate some, and this could 
improve conditions of our existence.”546 Sartreʼs notion of an ideal socialism, 
therefore, is not optimistic in a Hegelian way; he does not believe that our progress 
towards that ideal is in any way necessary or guaranteed. But, as Elizabeth 
Butterfield notes, “[Sartre] remains hopeful that we can improve human existence 
incrementally and in taking concrete steps.”547
" Of course, the other side of the micro-/macro-political divide requires that 
incrementality be supplemented by large-scale discourses. In the pursuit of the 
perpetual apocalypse, there must not merely be the hope for a permanent 
revolutionary spirit at the horizontal level. There must simultaneously be grand 
vertical projects that are wielded by imaginative political subjects. Part of the reason 
for this is that micro-politics is too easily re-incorporated back into the clutches of 
Kaironic Seriality. If the rot of this monstrosity infects every dimension of social life, 
then merely planting new gardens on the rocky subsoil will not produce long-term 
fruits. Rather, there needs to be a holistic transformation of the garden itself at every 
level of complexity and variation. As Nik Farrell Fox states, “a true dialectical 
understanding of society, in Sartreʼs view, would make intelligible the ʻmicro-contextsʼ 
of social life and draw these together to see how they continue to affect and in turn 
be affected by the wider ʻmacro-structuresʼ of society.”548 
" Remember that for Sartre it doesnʼt matter ultimately if a group is constituted 
from bottom up or top down – the point for him is to understand the formation of the 
group: how? why? under what conditions? In a practical example, if a corporation 
comes together to implement a new policy to provide, for example, unlimited 
vacation time so long as the employees complete their projects in a timely manner, 
their deliberation and subsequent drafting of new corporate policies resembles the 
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logic of the pledged group. It was a group that emerged out of a larger institutional 
framework and that united various heterogeneous praxes under the common inertia 
of a new pledge. This pledge of course will supplant existing corporate regulations 
and will have far reaching consequences (of which we canʼt go into here). The point 
is that this common praxis (and the subsequent implementation of it and totalization 
of it as it is lived by management and employee alike) emerges and creates a new 
nexus of capacities, exigencies, duties and rights, etc., which can be understood by 
the logic of the organization. So, with respect to this new policy, a new regroupment 
has been effected insofar as it has been driven, in part, by the imaginative logic of 
action. It will have an effect over the larger institutional ossature and activity, but it 
will also retain various levels of seriality within it. Even in the very language of the 
contract itself, which promises to create novel social arrangements, there will be 
serial forces brought into the new phase of corporate development. As such, 
freedom or de-alienation will not be manifest in toto. But there will be a new taste of 
de-alienation and commonality in so far as each person in the social grouping 
practically enacts this new policy with each transaction and with each vacation taken 
and with each assignment completed from outside the office. And it is the 
intelligibility of this new policy – how it emerged, what are its effects, what are the 
mediations that led to its development and how to understand them – that CDR 
allows us to explore, understand, and think. And this is because Sartre develops a 
heuristic to the formal conditions of group arrangements, serial conditions, material 
conditions, group being, class being, etc that we can further formulate and apply in 
various micro and macro contexts. 
" In fact, there are times when Sartre claims that the revolutionary spirit “must 
necessarily reproduce – up to a certain limit – the centralization and coercion of the 
bourgeois state which it is its mission to overthrow.”549 This is because the ultimate 
difference between a serial leader and a revolutionary agitator is one of difference in 
distance and mediation. He states, “In fact, what distinguishes the leader from the 
agitator – apart from the coercive nature of his power – is, frequently, the number of 
mediations which separate him from the group.”550 Therefore, it can be said that the 
ʻlimitʼ that Sartre differentiates between the bourgeois and revolutionary logic has to 
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do with the mediations and the distance between free praxis and centralization. If 
centralization is driven by free praxis – that is, by the imaginative logic of action – 
then it will not infringe upon freedom. Under such circumstances, a political party, for 
example, will fit within the logical schema of the group (most akin to the logical 
iteration of the organization). However, if the centralization is driven by the serial 
logic of inaction, or, what amounts to the same thing, if the centralization of power is 
at a greater mediated distance from free praxis, then the party will perpetuate 
seriality. What all of this means is that both the micro- and the macro-political levels 
of engagement are in themselves benign. They only begin to bear value in the socio-
political arena insofar as they are understood by operating according to either the 
serial logic of inaction or the imaginative logic of action. If the former, then any micro- 
or macro-political endeavor will lead to alienation and/or oppression. And to the 
contrary, if the imaginative logic of action is the mode of praxis that drives socio-
political engagement, then any and all horizontal and vertical engagement will be 
characterized by de-alienation.551 Thus, large-scale visions of imaginative political 
subjects will not in themselves tend towards authoritarianism. In fact, they will retain 
the democratic purity that micro-political theorists so desire. And likewise, the 
imaginative logic of action will actually infuse vitality into the macro-political levels of 
engagement as well, as the latter will become moments or incarnations of what Nick 
Srnicek and Alex Williams call “hyperstitions.” Arguing for both a micro- and macro-
political outlook within Leftist politics, Srnicek and Williams suggest that, “[Progress] 
must be understood as hyperstitional: as a kind of fiction, but one that aims to 
transform itself into a truth. Hyperstitions operate by catalysing dispersed sentiments 
into a historical force that brings the future into existence.”552 Like the images of the 
poetic imagination, hyperstitions must not be merely phantasmic ideals, but must be 
images driven by the imaginative logic of action. They refract the future through the 
present in order to transform the latter in realizing the former. Of course, this 
refraction is not something that is easily determinable. In fact, we have to agree with 
Sartre: “one can only know something is impossible once one has tried it and 
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failed.”553 This means that there is a sense of play and experimentation that must 
govern any hope for the effectiveness of the perpetual apocalypse. 
"
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Conclusion – Final Thoughts and Future Aspirations
C.1 Final Thoughts 
"
" The reason that the logic of the group ends up back in serial conditions is that 
seriality is Infinite. As such, it is never truly overcome (so long as there is scarcity). 
Even in the apocalyptic moment, the freedom that is experienced is freedom in 
relation to a particular threat, not to seriality as such. Culture, language, identity, 
class, race, etc, all still remain, and are interiorized, in the group – in all its phases. 
That is why there is still alienation contained within the inter-subjective relations; it is 
just that fraternity comes to silence it for a while, to direct attention away from its 
presence. This is why there must be a full-scale war against Kaironic Seriality. This is 
why a notion of perpetual apocalypse has use. There is a perpetual small-scale and 
large-scale antagonism required to really combat the monstrosity of Kaironic 
Seriality. Horizontal political uprisings are necessary, but insufficient; global 
economic policies geared towards equality are likewise necessary, but insufficient – 
there must be a perpetual deployment of both local and global, micro- and macro-
political, social, economic, ecological, spiritual, social, artistic, etc actions. 
Imaginative political subjects-in-becoming wield the imaginative logic of action as a 
productive weapon against Kaironic Seriality. This isn't to simply try horizontal tactics 
or micro-political action, but rather, it is a way that we can utilize the horizontal in the 
transformation of subjectivities while we simultaneously create counter-hegemonic 
attacks. 
" Against the common charges of pessimism leveled against Sartre's circularity, 
it is crucial to note that while, yes, there are moments of circularity in CDR from 
series to group to series, even this isn't a mere repetition of the same. As Sartre likes 
to speak of the spiral movement where men pass the 'same' moment, he also notes 
that this spiral passing takes place at varying “levels of integration and 
complexity.”554 Thus, when Chiodi says that de-alienation merely has the ʻtemporal 
dimension of an instantʼ what he is failing to assess are the transformative effects of 
the apocalypse and the spontaneous upsurge of freedom in real material terms. By 
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remaining at the level of the abstract, he fails to consider the diachronic, synchronic, 
and thus Kaironic effects of this evental logic, as there is literally a shift from one 
dispensation to another – in qualitative terms. For, in the lives of real material beings, 
in their unique individuality, there are micro-psychobiological shifts that radically 
transform them as they move through life to the next stage(s) of life. Likewise, the 
evental logic also produces real material effects on the broad cultural and political 
landscape. Thus, even in the logic of circularity, there is a variegating intensity that 
can't be ignored: an affective transformative power that creates new unbounded 
situations of life from which further complex layerings of serial-group-serial-group 
relations will unfold, which themselves will produce profound breaks or fissures in the 
politico-historical landscape. 
" Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason is a heuristic to establish a living logic. 
As such, it isn't normative or ontological per se. Rather, it is a moment of praxis that 
itself must be taken up and used. That is, it is an emergent tool – i.e. a hypo-logic – 
that is to be applied to various specific contexts as is fitting. For, the insights 
contained therein are open and applicable to various contextual attachments. In the 
course of this project, we have endeavored to do just that. In the creative analysis of 
the logical constructions of CDR, and by exploring the logic of the poetic imagination, 
we have developed an imaginative logic of action that can aid imaginative political 
subjects-in-becoming in the perpetual creation of society. However, with that said, so 
long as seriality is the dominant force that defines human relations, it will necessarily 
characterize the human itself as inhuman. Thus there must be a sort of mortification 
of sin, a self-directed war to overcome the power of the monstrous serial logic that 
dominates the destinies of inhuman bodies under global capitalist domination. 
However, lest one suppose this is a simple morality tale, it must be emphasized that 
this transformation of self isn't merely an individual pursuit. Rather, it is a group 
effort. It is a collective antagonism directed against the dominant age but that is 
awakened within, as it is always the opportune moment to act. And in this sense the 
transformation of life and society is most assuredly an experiment. But it is also a 
science, a politics, an economics, a social theory – and just as equally, it is an art.
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C.2 Future Aspirations: The Problem of History and The Paradoxico-Critical 
Orientation
" The above does not resolve certain aporia (some of which Sartre himself was 
aware) that we would be remiss to ignore. This is not the space to resolve these 
issues entirely, but signaling a way forward, both from within a position of fidelity to 
the ends of the present project and also by drawing from peripheral concerns, we 
can intimate trajectories for further study. 
" At the end of Volume One, Sartre prepares to shift tack for further 
investigation into anthropological history. Whereas Volume One is concerned with 
the intelligibility of the elementary formal structures of history, Volume Two concerns 
itself with the intelligibility of history as such. In his original “Preface” to SM and CDR 
Volume One, he states that Volume Two would investigate the “problem of 
totalisation itself, that is to say, of History in its development and of Truth in its 
becoming.”555 This problem of history to which he refers pertains to the relation 
between the multiplicity of totalizations which compose history and the totalization of 
totalizations. He is explicit about this in the final pages of Volume One where he 
begins to formulate his conceptions of the singular-universal, totalization-of-
envelopment, and practical temporalization that would become crucial to formulating 
the problem of history and all this entails. He foreshadows this endeavor when he 
avers that, “History is intelligible if the different practices which can be found and 
located at a given moment of the historical temporalisation finally appear as partially 
totalising and as connected and merged in their very oppositions and diversities by 
an intelligible totalisation from which there is no appeal.”556 Merging these ʻdifferent 
practicesʼ (i.e. totalizations) in their ʻoppositions and diversitiesʼ becomes problematic 
for Sartre because these different practices emerge in a milieu of scarcity. The result 
of the latter is that scarcity is interiorized by totalization thereby creating human-
scarcity (or in the language of this project ʻinhumansʼ). This creates a condition of 
humanity that is defined as negation; the negation of ʻmanʼ that was discussed 
earlier. Therefore, because humanity is inhumanity, negation of negation is the de 
facto struggle against human-scarcity. This means that violence and struggle 
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become the de facto statut from which praxis totalizes. ʻViolenceʻ here does not 
necessarily have moral or ethical undertones. In fact, it is better to suggest that, in its 
basic sense, violence is a formal, logical construct that makes intelligible the 
historical activity of praxis in the milieu of scarcity.557 With that in mind, one would not 
be blamed for supposing the inter-subjective pessimism of BN has snuck in the back 
door of his materialist investigation. However, it would be a disservice to reduce 
Sartreʼs development of violence to the phenomenological conflict of the mode 
being-for-others. Instead, violence, as the intelligibility of the negation of negation, 
has more substantive value.
" As the title of the opening chapter of Volume Two intimates, the real value of 
understanding violence in its relation to history is that it brings focus to whether 
violence is merely an irreducible rift or a moment of totalization. That is, is violence, 
therefore, the irreducible competition of projects transcending one another in 
ontological conflict as his earlier phenomenological ontology suggests, or is there a 
productive sense in which violence is a moment of totalization? This ʻproductive 
senseʼ is what he indicates in the closing pages of Volume One when he states that 
the different practices appear as ʻconnected and merged in their oppositions and 
diversities by an intelligible totalisationʼ. His claim is that the field of conflictual 
totalizations are not mere isolated projects externally related. Rather, there is a 
sense in which this field of totalizations interpenetrates in a unity of inconsistency. 
" Relatedly, prior to his brilliant analysis of the boxing match in Volume Two, he 
asks the pertinent question, “If the plurality of epicentres is a real condition of two 
opposed intelligibilities... how could there be one dialectical intelligibility of the 
ongoing process?”558 In other words, how can we speak about a totalization of 
totalizations if each totalization itself is a plurality of totalizations within totalizations? 
Further, how can we speak about unity, wholes, singular events at all, if everything is 
in a process of becoming? Such historical objects can be viewed externally as 
abstract totalities. This is precisely what analytical reason does when it analyzes the 
details of past historical events. However, when viewed from this perspective, the 
event is not understood in its dialectical intelligibility. In order for the latter to take 
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hold, the event must be mined for its various singularities which incarnate the 
universal. This means that each singularity of any given event must be understood 
as a singular-universal, or a universal singularized.
" The singular-universal is Sartreʼs notion for how the singularities of a given 
moment of totalization are not isolated parts of a whole. They are compressed points 
of enveloping History writ large – totalization-of-envelopment. He describes the 
singular-universal as operating according to two dialectical procedures: 1) centripetal 
and 2) centrifugal.
“On the one hand, a procedure of decompressive expansion which starts off 
from the object to arrive at everything, following the order of significations. [... 
On] the other hand, a procedure of totalizing compression which, by contrast, 
grasps the centripetal movement of all the significations attracted and 
condensed in the event or in the object.”559 
It is this latter procedure of compression which grasps ʻall the significations attracted 
and condensed in the event or in the objectʼ that is most crucial for decoding 
dialectical intelligibility. Both are necessary, but the universal singularized is what 
unites totalizations and the totalization-of-envelopment. And as Aronson notes, for 
Sartre, the stakes of determining the validity of this procedure are veritably high, as 
the entire project of seeking the dialectical intelligibility of history relies on it: “it is of 
the very nature of the dialectic that it can be methodologically validated only if it is 
substantively true, and it is substantively true only if history itself turns out to cohere 
as a totalization of envelopment.”560 We will not engage with the details of this 
provocation, for, to do so would require a complete separate project. However, 
expanding a related concern in the present project, there is a metacritical question 
that can point towards such future exploration. 
" Undergirding the investigation into the single meaning of history is the 
presupposition that history is singular. This is what Aronson flags when he claims 
that Sartreʼs project depends on the coherence of history as totalization-of-
envelopment. This does not mean that history is a closed totality. But it does imply 
that there is a sense in which to speak about the validity of dialectical intelligibility 
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there must be a way to understand it as being whole, or at least whole adjacent. As 
such, we are once again on the terrain of the relation between thought and Being 
that was discussed in Chapter One with regard to Livingstonʼs orientations of 
thought. Grouping Sartre within the Paradoxico-Critical orientation gives impetus to a 
discussion about the intelligibility of history that seems to have stalled in many ways. 
By framing CDR within the Paradoxico-Critical orientation, the perceived ʻproblem of 
historyʼ revealed by the interpenetrative relation between totalizations and 
totalization-of-envelopment dissipates. There is no concern with trying to reconcile 
contradictions or inconsistencies in determining the single meaning of History. 
Rather, these inconsistencies and contradictions themselves play at the surface of 
the limit of history as such and thereby define the meanings and significations that 
emerge within these limits. The singular-universal, therefore, becomes less 
conceptual and more notional (in the Sartrean sense). It becomes a productive 
paradoxical and critical heuristic that reveals the relations between the whole and the 
parts insofar as it makes this relation intelligible in both its centripetal and centrifugal 
movements. Thus, further study into the implications that Livingston draws out from 
the Paradoxico-Critical orientation seems quite promising. Particularly, in what ways 
can the Paradoxico-Critical orientation help to frame dialectical reason in such a way 
that it can positively build political programs? That is, rather than denying the 
existence of a world of worlds in the service of a subtractive political schematic (à la 
Badiou or Prozorov561), how can dialectical reason work within a framework which 
affirms the existence of a disjunctive totality where the relations between parts and 
whole infuse one another, co-constitute one another, and perpetually redefine the 
meanings derived from these various relations?
C.3 Future Aspirations: A Prolegomena to Any Future Political Economy 
" A second area for future study opened up by the present project would be a 
reexamination of the critique of political economy from within decidedly Sartrean 
terms. As Matthew Ally has described it, CDR provides a ʻmetacritiqueʼ of 
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capitalism.562 Fleshing out the specifics of what this metacritique would mean for 
political economy from within the hypo-logical reading elaborated here would mean 
that a regressive-progressive synthetic analysis using Sartrean methodology and 
terms could shed new light onto persistent problems. This approach has great 
resonance with the metastructural project of Jacques Bidet, whose Exploring Marxʼs 
Capital and Foucault with Marx563 cover much of the same terrain. Not wishing to 
retread the same territory however, there are three interrelated areas that are most 
promising for this future project:
1) Capitalism is a Scarcity-producing Machine:
" J.W. Mason has recently argued that the financial system determines “what 
new projects will get a share of societyʼs resources, and suspend — or enforce — 
the ʻjudgment of the marketʼ on money-losing enterprises.”564 The suggestion here is 
that capitalism is not merely a system of responding to preexistent desires (supplying 
consumer demand). It is also, and perhaps most paramount, a cultural system which 
produces desire, and thus need. So while there is a sense in which supply meets 
demand, such demand has first been created through the various machinations of 
production. As such, capitalism is essentially a creative and imaginative project. 
However, such imagination is conditioned by limitations that are endemic to the 
capitalist logic itself (think ʻserial logic of inactionʼ). That is, it can only create towards 
the end of producing scarcity. This might seem counter-intuitive in an age that is 
often designated ʻpost-scarcityʼ. However, discussions about post-scarcity often fail 
to consider luxury desires and needs as being crucial to the human project under the 
logic of capitalism. Sure, there are enough resources and there is enough 
mechanical and digital acumen to feed, clothe, house, and hydrate the planet. 
Unfortunately, we arenʼt Epicureans. We need that new iPhone. We crave more 
subscribers, followers, likes. We must accumulate more social-symbolic capital. This 
234
562 Ally, 282.
563 Jacques Bidet, Exploring Marxʼs Capital: Philosophical, Economic and Political Dimensions, trans. 
David Fernbach (Leiden, Brill, 2007) and Foucault with Marx, trans. Steven Corcoran (London, Zed 
Books, 2016). 
564 J.W. Mason, “Socialize Finance,” Jacobin, November 28, 2016, https://www.jacobinmag.com/
2016/11/finance-banks-capitalism-markets-socialism-planning/.
is where Keynes got it wrong. He thought humans have a fixed amount of wants, that 
human nature is essentially limited.565 In a different register, this is also where 
Augustine and Pascal get it wrong. Although they admit to a limitless depth of desire, 
their essentialist narrative places the relation between lack and fulfillment in a static 
binary between the infinite lack of the self and the infinite abundance of the Divine. 
Both the Keynesian model and the Augustinian/Pascalian model manufacture false 
expectations about social (and individual) well-being because they think human 
desire is natural rather than constructed by social conditions.
" One thing the creative capacities of capitalism have taught us is that there is 
no end to want (contra Keynes); not because of a necessary lack (à la Augustine/
Pascal) – for this implies that there is a potential prescription for fulfillment – but 
because of an open disposition that is perpetually being stimulated and recreated. 
Thus, new desires emerge as we are being constructed afresh through the 
overproduction of goods and values. In other words, this means that capitalism 
doesn't encourage pre-existent wants but creates them. In short: capitalism creates 
scarcity. It is the toddler whose legs canʼt keep up with the rest of her body. Again 
and again, she tries to walk towards mom, but her momentum and gravity result in a 
terrific crash. Alone on the floor, seemingly miles from her satisfaction, she cries, 
frustrated and scared. In order for her to reach her mom, she must learn. She must 
grow. She must develop. She must change. 
" Without pressing the metaphor beyond its useful scope, what is instructive 
from the picture above is that there is, likewise, a problem intrinsic to the present 
state of affairs. Things arenʼt running in accordance with our desires. In fact, our 
system is working against us. We reproduce our own perpetual dissatisfaction by 
producing for the market. As such, we reproduce a condition of socio-economic 
crisis. By creating scarcity, the logic of the market – and we, as we appropriate such 
conditions and live them – structure social life such that our brand is crisis. This 
leads to the second point. 
2) Practico-inert and Seriality:
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" If it is the case that the productive mechanisms of capitalism produce scarcity, 
then Sartreʼs investigation into the practico-inert and seriality would be useful in 
developing a ʻserial theory of economicsʼ. An increase in automobile production, for 
example, requires an increase in rubber/steel/electronics/engineering/etc production. 
It also requires an increase in road construction, which itself requires an increase in 
paint for lines to be drawn, concrete and asphalt, machinery to build the roads, etc. 
This leads to an increase in pollution, which requires techniques for cleaning air, new 
tech for making cars less pollutant, etc, etc, etc. John Kenneth Galbraith calls this 
'social balance' (with this term, he is also interested in the relation between public 
and private services here – Ex. More cars means more cops, more pollution 
regulation, etc).566 Sartre would call it 'counter-finality'. 
" This chain of social balance is a result of demands, or exigencies, being 
placed on the production process. As such, the economy is essentially driven by this 
pluridimensional process of the production of practico-inert objects. There is a sense 
in which the production process is constrained; it is predestined by the exigencies 
placed on it by the production of previous goods and services. In this sense, even 
economic innovation is constrained. It is conditioned by the demands placed upon it 
by the process of production. But then new production creates new parameters, new 
conditions of exigency.
" Further, the idea that the practico-inert, as a molecular dispersal, is a complex 
mediating network of constitutive forces reintroduces the notion of Kaironic Seriality. 
The larger the practico-inert field gets, the deeper and more potent these constitutive 
forces become. This means that the very movement of totalization, as praxis 
objectifies itself, creates deeper and more potent conditions of its own alienation. As 
the milieu of scarcity is reproduced through praxis' transcending of the situation, 
Kaironic Seriality increases.
" One way of looking at this is through the material mediation of personalized 
commodities. As commodities moved from one size fits all (the famous Fordist line, 
"They can have any color they want, so long as its black"), to hyper-personalized in 
the 80s,567 so too has the stringency of control increased. Far from providing material 
freedom à la Libertarian logic, this hyper-personalization builds inhuman subjects 
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from the ground up through externally derived desires and identities that are fed to 
consumers through marketing, public relations, and the capitalist mode of production 
itself. Thus, what we get is a field of practico-inert mediators (in this instance 
commodities) that thoroughly constitute our very subjectivities. The result is that 
seriality, as the social effect of the deepening of practico-inert mediation, increases 
exponentially.
" No one is born preferring Toyota over Honda. No one is born desiring an 
iPhone. These are constructed desires, constituted by the productive social forces of 
a particular socio-economic and historical regime. As such, the very preferences we 
exhibit, the very desires we express, are constituted by the constitutive mediatory 
power of the practico-inert field. This is what creates 'men of scarcity'. We are 
constituted, under such conditions, as inhuman because the dominating logic that 
determines our social life is a serial logic of inaction. In this way, we can speak of 
inhumanity as under the control mechanisms of the conditioning regime of seriality. 
This control is not tyrannical. Rather, it is insidious and deceptive. It does not stand 
over and above as a transcendent Other imposing demands from the outside. 
Instead, it is immanent to (or as) the very social processes that condition life in this 
history, creating demands that emerge within the network of social relations itself. 
This disguises its power, making it seem as the spontaneous and free result of 
individuals who, in point of fact, ʻself-domesticateʼ themselves in their own alienation.
" What is important about this is that CDR becomes read as explicitly political-
economic. This analysis of seriality would be an investigation into the political 
economy of capitalism-as-serial. Much like Bidet's reading of Foucault and Marx, the 
hypo-logic of CDR opens up the possibility to explore both the proprietor-power 
relation and the reproduction of class relationships within the power relations 
conditioned by knowledge-power regimes of hegemony. Sartre's main concern, 
however, is the ways in which this hegemony-as-seriality alienates, the extent to 
which it alienates, under what conditions serial regimes of hegemony emerge and 
take hold, and the possibility of such hegemony being torn asunder.
" Therefore, a deep analysis of the relation between commodities as practico-
inert mediators and social relations would be highly beneficial both for the future of 
Sartre studies and for the broader field of political economy. Not only will physical 
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commodities and services need to be explored, but there seems to be a logic of the 
commodification of social life that could be further explored through a Sartrean lens. 
3) Theories of Value and Inequality:
" This opens up the possibility of third path of inquiry. Not only is scarcity 
produced, but it is also a relational term. It implies that there is not enough of 
something. But this something only matters in relation to the person or community 
that desires said good or service. As such, scarcity is not a de jure fact of life, but an 
historically contingent (de facto) condition of social relations. This means that 
scarcity is a designation of value. Things are deemed scarce if a person or 
community does not have access to (or enough of) the good or service. But one only 
desires such a good or service if there is supposed value in the good or service in 
question. This is why an exploration of Sartrean scarcity is crucial to investigate 
value in new terms. We must seek to understand why we value certain items. How is 
value determined? What does value mean? When we say we value something or 
that something has value, what is this indicating? One way to approach this (and to 
be clear, this not the only way, but merely an example) is through a renewed relation 
between theories of value and inequality.
" The qualitative relation between inequality and objective theories of value has 
received very little attention outside fringe Marxian circles. On the other hand, 
quantitative measurements of wealth inequality have taken center stage in recent 
years. The conclusion derived from the data is that wealth inequality is increasing 
exponentially.568 Economically, this increase in inequality has been identified as one 
primary source of stagnated aggregate demand.569 And while it does seem to be the 
case that the warnings of Piketty, Stiglitz, Saez, Atkinson, and others of their ilk 
ought to be heeded, there is very little attention paid to the quality of inequality. Frank 
Stilwell has sought to analyze inequality while paying attention to demographic and 
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regional/spatial concerns. Yet, even this approach neglects a deep qualitative focus. 
In other words, what is missing in these accounts are investigations into the 
substance of inequality which then limits what might be more accurate measures for 
investigating its variegating intensities. 
" Quantitative measures of wealth inequality have use diagrammatically. That 
is, they are able to homogenize abstractions in asymmetrical economic relations to a 
degree, and provide useful indexes for understanding economic realities. However, 
they are insufficient in that they do not have any way of measuring the intensity or 
magnitude of inequality in socioeconomic or politico-economic terms. This project 
would seek to correct this through a renewed analysis of objective theories of value 
in relation to inequality. The question governing the entire process would be 
(following the hypo-logic of CDR): under what conditions does inequality reproduce 
asymmetrical social relations? 
" This would require (at least?) three subparts within the larger project. The first 
part of this project would be a re-imagining of the labor theory of value (LTV). The 
second part would have to establish the connection between this re-imagining and 
inequality. And finally, the third part would discuss the consequences of inequality 
from within the newly established paradigm. 
" Jacques Bidet has stated that, for Marx, the LTV is not merely a quantitative 
category (though it is), but also must be understood as a theory of class struggle.570 
In this sense, what Marx established was an objective theory of value that explained 
the asymmetrical social relations of early industrial capitalism. Far from a secondary 
matter for understanding the political economy of capitalist societies, Marxʼs LTV 
provides a framework for understanding the very substance of value as negative and 
creative. It is negative in that it negates the particularity of labor by homogenizing 
labor-power into abstract labor. It is creative in that labor-power produces value by 
imbuing commodities with human praxis. This labor power is extracted in the 
creation of commodities by minimizing the value of labor power (through devaluation 
and the wage mechanism) and increasing the output of labor power as much as 
possible (both in terms of duration and intensity). This is what creates the 
asymmetrical property-power relations between the bourgeois and proletariat. The 
goal of capitalism then becomes the cyclical extraction of value in order to produce 
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surplus-value so that more value can be extracted and then reproduced as surplus-
value ad infinitum – which results in the reproduction of class struggle.
" As much as mainstream economics is skeptical of Marx, Marxists are too 
often overly dismissive of his classical interlocutors regarding LTV. Much research 
has been done on Marxʼs criticism and expansion of Ricardo.571 And it is generally 
just assumed that Marx inverted Smithʼs LTV. For Smith, commodities have value as 
they 'command' a particular quantity of labor in order to buy it (exigency). Ricardo 
and Marx, by contrast, suggest that value isn't derived from the labor-exigency of the 
commodity but by the amount of labor needed for production. However, this course 
of study would investigate in what ways these supposed disparate ideas are actually 
co-imbricated; that value is determined by the dialectical relationship between both 
the exigency of the commodity and the expenditure of labor-power. This will provide 
the substance of a qualitative analysis of inequality. This is crucial in the 
establishment of a re-imagined relation between LTV and inequality. If surplus-value 
is the extraction of labor-power in the creation of profit, which then conditions value 
tout court, then in what ways does this process condition social inequality itself? The 
hope is that one need not be a ʻMarxistʼ in order to argue that inequality has a 
substantial basis within a matrix of objective theories of value, but that rather, the 
usefulness of LTV is precisely in that it grounds inequality in the very structure of 
socioeconomic modalities that exist under a capitalist regime of hegemony; and that 
ultimately, what neoliberalism perpetuates through financialization, exploitative 
globalization, and inefficient capital-output ratios (ICOR) is the deepening of social 
inequality through the stratification of social capital.
" Therefore, if it is true that surplus-value conditions value under the capitalist 
mode of production, then any understanding of inequality will benefit from the 
analysis of the process of valorization that is tied to the relation between objective 
theories of value and to problems of inequality, as inequality reproduces 
asymmetrical relations of social power. These asymmetrical relations of power, in 
turn, reproduce social stratification by concentrating social capital within certain 
social tiers and restricting it from others. The gap between the rich and the poor is 
manifest in a radical isolation between those at the top from those at the bottom. 
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Those with social capital are given power and status that is not afforded those 
without it. What is more, through the consumption of lower-value commodities, 
persons and communities appropriate corresponding habits of social status. One of 
the results of this is the deepening of socioeconomic tiers. These tiers harden, 
making social mobility problematic, if not impossible. 
" David Tuckett has described about how emotion influences economic decision 
making.572 In the creation of affective a priori, Tuckettʼs research shows how the 
unconscious appropriation of these social tiers conditions thoughts, feelings, and 
action – which problematizes things further by creating structures of thought, feeling, 
and action that determine individual and social options (cf. social logic of inaction). 
This process has a larger cultural effect in that those able to consume higher-value 
commodities are given more status and thus power within a marketized society. As 
such, as these habitual relations are deepened over time and intensified through 
complex cross-sectional global networks of relations, the asymmetry of social 
relations exponentially increases, creating further divides in inequality. This leads to 
the perpetual reproduction of asymmetrical social relations. Therefore, by 
understanding the logic of the practico-inert field and its constitutive power of 
mediation in Kaironic Seriality, a prolegomena to any future political economy would 
explore the causes and effects of this reproduction of asymmetrical social relations, 
and through the imaginative logic of action theorize ways to break the cycle.
" These are two just examples within a field of possibility that is yet wide open. 
Critique of Dialectical Reason is an under-appreciated and underutilized text. The 
riches it still has to offer have yet to be mined. Hopefully this project as a whole and 
the signposts in the “Conclusion” will inspire theorists to think inventively alongside a 
Sartre yet to be rediscovered. 
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Glossary of Terms
Affect
Affect refers to pre-personal, pre-subjective experience. It does not refer to 
emotion or feelings. Rather, affect refers to interaction and encounters that 
stimulate bodily responses. It most corresponds to Spinozaʼs affectus as 
interpreted by Deleuze.573 
Analytical Reason
Analytical Reason investigates the world by separating the observer from the 
observed. The observed is analyzed as a sequence of externalities, much like 
mathematical variables. Sartre attributes analytical reason to Positivist 
Rationalists and Positivist Marxists. It is a relativism insofar as analytical 
reason can only observe relative parts of an externally autonomous Reason. It 
corresponds with the Constructivist orientation of thought. 
Apocalypse
This term is derived from Malrauxʼs Days of Hope (sometimes translated as 
Manʼs Hope). In the novel, it refers to the fraternity of unwavering hope among 
soldiers in hopeless circumstances who cannot but fight their way out of 
hopelessness. In Critique of Dialectical Reason, apocalypse is the term that 
describes the awakening of humanity out of the inhuman conditions of serial 
existence. 
Dialectic of Nature
The dialectic of nature is a theory of the dialectic as an Eternal Reason. It is a 
law that determines all human interaction and physico-chemical processes. 
Sartre argues that the dialectic of nature is a ʻmetaphysical hypothesisʼ. It 
corresponds with the Constructivist orientation of thought.
Dialectical Reason
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573 Gilles Deleuze, “Lectures on Spinoza,” http://deleuzelectures.blogspot.ie/2007/02/on-spinoza.html.
Dialectical Reason is defined in contradistinction to analytical reason. Sartre 
refers to it as the ʻlaw of intelligibilityʼ. This means that dialectical reason is the 
rational structure of Being, the logic of totalization. It is derived squarely from 
the relation between ʻmen and matterʼ. As humans overcome conditions of 
scarcity, the movement towards the next moment of objectification is 
dialectical reason. It is not reducible to abstract thinking (although thought is a 
moment of praxis, a moment of dialectical movement). Rather, for Sartre, 
dialectical reason is lived (le vécu). This is why he refers to it as the ʻliving 
logic of actionʼ. It accords with the Paradoxico-Critical orientation of thought. 
Empathy
Empathy is not to be understood with regard to compassion or feeling in any 
sense. It refers to a contagious, affective (i.e. unconscious and automatic) 
vicarious experience of a common goal. Empathy is what characterizes the 
fusion of the group. 
Formal
Formal refers to the many grouped as one. A formal construct is one in which 
a multiplicity is united into a singular category. Critique of Dialectical Reason 
is a formal investigation in that it seeks to encompass the manifold of lived 
experienced under particular conditions into simple, abstract logical concepts. 
These concepts are considered formal in that they contain the many in the 
one; the many are not reduced to the one. In this way, the one opens up to 
the infinite constellation of meanings contained within it. These formal 
concepts are historicized a priori. They are both the result and condition of 
dialectical totalization.  
Infinite Seriality
Infinite Seriality is Sartreʼs terms for the confluence of horizontal and vertical 




Kaironic Seriality has a dual meaning. It describes the social fact of existence 
by calling the age of capitalist hegemony Impossible, and simultaneously 
declares that it is never not the opportune moment to act in antagonism to 
serial power structures. Whereas Infinite Seriality is purely descriptive, 
Kaironic Seriality is descriptive insofar as it identifies the stakes of inhuman 
serial existence as the Impossible, and it is prescriptive insofar as it is the 
formal fact that this impossibility is no longer possible. It is not Sartreʼs term, 
but the authorʼs. It is a useful construct insofar as it serves the ends of this 
project by clearly nominating a foe that must be perpetually negated through 
vigilant action.
Logic
Logic in Critique of Dialectical Reason means ʻintelligibilityʼ. It is the sense of 
the elemental formal structures. While not identical to dialectical reason, logic 
cannot ever be understood apart from dialectical reason. 
Mediation
There is always mediation between a person and the conditions into which s/
he is thrown. One is not self-sufficient, but must look outside oneself in order 
to survive. Breathing air, walking on various terrain, using tools, speaking 
words: all of these demonstrate that the human condition is necessarily a 
mediatory condition. There is no such thing as immediacy in real material 
terms.
Orientations of Thought
" Transcendent/Onto-Theological: any position that views the totality of what 
" " can be known within a set limit that is dependent upon a transcendent 
" " beyond which itself is ineffable, superlative, and groundless. Ex. 
" " Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas.  
" Constructivist: delimits all that is sayable or sensical while remaining outside 
" " of that totality. Ex. Kant, Russell, Carnap, Ayer, Foucault, analytical 
" " reason, dialectic of nature. 
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" Generic: Alain Badiouʼs self-designation. Any self-referential position that 
" " recognizes the paradoxes of totality and thus denies the being of 
" " totality as such in favor of infinite worlds. When given the choice 
" " between completeness and consistency, this orientation chooses 
" " consistency. Ex. Badiou, Gabriel. 
" Paradoxico-Critical: Paul Livingstonʼs addition to the three orientations that 
" " Badiou articulates. Any position that recognizes the paradoxes of 
" " self-reflexivity but does not reject totality as such. When given the 
" " choice between completeness and consistency, this orientation 
" " chooses completeness. Ex. Deleuze, Derrida, Agamben.
Praxis
Praxis is the logic of human activity. Sartre refers to praxis and totalization in 
interchangeable terms, with nuances differentiating them based on the 
context of the discussion. Similarly, praxis is dialectical reason, the lived of the 
living logic of action. It describes human activity in its perpetual interiorization 
and exteriorization of the situation into which it is thrown at any and every 
given moment. Praxis is not generic action. It is the re-organization of the 
material environment through totalization. 
Subjectivity
Subjectivity has two senses: 
1) It is part of the process of totalization. It is described, in mereological 
terms, as a system of interiority. 
2) It is the gap between interiorization and exteriorization, the 
differential. It is the spark of life initiated by the apocalypse. 
These two senses are not contradictory, but envelop one another. The first 
sense is the abstract logic of totalization. The second is the particular motive 
force of the former. Under inhuman conditions, the second sense is dormant 
and must be awakened by the apocalypse. But this language is merely an 
abstraction. In real material terms, subjectivity is never entirely dormant. 
Sartreʼs point is to describe how and why subjectivity emerges under 
conditions of serial alienation. 
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Telepathy
This does not refer to extra-sensory perception. Telepathy, in our usage, is the 
real, material, contagious spread of affect in the group-in-fusion. 
Totality
Totality is a correlative of the imagination. Sartre refers to totality as being 
practico-inert. He argues that reason conditioned by closed totalities (à la 
Lukács) leads to dogmatic insensitivity to the multiplicity. 
Totalization
In contradistinction to totality, totalization is an open-ended process. This is 
the unceasing movement of dialectical reason. If totality is a correlative of the 
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